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IRISH 1798 COLLECTION

Gerald T. Elliott.

ON THE
DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

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ON THE
DEFENCE OF IRELAND;

INCLUDING

OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OTHER SUBJECTS
CONNECTED THEREWITH.

BY THE LATE

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR HENRY SHEEHY KEATING, K.C.B.

[THEN (1795) LIEUTENANT KEATING.]

WITH NOTES, AND AN

APPENDIX

ON CERTAIN MILITARY PRINCIPLES USEFUL FOR THE
BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE TEXT;

TOGETHER WITH

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR.

DUBLIN:

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Si Saraceni, injuriis fatigati, ab eis (Siculis) cæperint dissidere, et castellas forte maritime, vel montanas munitiones occupaverent; ut hinc cum Theutonicis summa virtute pugnandum. Illinc Saracenis crebris insultibus occurrendum, quid putas acturi sunt inter has depressi angustias, et velut inter malleum et incudem constituti?

EDITOR'S PREFACE;

(CONTAINING A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE AUTHOR.)

The Pamphlet now reprinted was first published in the year 1795. It attracted at the time no little attention; and it has ever since been regarded with so much interest that copies of it have long been much sought after, not only by collectors of rare pamphlets, but by the thinking portion of the public in Ireland in general. It is reprinted here, word for word,—except the Second Chapter, (see p. 9,) which would be totally uninteresting to the modern reader, because the observations of which it entirely consists are all of them only applicable to the material circumstances of a past generation, and wholly inapplicable to those of the present time. An APPENDIX has been added, (p. 101,) containing full and it is hoped simple explanations of the various Military Principles alluded to in the text, and of terms which without explanation would probably be found unintelligible by the unprofessional reader; and at the end of this Appendix an ADDITIONAL NOTE will be found, (p. 136,) taken from the works of the late illustrious General Sir Charles J. Napier, G.C.B., containing much valuable criticism and many practical observations upon the same interesting subject.

Concerning the life and career of the Author of the Pamphlet, the present Editor has been favoured with a Memorandum by one of the most distinguished authorities upon Irish Military History, the well-known author of the "Green Book,"* and Editor (for the Archæological Society) of Col. O'Kelly's "Ma-

* "*The Green Book; or Gleanings from the Writing-Desk of a Literary Agitator.*" By John Cornelius O'Callaghan. Dublin: T. O'Gorman; 1841; (480 pp.) [A Second Edition (greatly improved) was published, in 1844, by Mr. James Duffy, Wellington Quay.]

cariae Excidium,"*—John Cornelius O'Callaghan, Esq.,—to the completion of whose long expected "History of the Irish Brigade" the public of Ireland look forward with so much interest. Some of the dates recorded, will perhaps excite surprise, when it is remembered, that at the beginning of the present century, the superior ranks of the British Army were closed to the Catholic soldier,—and General Keating was a Catholic. It is an interesting fact, that he was the *first* Catholic who rose to command in that Army for many generations; and he did so, it is said, in consequence of a mistake on the part of the Government of the day as to the religion of the hero, whom they hastily promoted, on occasion of extraordinary services in the East as they would have promoted a Protestant officer, only discovering when it was too late (for a formal announcement in Parliament could not well be retracted) that he did not belong to the favoured persuasion.

The late SIR HENRY SHEEHY KEATING, K.C.B., entered the English Army, as an Ensign, in 1793, his first commission bearing date Aug. 31, in that year. The dates of his subsequent promotions and appointments are as follows: Lieutenant, Jan. 3, 1794; Captain, Sept. 8, 1796; Major, Sept. 3, 1800; Lieutenant-Colonel, Aug. 1, 1804; Colonel, June 4, 1813; Major-General, Aug. 12, 1819; Lieutenant-General, Jan. 10, 1837. He was named a Knight Commander of the Bath in 1836; and on April 4, 1845, he was appointed to the Colonelcy of the 33d Foot. He died at Cheltenham, in England, Sept. 12, 1847, at the age of 70.

Of General Keating's services (to the English Crown) Mr. O'Callaghan's Memorandum notes the following: he was sent with the expedition under Sir Charles Grey to the West Indies, shortly after he entered the army; he landed at Martinique early in 1794; he was present at the affair of La Trinité, at the attack of Mont Rouge, and at M^{ont} Calabasse, where his sword-arm was broken by a musket-shot; and he was also engaged at the defence of Berville Camp, when, his skull being fractured by a shell, he was made prisoner; he was kept on board a French prison-ship for eighteen months, and he was three months afterwards still a close

* "*Macariae Excidium*, or The Destruction of 'Cyprus,' being a Secret History of the War of the Revolution in Ireland, (1688-1891); by Colonel Charles O'Kelly." Edited, from four English copies, and a Latin MS. in the Royal Irish Academy,—with Notes, Illustrations, and a Memoir of the Author and his descendants,—by John Cornelius O'Callaghan. Dublin: For the Irish Archæological Society, 1850; (556 pp.).

prisoner at Rochelle. In 1807, when a Lieutenant-Colonel, he went to the East Indies. In 1809 he, with Commodore Rowley, planned the attack upon and succeeded in the capture of the town and shipping of Saint Paul's, in the Island of Bourbon. In 1810, in command of 5,000 men, he conquered that island, reducing the garrison to be prisoners of war, and making himself master of their arms, ammunition, and *materiel*. He afterwards commanded the advance of the army in an attack upon the Isle of France (Mauritius), and was wounded in the arm by a sword-thrust. For his services in that part of the East the East India Company presented him with a piece of plate of the value of five hundred guineas.

The Editor is further informed by Mr. O'Callaghan, that he believes Sir Henry Keating was married to a sister of the Right Rev. Dr. Singer, (formerly S.F.T.C.D., and afterwards Protestant Bishop of Meath), by whom he had one or two sons ;—that one of Sir Henry's sisters, married to the late Commissioner Therry, was the mother of the present Hon. Roger Therry, late Chief Justice of Sidney ;—and that another sister, named Theodosia, was in 1790 at the same school with Mr. O'Callaghan's mother, in Cork Convent. Mr. O'Callaghan adds, that the late Roger Sheehy Keating, who was married to a sister of Lady Kenmare, was an elder brother of General Sir Henry Keating.

AUTHOR'S ADVERTISEMENT ;

TO THE READER.

THE Author is sensible that the following sheets require more correction than it has been in his power to bestow on them. The observations they contain might have been arranged more methodically, and deduced more coherently. Strongly impressed with the perilous situation of the country, [1794,] and in the habit of meditating on the train and vicissitude of human events, he is convinced that there is nothing possible which may not be apprehended. It does not seem bad reasoning to say, that whatever has happened elsewhere similar causes may produce here ; and it does not appear bad sense to neglect seriously how we would act, were such things to occur here as have happened elsewhere.*

In this slight sketch there are, at any rate, no wanderings of imagination, no abstract theories, no inapplicable speculations, none of these theoretical reveries, specious in the closet, but impracticable in application. There is no opinion which is not warranted by fact, or by authority ; nor any inference which analogy will not justify.

Time will shew whether the man who palliates and conceals the imminence of danger, or he who probes the wound, and arouses to the true sense of it, is the real friend of his country.

* [The Author does not say from what point of view he intends the reader to regard the subjects proposed for reflection. His observations are quite general. They will be found for the most part very true,—in a sense very different from that of an English officer.]

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE military situation of Ireland is little understood ; yet from local circumstances, as well as the extraordinary turn human affairs have taken within the last six years, [1789-95,*] it is likely to become the scene of important transactions. Its situation between the old and new worlds, its fine harbours, and the number of inhabitants which the fertility of its soil and its insular situation have enabled it to maintain, have caused it notwithstanding the misfortunes it has laboured under for five centuries past, to advance with rapid strides towards its proper station in the scale of nations [*i.e.*, between 1782 and 1794] ; yet it is little known to its own inhabitants, and too little to its close ally † and sister ‡ Kingdom. It is hoped that an humble endeavour to make both better acquainted with it will, if successful, be attended with mutual advantages §.

Ireland has seldom been inspected by a military eye. Those of its natives who aim at the profession go where their hopes and ambition have a greater field ; and the British military service is not exactly calculated to encourage application or study,—for we see too many instances where after an officer has devoted his life

* [Shall we say, also, 1854-60 ?] † [!] ‡ [!!] § [!!!]

(the best part of it) thereto, he finds the utmost to which he can extend his hopes is: permission to retire; that it is not in the field or the closet, but at the levée, that he ought to have employed his time; and that his application to his science has been thrown away in acquiring knowledge, of which, when acquired, there is no one capable of judging, and which must, therefore, in all probability remain locked up in his breast for ever.

The only real military work wrote in the English language [up to 1795] is by General Lloyd. His two volumes, particularly his second, contain ideas that can never be too much resolved in a military man's mind. In this light they are considered by the officers of science on the continent; they prove the extent of his genius. What little more has been written in English is merely compilation, some of which is selected with tolerable judgment from the only good school, the Prussian; the rest consists of puerilities, which nothing but the gross ignorance of the [English] nation in everything that regards that profession could have enabled to pay for paper and printing.

However, such as they are, by dint of great names, lofty deductions, and long lists of subscribers, they contrive to hold their station upon the shelves of every man who wishes to hold himself forth in the light of a martinet.

The *yagers*, or gamekeepers, of the Austrian gentry are in time of war formed into corps receiving double pay. Each corps, in the Seven Years' War, consisted of about two hundred. The utility of them must be obvious. They were all men of approved fidelity, and excellent marksmen; but the principal advantage derived from them was that they could not be placed in a spot of the German Empire with which at least some of them were not intimately acquainted. Every mountain, defile, river, and pass they had a thorough knowledge of, and therefore could approach

nearer the enemy, and watch his motions more closely and more safely, than any other corps of light troops whatever.

Of these corps, during the Seven Years' War, one was commanded by Lloyd, the other by a most able officer, Edward Count Dalton, who served, as did several more of his family, the House of Austria, for many years, with equal advantage to it and credit to themselves. He finished his honourable career by a cannon shot at Dunkirk.

So much has been said of General Lloyd prefatory to the introduction of certain observations quoted from his writings, part of which the event has proved prophetic; what has not yet been proved so it is to be hoped wise measures and foresight will furnish the means of contradicting.

After describing the general strength of the French frontier, speaking of that part from Sedan to Dunkirk, he says: It has been the scene of successive wars for nearly two centuries; the most expensive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind.

This line is stronger by art than by nature, having a prodigious number of strong fortresses and posts on it; moreover it projects in many places, so that an enemy can enter it nowhere without having some of them in front and on his flanks. His depots must be at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of 40,000 men, and another of equal force about Condé, will so bridle his operations that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger; for that which we suppose on the Sambre, by masking Namur, penetrates into the country of Brussels, &c., which will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In the present state of Austrian Flanders, (1780,) [when Lloyd wrote], and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from overrunning the above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

Vol. II., p. 181, Lloyd says: When the combined fleet appeared on our coast, the [English] nation, unaccustomed to see an enemy so near, seemed much alarmed. I then thought it my duty to examine the possible results of an invasion, and pointed out the means of defeating it, (which he indeed eventually did;) determined and fixed the lines on which the enemy must have acted, had he landed, and the different positions the English army must have occupied on such lines, to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping the post he had taken on our coast.

Vol. II., p. 118, speaking of Rome, he says: *After the expulsion of their Kings it became a democracy, and every citizen was bred and trained a soldier*; it was the only trade; the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief occupation was war. *Necessity first made that republic purely military.* The right was in the people, but the power really in the Senate. The Senate, far from desisting from encroaching on the people, became daily more wanton in their oppressions. To secure their usurpations the most proper method was to engage the people in Continental wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a distance. The virtue and prowess of the soldier exalted the condition of the citizen; no human reward was refused to great military merit with that knowledge, the fruit of ages, and with every motive which can excite a man to the vigorous exertion of his forces, such a people *must necessarily become finally superior* to every other people placed in different circumstances. This difference alone rendered Rome, a military republic, superior to Carthage, a commercial one.* The first species of republics must probably fall by the hands of a citizen; the last by those of a foreigner.

* [Was Keating's object to suggest France as the Rome, and England the Carthage, of the modern world? It is worth thinking of!]

P. 115, he says: Carthage was often involved in wars on account of its distant settlements. Their armies were sufficient against the people they contended with, when their operations were confined to their islands and the coast, because their fleets could co-operate with success; and had they carried their views no farther, they might probably have existed many ages longer. But long and distant wars, supported only by money and mercenaries, brought on necessarily their distress and final destruction.

P. 117, speaking of a confederate army, he says: The views of the different parties seldom coincide in the various points which occur in a long and extensive war. When opposed to such an army, temporize, use insinuations and seductions, some one or other of the parties will grow tired, and fall under temptation;—or attack vigorously the dominions of one of the members; this will create a powerful diversion, and his defection will probably break the confederacy.

If anything in the following pages can tend to convince the people of these countries of their alarming situation, of the danger of the enemy they are now [1795] at war with, and of the necessity of a general exertion of the whole people, and that they [*i.e.*, the British] can place no reliance on foreign succour [against France], the view with which they are written will be fulfilled.

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ON THE

DEFENCE OF IRELAND.

CHAPTER I.

OF ITS IMPORTANCE, &c.

OF THE FACE OF THE COUNTRY—COASTS—HARBOURS—
LANDING PLACES—INHABITANTS—TOWNS—NATURAL AND
ARTIFICIAL STRENGTH.

IRELAND, situated at the extremity of the old world, has for some centuries back, been hardly known to it, farther than appearing an unimportant spot in the map of Europe. Yet this small spot is probably more essential, not merely to the consequence, but to the very existence of England, (1) than all those exterior possessions, to retain or

(1) [*“essential . . . to the very existence of England”*—This was a favourite theory, or rather a favourite statement, current among the Anglo-Irish at the time of the publication of this pamphlet. It is now, however, no longer a matter of question, even among the most careless thinkers on the subject, that while on the one hand Ireland once set at liberty would be quite strong enough of herself to preserve

acquire which, she has been lavishing her blood and treasure, and accumulating debt upon her landed property for this century past. Extraordinary as it may appear, with all the advantages the island in question possesses, the benefits which England appears to have endeavoured to derive from her have been merely negative. *It seems as if the object of the sister kingdom had been not to derive good, but to prevent the possibility of rivalry* (2);—witness the restrictions on her trade, taken off a few years ago (3)*.

But if England thinks it necessary for her, as she ever must, to maintain a navy for the defence, not only of her exterior possessions, but also of her own coast, the situation of Ireland points it out for the place of arms. (4)

her independence, on the other hand the separation of Ireland from England could by no means of itself cause the ruin of a state whose wealth is certainly but little increased in proportion even by all it is able to drain from this country, and whose strength and station in the world have long been probably rather lowered than exalted by the connection.]

(2) [*“to prevent the possibility of rivalry.”*—The whole of the history of the last century proves the truth of this observation; and every one who has watched the course of English legislation and administration in the affairs of trade and commerce as well as of mere politics down to the present day, must perceive that the same principle has still continued to govern the counsels of our masters. The notorious history of the efforts of Ireland for so many years to procure the establishment of an Atlantic Mail Packet Station on her western or southern coasts, and the attitude of her government even to-day with respect to the Galway enterprise, may be named as affording the latest examples of the fact.]

* Those restrictions were of no benefit to England, though ruinous to Ireland. One or two trading towns, indeed, derived some trifling advantage, but by no means such as to make it a national concern.—*Author's Note.*

(3) [*“a few years ago.”*—That is in 1782-3.]

(4) [*“the situation of Ireland points it out for the place of arms.”*—Had Ireland become, or were she ever destined to become, a West-Britain, in imitation of Scotland, this observation would be unde-

The westerly and south-westerly winds which prevail in these latitudes for nine months in the year, are an insuperable disadvantage to England as a naval power; and from the port of Brest, by its situation on the Atlantic, a blow can be given to England before her fleet could get out of the Channel. (5) But Cork possesses the same advantages over Brest which Brest does over Plymouth, not to mention the many other fine harbours on our coast, whose names are hardly known out of Ireland.

Perhaps the importance of Ireland to the sister kingdom will never be felt, unless it falls into the hands of an enemy. (6) Should that ever be the case, the possession of it would empower that enemy, from its south-western and northern points, effectually to cripple the naval and commercial exertions of England, and in consequence reduce her to as insignificant a state as the island of Sar-

niably true. But England has never allowed herself to be persuaded to establish in Ireland a naval station or an arsenal, *nor will she do so.*]

(5) [*before her fleet could get out of the Channel.*"]—The force of this remark is no longer of course so great, since the application of steam power on so great a scale to ships of war. It is however even yet to a certain extent true, and will probably continue to be so for many years to come at least. Cork does still possess a great advantage over Brest, and Brest over Plymouth, in a nautical point of view; and Cherbourg, the greatest station of all, has since the author's time grown gradually to fulfil even in these days of steam all the conditions he imagined for Brest alone.]

(6) [*unless it falls into the hands of an enemy.*"]—That is of course an enemy to England. Mr. Keating did not perhaps think it prudent, in 1795, to suggest the probability of Ireland's existence as a state neither French nor English, in which case there is no reason to suppose that her harbours should be put to the sole use of those interested in destroying the trade of England. In the hands of such an enemy of England as France was during the last great war, for example, it is however true enough that these harbours might easily (and now as easily as then) be turned to account to the utter ruin of, not indeed of England as a state, but of the supremacy of England on the ocean.]

dinia in the scale of European powers. In fact, if a great naval power ever cultivates the advantages of Ireland to the utmost, that will alone insure her dictating to all the rest of Europe on the ocean. (7)

But we must likewise throw into the scale the great supplies which this country affords to a naval power. Except the article of timber, she has, or may have, every other. In the article of provisions, the fertility of her soil and mildness of her climate give her a decided advantage over any other country in the universe. Her ports are never frozen up, as is the case in the north of Europe and America; and she has none of those tedious and dangerous channel navigations which all the other nations of Europe, France and Spain only excepted, are obliged to undergo.

Should Ireland by the misfortune of war fall into the power of any foreign country, the separation from England would be felt and deplored; their situations and mutual wants are such as no substitute could be found for (8). The linen trade which constitutes the wealth of half the kingdom, and coals, so essential to our manu-

(7) [*"dictating to all the rest of Europe on the ocean."*—But Ireland as an independent country could not enjoy this power, nor would she ever need it. If Keating's observation be correct, then it would but follow that in the interests of France and England together both ought to see that Ireland *be* an independent state.]

(8.) [*"such as no substitute could be found for. . . . A conquest of Ireland . . . would be the greatest misfortune that could befall this island."*—In the whole of this paragraph Keating appears to have intended to convey but a little humorous irony. It is needless to remark that we are by no means naturally so dependent on England as here suggested; and the history of the last half century has abundantly proved whether "separation from England," even at the hands of "a foreign enemy [of England]," would not at any time have been, and have been felt by the great majority of the nation, rather a boon from heaven than a "misfortune" in any point of view whatever. Of course the question is now one of a purely speculative character merely.]

factures, would be for ever lost to us; for hitherto there has been no reason to believe the island contains any adequate supply within itself. The two most obvious articles among those necessary to this country are here specified. The detail might be much enlarged, but as it is not at all the object of this publication to consider any point not immediately connected with the military situation of the kingdom, no farther deduction shall be drawn from the foregoing premises than, that a conquest of Ireland, and consequent separation from England, by a foreign enemy, would be the greatest misfortune that could befall this island. (8)

The surface of Ireland presents a great tract of fertile land, in all its variations of pasture and tillage; but over this are interspersed great tracts of mountain. The flat and fertile lands are interspersed with great tracts of bog, of which most are passable in some parts to infantry, but not to cavalry or to artillery; a difficulty which is however compensated, in the infinity of most excellent roads, running in all directions to and from the coast to the capital, as well as cross roads, intersecting them in every point. Lakes and chains of rapids are another leading feature in the face of Ireland, and though the rivers are not large, yet as the banks are strong and afford good positions, or if not strong by elevation, are boggy, they are all of consequence in a military view. But the great object in the map of Ireland is the Shannon. This great chain of lakes cuts off an entire province from the rest of Ireland, and may be classed with the Elbe, and almost with the Rhine, whose banks furnish so many important events in the military history of Europe. (9)

(9) [*"cuts off an entire province."*—Certainly no longer, in a military point of view, at least in case of armies provided with the usual military equipments of modern times. Nevertheless the Shannon is of course an important military feature; and in some

The northern parts, and south-western point, are the most mountainous, the others the most fertile parts of the island; these last produce that redundance of provisions which we export to other countries with so much profit to ourselves (10); and of course it is from these only that an army, friendly or hostile, can expect to draw subsistence.

Ireland has no woods; its fuel in the interior parts is entirely turf, and therefore it is necessary that an army should be prepared to make use of that fuel, or so provide itself as not to stand in need of any, during the time of its absence from its magazines.

The coasts of Ireland are in general bold. All the western, north-western, and south-western parts have fine harbours, (those in the Channel are not so good) the west and south-westerly winds prevail on those coasts, and the tide rises everywhere to a considerable height. The coast counties are in general thinly peopled, producing considerable quantities of cattle, but not having many mills or stores, where any quantity of grain is laid up at a time, more than necessary for the actual residents from one year to another.* Therefore, if an enemy landed on those coasts, he would be obliged to subsist from the sea until he was able to penetrate into the interior of the country. From the indentations of the coasts, they of course afford an enemy positions; their coasts are generally less inclosed than the interior of the country, the face of which is divided into squares of larger or smaller size, by mounds

places, and at some periods of the year, it will perhaps bear out General Keating's eulogium even to-day.]

* As there is a considerable export, there certainly are stores at the sea ports. This observation must therefore not be taken in a strict, but a relative or comparative sense.—*Author's Note.* [In any sense it is less true now, and becoming daily less and less so.]

(10) [*"with so much profit to ourselves."*—Irony again!]

of earth, a defence against any arms but artillery, and which literally make every field a redoubt: and this description extends to all the cultivated part of the kingdom.

Its principal harbours are Cork, Bantry, [the Shannon] Galway, and Lough Foyle, but the landing places are innumerable. These harbours have bold shores, but as the tide rises so high there is always also a considerable extent of beach.

The inhabitants of Ireland consist of those resident in the great towns; tradesmen and manufacturers, who reside in dispersed cottages, in the parts of the island where the linen trade is carried on; and farmers and their labourers in the other parts.* The men of property, clergy and gentry, are much thinner dispersed through the country than in England; or, compared to the population, are in Scotland; and being at no pains to acquire it, are possessed of very little influence over the peasantry. The towns are in general poor, of no natural

* Of these, the people of the lower orders in the north are of a military turn, capable of being immediately formed into excellent soldiers. Those of the rest of the kingdom are utterly devoid of military spirit, depressed by poverty, except when they are goaded to some act of desperation; but still capable of being made to fight in defence of their homes and families, to which they are strongly attached; a good militia might in time be formed of them.—*Author's Note.* [The testimony borne in this note to the extraordinary state of depression, political and moral, in which the Catholic population of Ireland was still plunged, so late as 1795, the date of Keating's pamphlet, is too interesting to allow of its omission, though the author's remark is of course wholly inapplicable at the present day. A more warlike population than that of Tipperary, Waterford, and Wexford, or that of great part of Cork, and of Clare, (all the Catholic peasantry of to-day,) it would be difficult to find in Europe; and should Ireland ever live to be a free country, no nation possesses a population better able or more willing to assert its independence than that of the Catholic counties. As for Ulster, it is to-day full two-thirds Catholic; and its Catholic population are to the full as brave in the present generation as their Presbyterian and Protestant fellow-countrymen.]

strength, nor are there any fortified; those which had works around them were destroyed by Cromwell. The natural strength of Ireland consists in the face of the country, and the nature of the climate; it has no artificial strength but what it possesses in the navy of England.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PROBABILITY OF AN ATTACK BY THE FRENCH—IN WHAT PART THEY WOULD MOST PROBABLY MAKE IT—ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE—WITH WHAT FORCE.

[The observations of the author on the probability and means of an invasion of Ireland by the French, which occupy this chapter, are totally useless at the present day. 1st. For example, he points out the advantage to the French of Brest harbour (“the westerly and south-westerly winds,” he says, “which blow nine months in the year, are favourable to a fleet sailing from Brest to the western coast of Ireland”), upon grounds peculiar to the circumstances of sailing vessels only. At the present day steam has so changed the face of things that it is scarcely any peculiar advantage to France that “Brest, taking it in a nautical point of view [*i.e.*, as regards sailing vessels], is nearer Ireland by near one-half than Plymouth.” 2d. It is no longer “highly probable, from the present state of affairs between England and France, that the French will make an attack upon the British dominions in Europe;” the two great powers being in fact at peace, and France having no disposition (any more than interest) to go to war. Yet Keating’s observation is perhaps as true to-day as it was sixty years ago when he says that: “it is not probable that she will leave England, if she can help it, in a condition . . . to do her future injury;

and it will always be the object of that country to crush England if she can." And if England should ever again find herself at war with France, "it is also probable" (indeed far more than probable, since all France has long ago laid to heart the regrets of the great Napoleon at St. Helena that he had not preferred an Irish to an Egyptian expedition), "that France may think that as Ireland is the most vulnerable part of the British Empire, so a blow there would be the most fatal to her." And "if," adds the author, "the main design of the enemy was against this country, their fleet would be at sea in the mouth of the Channel, to detain the British in port, or prevent their sending out detachments, or to give battle, in order to secure the debarkation on the south-west, west, or north of Ireland, while a squadron of frigates would station themselves in St. George's Channel to intercept succours arriving from England." 3d. In these days of railway communication General Keating's observations no longer apply, either with respect to the probable choice of Galway (as affording the shortest march to Dublin) as the place of debarkation for an invading force, or the difficulty now no more of suddenly concentrating at Brest (or Cherbourg) an army of 50,000 men, with a sufficient transport fleet, without attracting notice by prolonged preparations. For the rest, when the author concludes that "were an attack on the coast of Ireland made, on the part of the French, such an attack would so far succeed as that the disembarkation might be effected," he uses language in expressing opinion which to-day he would only alter by asserting with positive confidence that such a disembarkation could not be effectually resisted or prevented at all.]

CHAPTER III.

OF THE FORM OF DEBARKATION—AND WHERE IT IS OR IS
NOT TO BE APPREHENDED.

IF a fleet, having arrived on our coast, intends to effect an absolute conquest of the country, what becomes of the shipping which brought that force here is a matter of little consequence to the enemy; its business is to land the troops and stores, and not at all to re-embark them. As the object is the complete conquest of the island, and that cannot be effected until the capital is got possession of, therefore they will of course endeavour to disembark within as few days' march of the capital as possible, adhering to that essential rule in the military art, viz., *to make the line of operations as short as possible*. As this expression may not be intelligible, except to military men, the following definition comprehends and explains its meaning, in as few words as it can well be put.

The line of operation of an army is one drawn between the point against which it is destined, and that from whence it draws its subsistence; and this is the great and main ground-work of all plans of military movements, campaigns, &c. [see APPENDIX.]

But the nearest part of the coast where a landing can be effected to Dublin is Galway. (11) If a hostile fleet,

(11) [*“the nearest part of the coast. . . . Galway.”*—This is of course still partly true; but the facilities afforded by modern rail-

having on board a force such as we have stated, arrives in Galway harbour, no force that could be sent against it could prevent its landing and occupying the town, and if necessary a position from the sea and their fleet on the right, to Lough Corrib on their left; there they could maintain themselves, intrench their camp, secure their flanks, or indeed, if necessary, secure a retreat *.

Their frigates would probably make a diversion in their favour, by threatening other parts of the coast. But the march by Bantry is longer, and through a difficult country, as it is also from Cork, and still more so by Lough Foyle. The shortest and most eligible line of operation is by Galway, as in two days' march they are at the Shannon; by getting possession of which they have all the province of Connaught secured to them, and in four days' march they can be in possession of Dublin. (12)

The country through which these armies would pass admits very well of a defensive war, and like most of Ireland might be disputed, therefore, should the enemy make a landing in this country, it were to be wished they should attempt it in that part; (13) but as we cannot hope much complaisance from them, it is a duty we owe ourselves immediately to endeavour to secure those parts which are vulnerable.

Troops would disembark under cover of the artillery of their vessels, if there was an army guarding the coast.

way communication, at almost every part of the coast (except Bantry), are such that it would now be practically a matter of no importance whatever with respect to Dublin what point it might be convenient to select for the embarkation of an army of 50,000 men.]

* It is evident that several positions might be chosen there, where it would be impossible to turn their flanks or rere.—*Author's Note.*

(12) [*"four days' march."*—Even without a railway.]

(13) [*"it were to be wished."*—Of course on the understanding that the population should be friendly to the English, rather than desirous to see the country well rid of them.]

If the opposition which they expected was trifling, they would probably come in with the tide to the shore; but if the troops appeared in force on the shore, and that it was also covered with works and cannon, they would then disembark and form upon the beach, and advance against the coast in force. It is for this reason high strong tides and extensive strands are favourable to the operations of the enemy.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE BEST METHODS OF OPPOSING A DISEMBARKATION.

MAIZEROTY enters largely into the defence of a coast against incursions, but avoids saying anything relative to an invasion in force, as such an occurrence had not, like the other, come under his notice. Probably he did not choose to incur the risk of reasoning on what he had never seen; it is much easier certainly to write satisfactorily upon the one than upon the other.

Wherever a landing is to be apprehended, the whole of that coast ought to be well reconnoitred, and the water sounded, and the positions for opposing the enemy chosen. (14). The previous arrangements having been made, on his appearance on the coast, the troops destined for the defence of it should immediately assemble at the appointed rendezvous.

If batteries, and the other works, have not been thrown up, they ought to be so. The enemy will land upon as level a shore as they can, under cover of their vessels; the fire from their vessels would probably be very great,

(14) [*“the whole of that coast ought to be well reconnoitred, and the water sounded.”*—There is now, however, no part of the shore, or indeed of the island itself, of which the most minute and accurate maps and charts may not be had at a very small expense; and it is well known that the war-office of our continental neighbours has long ago been provided with the Ordnance Survey Maps of Ireland, and with all the English Admiralty Charts of our coasts and harbours.]

suppose four hundred guns ; it is therefore the object of the troops who defend to close upon the enemy immediately on their landing, as from that time their artillery, in which they will till then to a certainty be superior, will be useless. Should they be driven back to their boats, the batteries must again open upon and endeavour to sink them. Though troops disembarking in a bay, where there are several landing places possess an advantage over the defending army, inasmuch as acting on a smaller segment they can mask their real intention by feints till it is too late to prevent them, and they act *from* a centre, whereas their opponents act *to* one, which is an advantage. If the enemy intrenches himself, and that the troops do not arrive in time to prevent that, yet before he advances, the intrenchments ought to be immediately stormed, and an attack by cannon upon the fleet from the heights at the same time to distract their attention, and prevent their sending succours. If once driven from their intrenchments, their destruction ought to be the consequence.

Yet two Tuscan frigates at Algiers, by an enfilading fire, contrived to save the Spanish army ; the retreat was covered by the grenadiers commanded by Col. O'Brien ; only one shot was fired by them during the retreat, though the Algerine cavalry came up almost to their bayonets.

In a landing, not less than ten thousand should disembark at a time ; they should advance in as many columns as possible, and occupy the first heights, from which they should on no account whatever advance a step, but intrench themselves there.

The misconduct of those who commanded our expeditions on the coast of France, in Lord Chatham's time, was such that it is said they once encamped with their

front to the sea and their rear to the enemy, probably "*par signe de mepris.*"

Such incursions answer no end but the destruction of those engaged in them, as at St. Cas, unless there is well-grounded hope that the people of the country would be on the side of the invader.

If the defending army can make no impression on the enemy, its artillery and baggage, &c., must be sent up the country; and it must divide itself for the purpose of observing the motions of the enemy, and taking positions to obstruct his march to the capital until more or sufficient force assembles.

CHAPTER V.

CAMPAIGNS OF SCHOMBERG, WILLIAM III., AND GINKLE IN IRELAND. (15)

WILLIAM having driven James from England, this island became the theatre of the war, which was conducted with considerable talents on both sides, and had not it been for the pusillanimity of James it might have taken a very different turn from what it did; but the mere presence of that weak and headstrong monarch was sufficient to blast his fortune, and his friends' hopes.

Schomberg landed at the head of twelve thousand men, in August, 1689, without meeting any opposition, in Carrickfergus Bay. With the assistance of six ships of war, he took possession of that town, and on his advancing into the country the positions taken by the hostile armies were as follow: Schomberg occupied a position at Dundalk, which he found himself obliged to fortify. Rosen threatened his right flank, and James, with about thirty

(15) [*"campaigns of Schomberg,—William III.—and Ginkle, in Ireland."*—See, for a proper understanding of these campaigns, as well as of all this portion of Irish History, the *Green Book*, by John Cornelius O'Callaghan, Esq. See also the admirable edition of the '*Macariæ Excidium*' of Colonel O'Kelly, edited by the same accurate historian for the Irish Archaeological Society; Mr. O'Callaghan's notes to this volume are of great extent, and embrace the largest body of information ever collected together on the subject of this war, the events of which have been nevertheless since so grossly falsified by Lord Macaulay in his elegant romance entitled a History of England.]

thousand men, was posted on the Boyne at Drogheda. Thus James had Schomberg there in a *cul-de-sac*, his retreat cut off, his army wasting by sickness, shut up in intrenchments, and James himself with a superior army in their front. He made a feeble and characteristic attempt to vanquish Schomberg by treachery, and even then, when nothing more was wanting to the destruction of his enemy's army, but James' giving the word to attack, his resolution failed, and he retired to his former position, letting Schomberg escape, and retreat unmolested.

June, 1690, William landed with 36,000 men, and marched along the eastern coast toward the capital, drawing his supplies from his fleet. James's army, consisting of 30,000 men, lay in their position as before described at Drogheda, and he was now obliged, contrary to his inclination, to venture an action. James's position was well chosen; his right appuyé on Drogheda, which he occupied, his front to the Boyne, fordable but deep, with strong banks which were intersected by mounds of earth, hedges and ditches, his army presented a front of about three miles, extending towards Slane, where was a bridge which he neglected to occupy; the river toward the centre of James's position forms a considerable projecting bend, and another in reverse higher up towards Slane. This is important, as the fate of the battle was in a great degree decided by its locality, the effect of which, on the manœuvres of the two armies, was strongly marked in the course of the day; for it is to be observed both parties had neglected to occupy the pass of Slane. William advanced in three columns to the opposite banks of the river, reconnoitred, and adjusted his plan of operation, determining to attack by the right and centre. Accordingly, in the morning, he detached a corps to pass by Slane; this corps arrived

sooner at its destination than that sent by James (who saw his error too late) to anticipate it, which by the curve of the river was forced to make a considerable detour, whereby time, as we have stated, was given to William's detachment to arrive and seize the pass before them; having crossed which, and formed, they advanced on the left of James's army, and, extending to the right, turned it, notwithstanding a morass in its front, by which manœuvre it was compelled to fall back in confusion toward Duleek. William had so combined his attacks that his centre was to pass at the time his right should have completely engaged the left of James's army. When that, therefore, was seen to have taken place, his centre column advanced against Old-Bridge, and his left to the fords, which having passed, and gained the opposite bank at the projecting curve of the Boyne, they there formed and received an attack from the right and centre of James, which they repulsed, and advanced. The Irish army fell back above two miles, to Donore, where they formed, and advanced again to the charge; but William's cavalry, having, according to their orders, completely turned their left, the fortune of the day could not be recovered, and they were forced to fall back, pursued with loss, to Duleek, behind which they again rallied.

This is one of the most interesting actions recorded in history. James's position was well chosen; his great and glaring misconduct was in not occupying the pass of Slane with a strong corps of infantry and artillery, covered by works. This was the key to his post, and had it been properly guarded, William could not have forced his position; but when he had turned James's left, it enabled him, after his centre had crossed the Old-Bridge, to deploy it; for James's centre was obliged to fall back, seeing the enemy's cavalry on their flank. The cavalry was not then what

it is now, but that of both armies were much on a par.* Though the country was unfavourable for that army, yet they decided the day both here and at Aughrim. Had Slane been occupied, William must have gone higher up the Boyne in order to have passed. It appears a great neglect on the part of William not to have intercepted the Irish army at Duleek. They must have surrendered or been driven into the sea. Probably he did not wish to be embarrassed with James as a prisoner, following the proverb adopted from the Spaniards, "*A l'ennemi qui se retire un pont d'or.*" James was glad to have an excuse for flying to Versailles. From this time James's army acted without a plan; but they were reduced to desperation. The resource they adopted of retiring behind the Shannon was a good one; William's followed them in a disorderly manner. Grace, who commanded in Athlone, had occupied the town west of the Shannon, with four thousand men, supported by another corps in the neighbourhood. Douglas attempted to reduce it with a battery of six guns; this not succeeding to his wishes, he retreated with disgrace.

Meantime, William laid siege to Limerick, where Sarsfield performed a gallant action with a corps of cavalry. He made a detour, crossed the Shannon at Killaloe, came in the rear of William's army within about seven miles,

* No success gained by James's right and centre could alter the events of that day. Had they even thrown their opponents back into the river, still William's advancing on their flank, which was uncovered, could not be remedied. The attack by Slane was the grand manœuvre. The attacks of the centre and left were only secondary ones. In this action the great system was displayed; the right attacking, the left refusing itself. Two detachments sent to seize a pass, the intermediate ground favours one more than the other. It arrives in time to form and drive in its opponent. Had James seized the pass, he could have turned William's right, while in the act of fording the river, had he ventured to do it.—*Author's Note.*

and intercepted and destroyed a convoy of artillery, who thought themselves in perfect safety so near their own camp. Limerick made a gallant defence, and William was forced to retreat. Sept. 29th, the Duke of Marlborough landed at Cork with five thousand men. Having increased it to about ten thousand, he took Cork and Kinsale.

Previous to the campaign of 1691 the Irish and their French allies possessed all the country west of the Shannon, with the important garrisons of Limerick and Athlone, and were entire masters of the whole of the Shannon. Ginkle having withdrawn into winter cantonments, was obliged to confine himself solely to the protection of the English frontier, as it was called, which was continually and vexatiously harassed by incursions from the opposite side of the Shannon. To add to its misfortunes, bodies of undisciplined and insubordinate armed men, taking advantage of the unhappy times, plundered and murdered on all sides, (16) under the names of Volunteers and Rapparees, so called from the species of weapon which they were armed with, a kind of spear or pike, the first that occurs and easiest supplied. These wretches (16) having been already robbed, first by James's, and if they escaped them, by William's army, deprived thereby of the means of subsistence, were forced to take to a life of robbery (16), and wandered under these names in gangs,

(16) [*"plundered and murdered . . . under the names of Volunteers and Rapparees," "wretches . . . forced to take to a life of robbery."*—The Irish reader need scarcely be reminded now of what Lieutenant Keating seems to have strangely *forgotten*, that these men were neither "wretches," "murderers," nor "robbers," but simply outlaws at war with the plunderers and relentless desolators of their country. Mr. James Duffy of Dublin has lately published an elegant little popular novel, in which the true character of the "Rapparee" chiefs is fairly delineated in the person of the celebrated Count Redmond O'Hanlon; a tale which will perhaps serve in some sort to

the men armed, and followed by their wives and families, whom they easily trained to the business.

James's army, elated at having forced William to retreat, and indeed with reason, as it was nearly equivalent to depriving him of all the fruits of his victory,—for, in reality, he gained nothing by it but Dublin, and a desolated country, to harass their enemy,—and also with more sanguine views, projected an attack on Mullingar, and to further it occupied and fortified the town of Ballymore, which is situated half way between Mullingar and Athlone; but Ginkle, thinking it necessary to prevent their establishing themselves at Mullingar, advanced against them and drove them from it (it has been asserted the Irish pointed their pallisades the wrong way). Ginkle pursued them to Grenogue, where they attempted a stand in front of the town, but were driven through it, and pursued to the very walls of Athlone. The whole of this conduct on the part of the Irish was erroneous, as they ought solely to have occupied themselves in strengthening their frontier behind the Shannon, augmenting the fortifications of Athlone and Limerick, and beating up Ginkle's quarters, whose army, dispirited and unhealthy, in bad winter quarters, would have melted away before the campaign began.

In Spring, St. Ruth, a French general, sent over by that court, took the command, contrary to the feelings of the gallant Sarsfield, who deserved better treatment. St. Ruth was a man of abilities; like his countrymen, ardent, vehement, and attached to his own opinions, with a sovereign contempt of the persons and talents of those with whom he has to act, who were not of his nation. He brought some French officers with him, who came fraught

remove the effect of mere calumnious statements such as those adopted by Keating.]

with the same contempt of the natives, by whom they were universally hated. It is probable they did more harm to that cause than good; disunion and jealousy immediately showed themselves. Though the French court sent officers, they did not send either money or any other requisite; but James's army, tho' thus abandoned by their allies, did not despair, but were, on the contrary, much elated by their late successes. St. Ruth soon decided on his plan of operations, which was to occupy the frontier presented by the river Shannon, by taking his position in a central point near Athlone. A great oversight was committed by St. Ruth in not withdrawing his force from Ballymore, a place at that time of no consequence to him; but he suffered Ginkle on his advance to take a thousand of his best troops, then in garrison there, prisoners; a circumstance attended with peculiarly bad consequences at the opening of the campaign, as it raised the spirits of the other army, and damped those of his own.

Ginkle advanced towards Athlone, and reconnoitring the army of St. Ruth, found it posted on a neck of land between two bogs, about two miles beyond the Shannon. He carried the part of the town of Athlone on the east side of the river without difficulty. St. Ruth's army retired to the other, breaking down the bridges. Ginkle saw the danger and difficulty that was likely to attend the attempt to pass the river, under the guns of a fortress, and in front of a formidable enemy. He therefore formed a plan for that purpose, by stealing a march, and throwing a bridge of boats over it above Lough Ree, at Lanesborough, but by his enemy's vigilance the scheme was discovered and foiled.

He then determined to force his passage in the place he occupied, and after some attempts succeeded in repairing

the bridge which St. Ruth's army in their retreat had broken down. Having done which he ordered his right column to attack by the bridge, and the left and centre to ford the river. St. Ruth, however, burnt the bridge, and Ginkle was obliged to countermand the attack; and saw himself reduced to the desperate necessity of retreating to Dublin, through a desolated country, exposed to the harassing of an exulting enemy. It is not often that a council of war gives its opinion for battle; the foreseeing and starting difficulties is the affectation of superior wisdom; yet it happened that Ginkle's council did adopt the boldest, and as it generally is the wisest measure, for a failure in it could not put them in a worse situation than they were. This was for the immediate attack. Two thousand men, divided into three columns, advanced to storm the town, which was defended by about an equal number. Some resistance was made; but the gallantry of the centre column, who passed the ford under a most heavy fire, and entered the town, driving the enemy before them, enabled the other two columns to establish themselves also within the walls. St. Ruth committed an unpardonable error in his neglect of this post, as the event shewed.

St. Ruth was obliged, by this success, to change his position, in order to cover and keep his communication open with Limerick. He therefore retreated down the course of the Shannon, and took a position behind the river Suck; his right toward the Shannon, occupying the heights called Kilcommedin Hill, upon a front of two miles; his left secured by a rivulet and a bog, which also covered his front, as far as a pass on a chain of small hills which lay opposite his right. Here he determined to wait the attack of the British.

St. Ruth's army consisted of about 24,000 men; William's of about 18,000 [*wrong*; see NOTE, p. 34.] Ginkle

having called in all his detachment, on the 12th of July, 1692, attacked with his left; the cavalry marched by the pass before-mentioned and deployed, covering the left flank of his infantry, as they advanced upon the enemy, who retired gradually from ditch to ditch before them. As the infantry advanced in this difficult ground, where their cavalry could not protect them, they began to find themselves enfiladed, and flanked from behind the hedges on their left; for gaps having been cut at proper intervals in the banks and ditches, the enemy had by that means got upon their flank. This gave them a check. St. Ruth, wishing to follow up his blow there, and seeing nothing to apprehend upon his left, drew away his cavalry from thence, in the intention of bringing it upon the left of Ginkle. There was a narrow pass by the castle of Aughrim, in front of St. Ruth's left. Ginkle ordered his right wing to attack St. Ruth's left, which was now exposed, and to defile by this pass, and form on the other side; the right of his infantry advancing through the bog, so as to form on the opposite side, by the time the cavalry of the right had formed its line. Talmash, who commanded it, executed the manœuvre with ability, and led his corps in a column between the castle and the bog, formed on the other side, and advanced just in time to save the centre of the British line of infantry, which, having waded through the bog, had attacked and driven the Irish line before them; but falling into confusion in advancing, the Irish had rallied, and charging them in turn had driven them back with great loss into the bog. Just at this critical instant Ginkle's cavalry showing themselves, checked St. Ruth's line, and gave time to his infantry (who had gone beyond their orders, which were, not to advance upon the enemy until they saw their right wing of cavalry entirely passed the castle), to rally under

the ditches at the bog's edge, and, being re-formed, to advance in good order, with the cavalry upon their right, upon the left of the enemy. St. Ruth, to whom the appearance of Ginkle's right wing of cavalry so near his line was a surprise, not expecting to have had both his flanks attacked, was bringing up a reserve of cavalry for the purpose of falling on Ginkle's right, when he was killed by a cannon shot.

This fortunate (17) shot probably caused the gaining of the battle. St. Ruth had the advantage upon the right, where the first attack had been made. Ginkle's infantry were exhausted by wading through a bog up to their middles; they had been driven back into that bog with loss and confusion, and St. Ruth was at that moment coming down upon their right flank with a fresh body of cavalry. So far everything was in his favour.

But St. Ruth communicated with no one; by this conduct he lost Athlone. To Sarsfield, his second in command, he had a particular pique. His whole arrangements were confined to his own head; and Sarsfield, who

(17) [*"fortunate."*—General Keating speaks, of course, as a British officer. It is not so that any Irishman speaks of the fatal accident which alone lost Aughrim,—a field on which the Irish army fought with a spirit and bravery which indeed deserved success, since it was never exceeded in any of the numerous engagements abroad in which the Brigade itself so often won undying laurels for themselves and for their country. The brave Saint Ruth is not yet forgotten in Ireland, and an interesting circumstance but lately served to show that his name is still remembered in France; for a few days before the 12th of July, 1858 (the anniversary of the fatal day of Aughrim), the Parish Priest of the parish in which this celebrated field of battle is situated received from the present Emperor of the French the offering of a suit of mourning vestments with instructions that on that day and on every succeeding anniversary a solemn Mass should be offered up for the repose of the soul of the gallant Frenchman at the altar of the Parish Church. Ireland recognised with warm emotion the meaning of so graceful an act of piety on the part of the representative of Napoleon.]

succeeded to the command, was in utter ignorance of what was going on about him, except of that which immediately concerned his own post: of course, on the fall of St. Ruth, everything was at a stop, the officers waiting for orders, and no one to give them. In consequence, his army first retreated, pressed by Ginkle, and then fled. The infantry, in their usual custom, to a bog,* the cavalry to Loughrea. Thus ended the battle of Aughrim, and with it the hopes of those who had attached themselves to James.

Ginkle's position, previous to the attack, was on the Suck, near Ballinasloe, opposite St. Ruth's. St. Ruth's main errors, every one of which was sufficient to have caused the loss of the battle, were—First, not communicating with Sarsfield: Secondly, not fortifying the pass on his right, which would have prevented Ginkle's cavalry from passing there, and, of course, the necessity of his unfurnishing his left: Thirdly, not attacking the right wing of Talmash, while in the act of deploying, after passing by the castle of Aughrim, a manœuvre that, by the foregoing account, must have taken up a considerable time.

Had the British army been defeated, St. Ruth, by crossing the Shannon, might have taken a position on their rear, and destroyed their whole army. His position was chosen with great skill, and his army seem to have maintained their ground with great firmness. On the other hand, the manœuvres of William's army were conducted in a manner that evinced much talents on the part of the generals. It is an extraordinary circumstance,

* A letter, giving an account of the battle of Kilrush, where Lord Mountgarret's army was defeated by the Earl of Ormond, says that the adjacent bog was black (the colour of their clothing), with the multitude who fled to it, out of reach of the cavalry.—*Author's Note.*

that, in such ground, the event of the action at Aughrim (as well as at Drogheda), should have been turned by the cavalry.

St. Ruth was everywhere himself during the action, but always a little too late. He was one of those men who never think anything properly done except what they do themselves. The army's retiring to Loughrea after the defeat was merely accidental. Had Sarsfield's army retired to Galway, they might probably have done better than at Limerick. Probably they would have compelled Ginkle to divide his force. At any rate, either Galway or Limerick must have been in his rear. Had Ginkle left him there, he would have lost Connaught again; and had he besieged him there, the garrison of Limerick might have made a diversion in his favour; besides, Sarsfield's army was still numerous. St. Ruth took one precaution, which never ought to be omitted in familiar circumstances. Ditches and banks become an inconvenience to an army, if they cramp its manœuvres. Whenever the situation is such, debouchures should be cut in them, in those places where they are best protected by cross fire. They should be sufficiently large for troops to pass on a considerable front, and might be closed against cavalry by *chevaux de frize*.

If Sarsfield had retreated to Galway, Ginkle could not have left him behind. The campaign was then far advanced, and would still have had Limerick to reduce; and an advanced season in the field is always fatal to foreigners in this country.

Ginkle marched by the Munster side of the Shannon, and occupied the ground before Limerick, which the King had done the year before, on the side of Ireton's Fort. He now secured all the passes on the Shannon, the necessity of which he had been taught the last

campaign. Perceiving he could not hope to take the place without completely investing it, he passed in the night above the town, by an island, to a part of the river which is fordable, and which he gained by the connivance of the officer appointed to guard it, with a corps of dragoons, as was the custom of that time; for they had usually a great and over-proportion of cavalry, to their infantry, and were, consequently, obliged often to employ the cavalry upon services to which they were not adapted. As for instance, leaving the entire guard of a ford to them, if attacked they cannot maintain their post. A good detachment of infantry, with some works mounted with guns, are the proper defence of a ford as well as of a bridge.

Ginkle having completely invested, blockaded the town to the 22d September. It is extraordinary, during this time, no attempt was made to destroy the bridge of communication and attack the forces on one side of the river, when separated; but, in general, an army which is discouraged by a series of ill success, *Ne s'occupe* (as the King of Prussia said of his officers) *qu'à parer les bottes que leur font les autres*; observing at the same time, *Mais je mettrai bientôt ordre à cela*, which he did, and turned the tide in his favour. On the 22d, Ginkle stormed the works of Thomond bridge. On the 23d, the garrison beat a parley, and by the surrender of this city, the conquest of the kingdom was completed.

These three campaigns in Ireland are the only part of its military history which are in any way interesting. (18)

(18) [*"the only part of its military history."*—The Irish reader will not of course be misled by this flippant observation. When the history of Ireland comes to be honestly written it will tell a different tale. For the rest, Keating had but the education of an English officer; an education very little more accurate or more enlightened in 1795 than it is even at the present day.]

At that time the grand principles of war were understood; and although the improvement of tactics, of which Prussia set the example, by introducing the true principles of the Greeks, has within the last fifty years, by its refinements and multiplied combinations, completely set aside the old system of warfare, yet the great principles must ever remain, in the same manner as architecture may derive benefit from the improvements of handicraft, though the sublime principles of Euclid, on which its rules are founded, must ever remain invariable.

In these campaigns, ability was shown on both sides. William was a military monarch, commanding a veteran army. James was the very reverse, commanding, or (to speak more properly) at the head of undisciplined forces, divided by different interests and views, while the faction and animosity of individuals tore them to pieces. The French affected and felt a contempt, which they did not seek to disguise, for the Irish, and the Irish retaliated in hatred to their haughty auxiliaries. Indeed, the Irish seem to have acted better from the time the French troops withdrew. (19)

A few observations upon the general conduct of the campaign may not be impertinent, as they will tend to throw into one view a series of military events, highly interesting to the Irish nation at the present day, [1795], when a formidable enemy is at their very doors, and when there is reason to apprehend that, if not this, the next ensuing campaign may bring the theatre of the war into our island.

Schomberg landed at Carrickfergus (as Thurot after-

(19) [The statements and suggestions contained in this paragraph are very much exaggerated and calculated seriously to mislead the reader. But in notes like the present he can only be shortly put on his guard; he cannot expect to be informed upon the whole history of the period.]

wards did), without opposition, in the year 1689, with about ten thousand men. Having augmented his army, he advanced to Dundalk; while James lay in an apathy, with treble his force, at Drogheda.

Why James's generals did not take a position at Newry is unaccountable; there they might have destroyed the British army. Again, at Dundalk, they had them, as it were, in a net. Yet even the hopes of treachery could not induce James to make a real attack upon Schomberg. If he had done it his correspondence with certain parts of that army would have been attended, probably, with good effect to him; but he did not get near enough to the conspiracy to be able to make it explode; as if there was any hope of success in war, without incurring some danger.

In the campaign of 1690, Schomberg was superseded by William himself, who commanded a fine army of 36,000 men, well appointed and inured to service, and who had, in addition to those advantages, the highest confidence in their commander. James still occupied his position near Drogheda.

William, with his superior force, was right to come to an action. His opponent's position was well chosen, but the locality was not taken sufficient advantage of. The salient curve of the Boyne was not fortified; Slane was not occupied. William might have been forced to have looked for a passage higher up the Boyne; but though he would have effected it, yet delay was injurious to him, whose presence was called for in other places, and might have been beneficial to James.

William could have finished the campaign in Ireland, after his victory at the Boyne, by seizing the pass of Duleek. Probably, had he done so, he would not have been able to avoid taking James prisoner, and he did not

wish to be embarrassed with him. It may be so inferred, from the little trouble he took to follow him.

After the defeat at the Boyne, the Irish army retired behind the Shannon. This was well judged. Limerick was so well defended, William was obliged to raise the siege. Next year Ginkle took it, for which he was indebted to the desperate situation of James's affairs, and, in consequence thereof, the distracted state of the garrison. Athlone was taken in a gallant manner, owing to the infatuation of St. Ruth. Still a victory was necessary to give William a decided superiority, and Ginkle was obliged to hazard a battle at Aughrim, where the situation of the British was such, that a defeat would to them have been utter ruin.

James's army made good use of the ditches and inclosures, in their positions; but the bayonet was not so well understood then as it is now; and wherever troops are so posted, they should be attacked with that arm. Most attacks upon intrenchments have succeeded, and the reason is obvious: an army is generally distributed through the extent of an intrenchment, and is equally weak everywhere. The assailants, on the contrary, concentrate their force upon certain points, which are carried before the other party can throw in a sufficient force to counterpoise them, and once the intrenchments are entered, the flank and rear of the army is exposed; nor can they make a change of position as they could in the open field, but are tied down to one plan of operation. The only possible way of guarding against these inconveniences, is by having great reserves, but then you must contract your intrenchments, and if the flanks are not secured by the natural position, that is hard to be done, without falling into other difficulties.

The feelings of the human mind also operate. The

man who stands behind the breast-work contemplates his enemy advancing. He apprehends that if he once enters the intrenchment, there is no chance of his safety but by flight. He has time to make all these kind of natural reflections. The assailant, on the contrary, kept in motion, is animated; he looks on his arrival in the works as the period of his danger; he therefore rushes on, and generally succeeds. The French have, this war (20), made a gallant defence of intrenchments; but they have the advantages of artillery, science, and discipline, united with incredible numbers and enthusiasm; a rare combination! In general, a chain of strong redoubts and *fleches* (21), are preferable to lines. It is more difficult to run away from them. That a fewer number can thus defend an equal extent of ground, they must be so near as to support each other mutually. Another advantage which attends them is, that they leave the ground open for the army to manœuvre, as occasion requires. They can advance to take an advantage of any confusion into which the enemy may be thrown; and, if requisite, retire behind the redoubts again; all which, lines will not permit.

It was well judged of Ginkle after passing the bog in the front of the enemy, at Aughrim, to order the infantry to form under the first enclosures or ditches; but the Irish committed an oversight, in leaving any such between them and the bog unoccupied; as they should have levelled all such, had they time enough. St. Ruth does not seem to have taken much pains to strengthen his position. He lost the battle of Aughrim by the same failing which had be-

(20) [*"this war,"*—that is the war of independance after the Great Revolution.]

(21) [*"flèches,"*—simple earthworks of the shape of a \wedge , or of an arrow's head; open behind, and not connected one with another by any wall or continued line of entrenchment.]

fore lost him Athlone—a pertinacious confidence in his own opinion, and contempt for the judgment of others.

[NOTE; ON THE NUMBERS, AT EACH SIDE, ENGAGED AT THE BATTLE OF AUGHRIM. (See p. 24.)]

[The account in the text of the numbers on both sides at the Battle of Aughrim is now known to be incorrect. It is taken from Story, whose loose assertion has been followed without inquiry by Burnet and Le Brune. Mr. O'Callaghan (in Note 228—p. 434—to his singularly erudite and copiously-noted edition of Col. O'Kelly's "Excidium Macariæ," published by the Irish Archaeological Society, in 1840,) has carefully analysed the historical evidences on the whole subject; and he shows that Story's unauthenticated assertion is at variance with the evidence supplied by Captain Parker, an officer who fought at the English side at Aughrim—by King James' Memoirs—by Major-General Dorrington, Colonel of King James' Foot Guards, who was made prisoner at Aughrim—by Colonel Charles O'Kelly, in the "Macariæ Excidium" itself—and by O'Halloran, who states the uniform belief of the Irish on the subject in the generation which succeeded the time of the Battle. Finally, Mr. O'Callaghan himself examined the original records of William's army, and has published "the complements, when perfect, in men and officers, of the British and Anglo-Irish and Huguenot Regiments in William's pay, from a great mass of official and original documents in Trinity College Library, Dublin, and the State Paper Office, and British Museum, London." Mr. O'Callaghan's detailed calculations give on Ginkle's side a total, of Infantry (if perfect) 24,495 officers and soldiers, of Horse (Light Cavalry) 6,837, and of Dragoons (Heavy Cavalry) 2,607. Consequently, he says, "the GRAND TOTAL of his officers and soldiers, Infantry, Horse, and Dragoons, would under such circumstances be 33,939 men—*besides* those connected with the artillery." And he adds that "the military duties to be elsewhere discharged in the country, either in garrisons, or by detachments, were entrusted to a numerous and well-armed Anglo-Irish militia, or yeomanry, and to the 15 remaining regiments of regular infantry, and 2 regiments and 2 troops of regular cavalry, that, with the 48 regiments and 14 troops of Ginkle's army at Aughrim, would make up the total of William III.'s regular forces in Ireland for the year 1691, as stated by Story, at 67 Regiments of the line—*exclusive* of men connected with the artillery." According to the Irish accounts the total numbers under St. Ruth's command at Aughrim did not exceed 17,000 (some say only 15,000.) So that, making every allowance for casual absences on the English side, by reducing the full amount of their army by above 8,000, out of nearly 34,000, it is certain that the real numbers on both sides appear to be those given in the text by Keating, but *reversed*.]

CHAPTER VI.

ON AN ARMED YEOMANRY—CAVALRY—AND FREE CORPS OF INFANTRY (22).

It were much to be wished that the plan of arming the yeomanry, and forming them into corps of cavalry, had been adopted; but it ought to be with much precaution. The principal precaution should be, not to have too many corps, and to pay great attention to having them in good hands. They should not be composed of too great a number of privates; as, for instance, the residence of every yeoman should be within seven miles of the place of rendezvous, in the centre of the whole; nor should their number be too small, as to every corps there ought to be five officers, resident gentlemen of influence and property. In case of the death or resignation of the captain, the next officer in command should invariably succeed him.

(22) [*“on an armed Yeomanry, &c.”*—The suggestions in this chapter are in some respects unsuited to the circumstances of more recent times; it contains nevertheless so many observations of an interesting character that it may be as well not to omit it altogether. The reader will no doubt at once perceive that in speaking of a “yeomanry” no other idea occurred to the mind of Lieutenant Keating, in 1795, than that of a Protestant and exclusively Anglo-Irish or West-British militia. It is also sufficiently plain that the writer of the pamphlet looked upon the country to be “defended” as the mere property of an oligarchy of “resident gentlemen,” in whose eyes the Catholic peasantry, the really Irish people of the South and West, were and were intended to be but *serfs adscripti glebæ*.]

People like those of whom such corps ought to be composed, would be disgusted and quit, were they to be turned over from one commandant to another, with as little ceremony as regulars; and the man who has most interest at court, has not always most interest in the country, *however high he may represent his own consequence there.*

There is not a county in Ireland, which could not make up two such corps of one hundred yeomen each. Some could make up five hundred; but, reckoning one with another, at three hundred to each county, it would make up a body of nine thousand six hundred cavalry, maintained without expense to government, ready to take the field at a day's notice, and fit for any service cavalry could be employed in.

Great care must be taken in giving the command of these corps. If they were given to any but men of liberal principles, it would do more harm than good; a spirit of party would govern in the selection of the corps; this baneful spirit is the destruction of all security in Ireland. All feasting, electioneering, and dissipation, should also be avoided. The less they become either soldiers or gentlemen the better (23). The pride and glory of England is its yeomanry; it was always so since the emancipation of the lower orders from villanage. In Ireland, one or two counties excepted, there has hardly hitherto been any such, till within this century, but they are now [1795], increasing considering them as a body. In Wicklow and Wexford there is a yeomanry that would not disgrace any shire in England.

(23) [*"either soldiers or gentlemen."*—An observation bitter enough, truly, in the mouth of a British officer that knew them! It would appear that the character of the "British soldier" was not much better regarded in 1795, than to-day.]

What makes a yeoman respectable, is the honest pride of conscious independence. The sense of his happy situation attaches him to his native soil, and the constitution of his country; consequently, the yeomen of England have always been found the most difficult to be seduced by the spirit of innovation. An observer of the Irish nation will not perceive much of the foregoing character here; but it depends upon the gentlemen, not the little *soi disant* gentleman, (the greatest tyrant and enemy the poor man has,) but the gentlemen of landed property, to create them; it is only giving them a valuable interest in their small farms (24). When such a thing is so easily done, one would think that the example of the world, and the present times, ought to make them set about it in earnest. Mr. Arthur Young, in his tour through Ireland, saw, and has pointedly and truly detailed the grievance, and the real cause of it; and supplies some excellent hints to the gentlemen of Ireland. The poor man pays the taxes and tithes, his penury supports the splendour of the great, and ultimately he is the man to whom the defence of the country must be intrusted; for it is evident that nothing but imminent danger can arouse the rich, and that does not appear to be a* strong inducement to them to take arms in

* They called *la rue ducale*, at Brussels, in the time of Dumourier's incursion, *la rue des lievres* (the street of the hares).—*Author's Note.*

(24) [*"it is only giving them a valuable interest in their small farms."*—In other words if the people are made to feel that the country is *theirs*, they will be ready to defend it *à l'outrance*. General Keating knew as well as any man that the Irish people have been made to feel precisely the reverse; and if he lived now he would probably say that in the existing condition of *the people* of Ireland they may be more reasonably expected to welcome than to resist any invasion likely to effect a change in the existing land tenure. There have been no real "Yeomen" in Ireland; and it is too late for landlords to attempt to create such a class, even were they sincerely willing to do so. The peasantry of the present generation have been

their hands; or if they were willing to fight for their properties, the number is too small to do it with any effect. For their own safety they ought then to put betimes those arms in the hands of a class of men, in whom they can confide, and not trust their all to the honour and self-denial of the outcasts of mankind, of men whose situation any change whatsoever must better, and who know it (25). The best defence any country can have is a happy, patriotic, and uncorrupted yeomanry. A national debt, and the concomitant evil of revenue laws, have not improved the morals of the people of England and Ireland, but are, on the contrary, it is to be feared, daily sapping the vitals and the strength of the empire.

The establishment of these corps of yeomanry cavalry should be as follows: (26)—To be commanded by five gentlemen of property: one captain, two lieutenants, and two sub-lieutenants, and to consist of one hundred rank and file, composed of gentlemen, persons of independent income, or in trade; farmers and their sons, or near relatives, although not actually in possession of farms; each master of a horse. The arms, appointments, saddles and bridles to be supplied by government; the clothes by themselves. Their clothing should consist of a round hat with a narrow brim; a frieze coat, buttoning down to the waist, and waistcoat; a frieze loose coat, carried on the pommel of the saddle; leather breeches; boots coming well up to

taught by the landlords themselves to look to becoming not “Yeomen” but *Proprietors*.]

(25) [“*outcasts of mankind, &c.*”—Another bitter description of the British soldier, and all the more bitter that it is, generally speaking, terribly true; at least it is most true of the class who alone in Ireland can be tempted to take what it was the fashion in 1843 to call ‘the Saxon Shilling!’]

(26) [“*the establishment,*” &c.—The system here suggested is framed according to the “aristocratic” prejudices of the time; these details, however, are, of course, quite arbitrary.]

the knees; a pair of strong ticken overhose, coming half-way down the leg; a straight one-edged sword, three feet from the pummel to the point, which must be sharp, in an iron scabbard,* like that of the Austrian cavalry, hanging in a waist-belt; one long pistol in the left hol-

* Wooden scabbards break, and leather ones shrink and become useless.—*Author's Note.* [General Keating is quite under a mistake as to iron scabbards; they blunt, and so render useless, even the best of swords. Captain Nolan (whose little work on cavalry tactics is the only good book on the subject in the English language) energetically condemns the English metal scabbard, and warmly advocates, for practical purposes, the wooden scabbards in which to his knowledge the gallant Sikhs of India preserved the edges of their blades (though often but old cast blades of English make and inferior steel) sharp enough to cut off English heads and English limbs at a blow in such charges as Nolan describes, and in which he himself gained such character in his profession. "When I was in India," says Nolan, "an engagement between a party of the Nizam's irregular horse and a numerous body of insurgents took place, in which the horsemen, though greatly inferior in numbers, defeated the Rohillas with great slaughter. My attention was drawn particularly to the fight by the doctor's report of the killed and wounded, most of whom had suffered by the sword, and in the column of remarks such entries as the following were numerous:—'Arm cut off from the shoulder.' 'Head severed.' 'Both hands cut off (apparently at one blow) above the wrists, in holding up the arms to protect the head.' 'Leg cut off above the knee,' &c., &c. I was astounded. Were these men giants to lop off limbs thus wholesale? or was this result to be attributed (as I was told) to the sharp edge of the native blade and the peculiar way of *drawing* it? I became anxious to see these horsemen of the Nizam, to examine their wonderful blades, and learn the knack of lopping off men's limbs. Opportunity soon offered, for the Commander-in-Chief went to Hyderabad on a tour of inspection, in which I accompanied him. After passing the Kisna River a squadron of these very horsemen joined the camp as part of the escort. And now fancy my astonishment! The sword-blades they had were chiefly old dragoon blades cast from our service. The men had mounted them after their own fashion. The hilt and handle, both of metal, small in the grip, *rather flat, not round like ours, where the edge seldom falls true; they all had an edge like a razor from heel to point, and were worn in wooden scabbards*; a short single string held them to the waist-belt, from which a strap passed through the hilt to a button in front, to keep the sword steady and

ster (27), and four pistol cartridges in a magazine with the holster; in the other holster two horse-shoes and two sets of nails; a haversack with a stiff leather bottom, to use as a nose-bag, should be all their baggage.

These corps should assemble on Sundays (28), after service, and on holidays, to practice moving in squadron, charging, breaking into file, and forming squadron from that to right and left, front and rere. They should also practice the sword, &c., the manner of posting videttes, patrolling a country, escorting a convoy, repeating signals, breaking, dispersing and forming, and also learn how to cross an enclosed country.

When an enemy is even in the country, these corps

prevent it flying out of the scabbard. *The swords are never drawn except in action.*"

"*Thinking the wooden scabbards,*" continues Captain Nolan, "*might be objected to as not suitable for campaigning, I got a return from one of these regiments and found the average of broken scabbards below that of the regulars, who have steel ones. The steel is snapped by a kick or a fall; the wood, being elastic, bends. They are not in the man's way; when dismounted they do not get between his legs and trip him up; they make no noise—a soldier on sentry of a dark night might move about without betraying his position to an enemy by the clanking of the rings against the scabbard. All that rattling noise in column, which announces its approach when miles off, and makes it so difficult to hear a word of command in the ranks, is thus got rid of; as well as the necessity of wrapping straw or hay round the scabbards, as now customary when engaged in any service in which an attempt is to be made to surprise an enemy.*"—(pp. 105, 107, of *Cavalry, its History and Tactics*; by Captain L. E. NOLAN, 15th Hussars; London, T. Bosworth, 1853).]

(27) [*"one long pistol in the left holster."*—At the present day, of course, the weapon employed would be a "revolver," or rather a "repeater" of Colt's manufacture—a very satisfactory arm.]

(28) [*"should assemble on Sundays."*—And surely if Ireland had her "National Guard" of Irish peasant volunteers, no better, healthier, more manly and becoming as well as innocent and rational recreation could be devised for the Sunday afternoon, after last Mass, in every parish, than regular public military exercise, and especially practise in the skilful use of the sword.]

ought not to be called into the field. When embodied, there would be full use for them in their respective counties, by employing them guarding magazines, convoys, assisting the quarter-masters and officers of stores in providing forage and provisions, and in maintaining internal peace. They should do orderly duty, if in the field, and be also cantoned about the army, but not commanded but by their own officers. They would probably in general act in small corps of twenty-five each, commanded by a lieutenant. While these corps remain in their counties, an officer, resident in the county for the purpose, and appointed by government, should make quarterly inspections of the troops, drawing the whole together for one day; this would give them a spirit of emulation; and he should report the strength and state of each troop, and the condition of their arms and appointments, for which each captain should be answerable. When employed, they should receive a high pay, 2s 6d a day, and draw rations for themselves and horses. Such a corps would be intimately acquainted with the passes, roads, &c., of their respective counties, and would be invaluable sources of information for the generals.

They could detect any treachery on the part of the country people (29), over whom, on account of the class from which they are drawn, they would have a much greater influence than any troops, solely military, could have. The pay seems high, but it must be made worth their while to quit their homes and occupations; besides,

(29) [*“treachery on the part of the country people.”*—This casual observation shows pretty clearly from what point of view Lieutenant Keating wrote. He is, in fact, speaking all along of an English Protestant “yeomanry” garrison of Ireland, and naturally takes for granted that the Catholic Irish “country people” would sympathise altogether with the enemies of that garrison, from whatever quarter they might present themselves.]

they could not in their way live as cheap, by forming messes, &c., as the military do. The evolutions of such a corps ought, as above stated, to be as simple as possible. Everything should be done by file. The squadrons to act on a small front. The formations from file may be simplified as follows, and which contains every possible formation:—

The squadron should always file from the right, consequently have it in front. To form from file to the front, each man moves rapidly up on the left of his file-leader, and dresses to the right. To form to the rere, the leading file of front rank turns to the left about and halts, his rere-rank man covering him. Each file gallops on till they come on his left, then turn to the left about, close, and dress to the right. To form to the right, the right file turns to his right, the rest pass in the rere, turn to the right and dress. To form to the left, the whole have only individually to turn to the left, dress, and close to the right. These simple evolutions, with the charge, and wheeling in squadron, and going about by subdivision, are all that are necessary for such a corps to know, and this they might be taught in a week.

A corps of *Hulans* (30), which were in the service of the King of Poland, answered very well the idea of a yeomanry cavalry, and their establishment might be with little variation adopted here. They were Tartars and Mahomedans. The gentleman served in the front rank, and carried a lance with a banderole, and a sabre; his servant covered him in the rere rank, armed with a carbine and sabre. The use of the lance for the cavalry is not sufficiently understood. Great advantages may be derived from it, either in the charge or pursuit. The Cossacks use them in passing rivers;

(30) [*“Hulans.”—i.e., Hussars.*]

they sound the depth of the water before them with the butt of the lance.

Corps of peasantry (infantry) should be formed, of whom certainly, upon an average, four hundred could be found, who, under proper officers, might be entrusted with arms, in every county*. They might be formed in corps of fifty, each commanded by three officers, to wear their own clothing. They should have a musket, without a bayonet (31); a pouch like the new magazines, to hold cartridges and balls, a powder-horn, and a sword two inches and a-half broad, straight and pointed, and two feet in length, handle included, in a wooden scabbard. This weapon is somewhat similar to that of the Roman Legionaries, and is useful in the attack of a post, intrenchment, &c. They should not quit their county, and ought

* A person who considers every grey-coated man as a Defender, will shudder at the idea of arming any of the Irish peasantry. Let such weigh well this calculation:—There must be at least twenty-three grand jurors in every county in Ireland; what description of people must these be, if twenty of that number are not of sufficient consequence and influence in their county, to produce among their friends, tenants and dependents, with their adherents, twenty men each, to whom they would entrust arms for mutual defence? If this calculation is just, the number required is completed. These corps should assemble for practice on Sunday and holiday evenings; it would be an amusement, and tend to prevent idleness and debauchery. Where there is a police, the constables should be enrolled in them, and might act as subordinate officers.—*Author's Note.* [*"... shudder at the idea of arming any of the Irish peasantry."*—In 1795, as even in our own days, the English knew very well what to expect from an armed Irish peasantry, and they have ever since taken especial care (witness the prodigious number of Acts of Parliament passed with this sole object in view) to keep the Irish peasantry unarmed. The trusty "adherents" of the grand juror class in Ireland, spoken of by Keating, were, of course, the Orange yeomanry exclusively!]

(31) [*"without a bayonet."*—Certainly not; the arm now to be preferred would, of course, be a light rifle (such as the Enfield), with the sword described in the text fitted to be used as a bayonet at need—that is, just such an arm as at present used by the English Rifle regiments.]

to be commanded by persons to whom they are attached by interest. When on duty they should receive a shilling a day and their rations. They should be practised at firing at a mark*, covering and concealing themselves, always acting two together, the one not firing till the other is loaded; but they should never be troubled with any manœuvre, either of tactic or parade, which always destroys the energy of the human faculties, and so far destroys the effect which ought to be derived from light troops.

It will be right to consider, in case of an invasion, what will be the probable turn of mind of the people. Some of the peasantry would remain quiet spectators of the events of the war; some would join that party who seemed to bid fairest for success; others will join whoever invites them by an offer of plunder. Some governments are afraid to put arms in the hands of the peasantry, for fear they should turn them against those by whom they were intrusted with them. It is a vain precaution, because if they are determined upon it, they will find the means of getting them from the scene of war. According to the disposition they seemed to be in; if they showed a good will to the cause, they might be attached to the army, form a chain of out-posts, get intelligence, &c. If they showed also a wavering disposition, they might be put at a considerable distance in the rear. They might also be employed to drive the cattle up the country, though this would be a precarious experiment. But then the question

* Was this system of free corps of peasantry adopted, they might be invited to join the standard or ordered back. If they were armed with pieces of a larger bore and greater length, to rest in order to take aim, the weight, as they have nothing else to carry, would not be of consequence, and they would throw a ball double the distance of the ordinary muskets.—*Author's Note.* [This was the weapon of the celebrated "Shelmalier" marksmen of '98. But modern improvements in the rifle have quite superseded the use of so cumbrous a gun.]

to be asked is, Can the soldiers be spared for that service at such a time?

In the year 1778, an invasion of England by the French was talked of. The instructions given by government were, that the army should drive the cattle up the country, and the farmers and peasantry march down to meet the enemy on the coast. It is to be supposed they meant to arm them. Probably they did not choose to trust them to drive their own cattle, as supposing, if a farmer could get a better price for his sheep from the French, than he could from his own countrymen, he would prefer the former (32). Some of the depots they had fixed on were not five miles from the coast; they ought always to be farther than a possible day's march: the cavalry patrolled from village to village, often out of sight even of the coast, in the idea of conveying intelligence of the appearance of the enemy. Fixed stations of infantry, with signal staffs on the heights, are preferable. If either yeomanry, cavalry, or corps of peasantry, should be ordered from home, their families should not be suffered to go with them, but receive a maintenance from the magazines; they would be in fact a kind of hostage for their fidelity.

It would be necessary to form corps of burghers, in the cities and considerable towns, under the municipal officers; they would not require clothing. In the time of danger, with proper encouragement, every housekeeper would associate with his neighbours, for the mutual security of their properties. *

It would, perhaps, be alleged, it is dangerous to do all this; these people are not to be entrusted with arms, be-

(32) [!]

* These are universally formed on the continent [under the name of the NATIONAL GUARD]; they frequently are not clothed; a man

cause they might use them against government. But, surely, the times are replete with danger; there is danger in every step we can take; and all prudence can do, is, to weigh these dangers well, and adopt the lesser. If you do not put (it might be said to government) confidence in the people, they will not put confidence in you. In the time of alarm they will associate with those, who can afford protection from the mob of the country. That protection the enemy will offer them; they will offer them arms if they were wanted, which they are not, for the country is full of arms. It is better, at all events, to assume the appearance of confidence while it can be done, for sooner or later the people must ultimately be resorted to.

Let us now suppose, what will [1795] be the probable consequence of a peace; trade will open between this country and France; the wants of the two nations are mutual; we want many things they have, and they want all the articles our country produces. Our ports would be filled with their shipping, and our country overrun with their people. Can it be supposed they will not import their principles? It will be answered—but they must be kept down. It is just as possible to stop the progress of time, as to stop the progress of thought; now that the people everywhere are beginning to discover

may do his duty as well in a brown coat as a red one; all parade is mere childishness, answering merely *ad captandum vulgus*. The most important posts in Paris are entrusted to the citizens. One would think that would convince those who can be convinced by anything, of the real state of the nation with whom we are at war [1795]. As to the armed peasantry, if they are commanded by officers who understand that service, and, of course, to teach them (which they would soon learn) how to act, they would be as useful in the field, in such a country as this, as the best regulars in Europe. The peasantry in Brittany, of whom the Chouans (so called from their war-cry) are a part, much resemble ours in the more remote parts, and we see what they were capable of doing; but they were commanded by able officers.—*Author's Note.*

their own strength, it must be admitted that the few cannot govern the many, except by opinion.*

* This has been called the Age of Reason, but it ought more properly to be, of Reasoning—of Discussion and Investigation.—*Author's Note.*

CHAPTER VII.

SYSTEM OF DEFENCE BY CORDONS. (33.)

THE King of Prussia defends [1795] the Margraviate of Brandenburg, on the side of Saxony, by a camp at Wittenberg; on the side of Hanover, by the post of Werben; which, as he observes, secures it.

Foland recommends, for the defence of a river, when it is part of a cordon, small corps of two thousand men every five miles. This, with the reserves, would constitute a body of thirty thousand men, to defend fifty miles of front. His account of the battle of Cassano, and passage of the Adda, is very instructive.

Lloyd says, the more extensive a frontier the easier defended, because those who attack can act on one line only, whereas those who defend can act on several. There is scarce a spot from which those who defend may not draw supplies, whereas those who attack can draw them but from one. An assailing army should endeavour to come

(33) [*“System of Defence by Cordons.”*—The student must not by any means pay implicit deference to the opinions expressed by Gen. Keating in this Chapter. In the hands of a first-rate general the *Cordon* system may, indeed, often be made to work effectively; but it is open to the serious objection that it divides the army of defence in such a manner as to risk the safety of the whole by exposing the base of operations to be carried by an active enemy whose whole force may be brought to bear suddenly upon that single point; and it is always dangerous in so far as it is likely to afford so many opportunities to such enemy to overpower and destroy the several divisions in detail. If the defending army be so numerous in comparison with

to a decisive action; a defending army should avoid one, or endeavour to render it indecisive.

The line of operations, is a line drawn from the point where your magazines, or subsistence, is collected. That which constitutes the ultimate object of your campaign, be your intention offensive or defensive, an invading army must choose the shortest time of operations; that of the defending army must be governed by the line adopted by the attacker.

If the defending army occupies a pass in front of the attacker, the latter must send a corps in the rear of it. If this corps is not beaten, the defending army must retire. The best way of destroying an invading army, is by acting on its flanks.

Before the system of defence is proceeded on, it is necessary to examine the possible routes for an enemy to take

that of the enemy as to allow of an army of reserve of fully equal numbers to be held in hand in a central position, the *cordon* may, indeed, be garrisoned by the remainder; but that is almost the only case in which the 'system' advocated in the text can be held to be a safe one. In such a case the several detachments, however, will really only be outposts of more than ordinary strength. The Chapter is allowed to stand here, however, as a suggestive example of the author's treatment of a military problem—and that, although the railway system of the present time, as well as other circumstances, so materially affect the data upon which General Keating's detailed plan was founded—the rather that it contains many observations of much practical interest in connexion with the military strength of Ireland as a theatre of war. But it would be out of place to endeavour here to explain the principles of the Art of War upon the basis of which alone a sound judgment can be exercised concerning the theory unfolded in the text. A careful study of either of Napoleon's Italian campaigns will readily supply even an ordinary reader with examples enough on the subject; and if he is disposed to go deeper into the matter he must be referred at once to the great text book upon the science of strategy, General Jomini's *Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires*, in which a military history of the great Frederick's performance in the 'Seven Years' War' is made the means of accurately analysing and defining the true principles and best practice of the Art, and see APPENDIX, *post*,—at the end.]

to strike at the capital, which is we suppose the object of his attack.

They are as follows:—

Landing in Lough Foyle,

- | | | |
|---------------|---|------------------------|
| 1. Strabane | } | Eight days' march (34) |
| 2. Omagh | | |
| 3. Augher | | |
| 4. Monaghan | | |
| 5. Cootehill | | |
| 6. Kingscourt | | |
| 7. Navan | | |
| 8. Dublin | | |

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Secondly, by 1. Enniskillen | } | Nine days' march. |
| 2. Cavan | | |
| 3. Athboy | | |

- | | | | |
|-------------|-----------|---|--------------------|
| Thirdly, by | Dungannon | } | Eight days' march. |
| | Armagh | | |
| | Dundalk | | |

- | | | | |
|----------------|-----------|---|--------------------|
| From Sligo, by | Carrick | } | Seven days' march. |
| | Mullingar | | |

- | | | |
|----------------------|---|------------------|
| From the Shannon, by | } | Nine days' march |
| Limerick | | |
| Birr, or | | |
| Maryboro' | | |

- | | | |
|-------------------------------|---|------------------|
| From Cork and the S. west, by | } | Ten days' march. |
| Clonmel and | | |
| Kilkenny, | | |
| or | | |
| Cashel and | | |
| Durrow | | |

(34) [*“Eight days' march,”*—*“nine days' march,”* &c.—On the supposition, of course, of the absence of railway communication.]

From Galway, by	} Six days' march.
Roscommon	
Lanesboro'	
Cross the Shannon	
Mullingar, or by	
Athenry	
Athlone	
Cross the Shannon	
Kilbeggan, or by	
Loughrea	
Banagher or Portumna	}
Cross the Shannon	
Portarlington	

From this statement, it appears, that the line from Galway to Dublin, being the shortest line of operation, is that which it is most probable an enemy will adopt.

We may suppose a probable attack to be made by the enemy, thus: That he has established himself at Galway, and advances on his line of operation towards Dublin. He advances to the Shannon, leaves an intermediate post at Kilconnel, and menaces Athlone, Banagher and Portumna, or Clonfert. This compels you to divide your force. He attacks one pass, penetrates and advances.

We suppose a plan of defence by cordons. The first cordon embracing the capital, thus:

1. The Boyne to Trim,
2. Edenderry,
3. Rathangan,
4. Kilcullen,
5. Liffey,

From that to

Blessington,
Bray River,
Sea.

This gives a cordon of sixty miles; the extremity of each flank being thirty miles distant from the centre; sup-

posing it defended by one army, posted at or near Edenderry; the sea on each flank.

SECOND CORDON.

1. Gore's Bridge,
2. Kilkenny,
3. Roscrea,
4. Banagher,
5. Athlone,
6. Colehill,
7. Finae,
8. Kingscourt.

Three corps would be necessary on this, *pour se donner mutuellement les mains*.

THIRD CORDON.

1. Cork,
2. Charleville,
3. Limerick,
4. Shannon to
5. Carrick,
6. Enniskillen,
7. Dungannon,
8. Newry.

This is a line of twelve days' march (35), constituting the exterior cordon, of which the Shannon is a principal part of the frontier. This should be occupied by camps or cantonments, and is the grand line of operation, and that whereon the troops should remain until the enemy de-

(35) ["*twelve days' march*," &c.—This observation is, of course, unfounded under the circumstances of the present time, for the reason, so often referred to, that if the railway communications be kept up there can be no difficulty in moving an army in as many *hours*, almost, as it would have required *days* in 1795. The movements of the French army in Italy during the late war (1859) must have made every one by this time familiar with the military uses of a modern railway.]

velopes his plans. This line would require the following force, thus distributed, viz.:—

At Cork	4,000 men
Charleville	1,000
Limerick	3,000
Athlone	6,000
Enniskillen	1,000
Dungannon	2,000
Newry	1,000
With a strong advanced camp at					} 5,000
Galway	
Killaloe	2,000
Portumna	2,000
Lanesboro'	2,000
Carrick	1,000

30,000 Total.

The reasons why it is probable an enemy would prefer Galway to any other of the possible routes, are, that those by the north, as well as by the south-west of the kingdom, are less capable of supplying his army; besides, that the face of the country presents much more difficulty to him, and would oblige him to proceed with more slowness and caution, than the route from Galway would require, which would be disadvantageous to him, in addition to the line of operations being considerably longer. From Galway the country is more open. If he crosses at Lanesboro', he has afterwards the Inny to cross, which affords a position. Banagher is on a salient bow of the river, and therefore capable of defence.

Lloyd says, if a river runs along your frontier endeavour to occupy two or three capital points on it, with good and extensive fortresses, so that you may not only cover your own country, but also make it impossible for an enemy to penetrate without giving you an opportunity of entering his, and cutting off his subsistence.

Of a river on a frontier he also says, though it be not navigable, it may be of great use in military operations, if it runs parallel to the frontier and crosses the principal roads, because it then furnishes good positions on its banks. An army cannot prevent the enemy throwing a bridge under the protection of his artillery, but it may prevent him from occupying such an extent of ground as is necessary for him to deploy, and may attack it in any part without being exposed to his artillery.

An invading army requires the direct roads to be in good order, and the cross-roads broken. A defending army, on the contrary, should cause the direct roads to be broken, and the cross-roads made good.

The centre of the cordons of defence, is one and the same with the point of the enemy's line of operation, that is of course Dublin; the grand or exterior cordon being fully occupied with its due proportion of troops, and an advanced army stationed at Galway, which, for the reasons before and hereafter to be specified, is most likely to be the point of debarkation. Having fortresses fully garrisoned on the Shannon, and a strong garrison in the capital, with a camp of reserve between it and the grand cordon, and able to act upon either, the island may then, so far as the exterior enemy is in question, be considered as able to make a stand; for it would be presumptuous indeed to say, it was in a complete state of defence. The troops supposed to be destined for the cordon, garrisons, &c., must be infantry and artillery, with small detachments of light cavalry to each corps or army; and hosts of the same along the coast, for which service 3,000 light cavalry would be sufficient; the remainder of the cavalry cantoned through the counties to maintain internal peace, which, reckoning three hundred in each county, a low computation, would take 10,000 more; the

garrison for the capital to be five thousand, and the army of reserve ten thousand. The number of troops, therefore, requisite to put this country in a state of safety, would thus amount to something less than sixty thousand men actually fit for the field.

If the question is asked, why disperse your army in a cordon?—keep them in great bodies, able to march to any point at a minute's notice. To this it is to be observed, that it is only possible to guess where the descent may be made. They may threaten* five points at the same time, and it shall be impossible to the stations on the coast to tell which is the real attack, until they have absolutely landed. Suppose five expresses to government, from different quarters of the island, announce an enemy on the coast. Three of these perhaps are squadrons of frigates; one an army of amusement, making a feint; the other the grand army. If the army for defence of the kingdom is in two camps, it is impossible that the army of the south could quit its station to act in the north, and *vice versa*. But even if it could be imprudent enough to do so on the first report, what would be the consequence? The false attacks meeting no resistance would become real ones. But where are the magazines to maintain together a great force in one point? How will they be supplied on the march? Either you quit your magazines to meet

* The French bring great numbers into action. Where a nation has such immense force of men, it is generally misapplied; they throw their numbers into such vast bodies, as to become unmanageable. The true way of employing them to advantage has been discovered by the French, of dividing and attacking upon many points at once. This forces their enemy to divide; he is of course inferior everywhere, and beaten in detail. It is never the interest of the smaller force to divide, if it can keep together. An army of forty thousand men may beat an army of eighty thousand, because that number cannot be brought into action. But divide them into four parts: the four armies of twenty thousand will invariably beat those composed of ten.—*Author's Note.*

the enemy on the coast, or you remain in your central position (not being able to quit them), for the enemy are to come to you; in that case you are obliged to act on a cordon. Immediately on such intelligence as above coming to the seat of government, what would be the orders? —not to march, but—report; a second report must be made, and how soon? by the time the enemy have actually debarked, and when they are formed on your coast. Then, indeed, comes the word, march! but in what form? you meet the enemy on the coast if he chooses to wait there; if he does not, *where* do you meet him? If it is not too presumptuous it might be said, it *must* be on some part of the cordon, as above laid down. You come to an action; if you beat him, you pursue him. But suppose it turns out otherwise, that he comes on you with superior force, or beats you, you *must* retreat to the second cordon, to the third cordon; concentrate your force there, if you can; if not, fall back on the capital.

But if your armies are in two great corps, your magazines must be with them. If you march down then to the coast, your line of operation becomes longer than your enemy's. Yet the whole of your magazines must follow, or you may be cut off from them. If you cannot keep the field, but must come to an immediate action for want of them, you do exactly what the enemy wishes. Your centre magazines would be much better supplied by substituting smaller ones in different stations.

It will be proved from experience, that the system of cordons has always been adopted, and when it has failed the fault was not there. The reason why the system of cordons is the best, are: First, your troops are easier maintained: Secondly, they are easier drawn together: Thirdly, their positions must be better chosen: and, Fourthly, that if the enemy, after being opposed in

force on the cordon, succeeds and penetrates, he does not get at your magazines, but you cut off his; for when he advances, the troops left on the cordon act upon the flanks of his line of operations, cut off his supplies, and harass his rere. If he defeats your army, your grand magazines fall into his hands; but if they are detached upon the cordon, he cannot turn out of his line to seize them.

That they are easier maintained, being dispersed at twenty or fifteen miles distance, than if they were assembled in a grand army at any one point, is pretty obvious. The reason why they are easier drawn together is this: their magazines are not confined to a point. Thus, for example, an enemy is in the west; orders come for the troops on the grand cordon to rendezvous at Athlone; the orders are issued, and the post is occupied as follows:

First day, garrison consists of	6,000 men.
That day there arrives from Portumna ..	2,000
Lanesboro' ..	2,000
At Galway ..	5,000

There are thus brought together in one day	15,000
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The second day,—from Killaloe	2,000	}	3,000
Carrick	1,000		

The third day from Dublin the army			
of reserve ..	10,000	}	14,000
Enniskillen	1,000		
Limerick	3,000		

32 000

Thus 32,000 men are brought together in three days. There is no difficulty for forage, &c., as they find it at the several posts on their march upon the cordon. The same in regard to carriages; the roads, it is supposed, they must have in proper order, and be well acquainted with. The

army of reserve should be able to march, for instance, on at least two columns; the troops from the cordon, being fewer in number, might march on one. It would not be necessary for the magazines to follow, for this reason, that if there is at Athlone provisions for six thousand men (as there ought) for two months, there are provisions for thirty thousand for ten days; and during the interval of the enemy's being on the coast, they should forage with large parties in the front of their cordon, and if possible reduce it to a desert. But if the army waits the advance of the enemy, whatever redundant forage is collected, should be sent back at least behind the second cordon, and not more than fourteen days' provisions left with the grand army at one time.

The troops on the extremity of the frontier, would at the same time close inwards. A detachment from Cork would occupy Limerick in three days, and from Dungannon to Carrick in the same period. If the grand army is beaten, those flank corps act upon the flanks of the enemy as he advances; and the defending army occupies the position previously ascertained on the second cordon, where its magazines are ready formed. It must be observed, that there are forced marches, but certainly not an unreasonable calculation, for an army freed from baggage, and the longest march not exceeding three days.

The positions upon these cordons, forage, and roads, should be previously examined, and the state of forage both in front and rere reported. Where the roads are not good they should be repaired, and where wanting opened.

The advantage also of a cordon is, that by retreating you concentrate your force; thus, if not strong enough to oppose on the first cordon, call back all your troops to the second. This will be further elucidated, by considering Dalton's cordon, between the Elbe and Iser.

If the alarm is a false one, the troops are easily counter-manded. If the enemy lands on a flank, it of course takes double the time to bring the same number together; therefore, the reserves should be stationed a portée of the weakest part, and the flanks strengthened as much as possible; at all events, positions should be chosen in the rear to assemble on. Wherever an action is to be risked, the defending army have it in their power to appoint the field, which is in front of their position. This they can turn to their advantage thus: if they are superior in cavalry, open the ground for 800 yards front of the flanks, and occupy it by the cavalry. If your army manœuvres, give yourself room. If it is composed of troops that you cannot rely on in face of an enemy, occupy the hedges and ditches, taking care to cut intervals in them, but always so that they are flanked with musketry. Break up all the passes, roads, &c., in front of your grand cordon, except what it is for your own convenience to keep.

Always forage in front. Keep not more than fourteen days' provisions in the magazines on your grand cordon; from them also on your second, and send back all your redundancy there. The enemy will thus find nothing on landing. The advanced corps on the coast should never have more there than one week's provisions in the magazines. Dalton occupied his famous position between the Iser and the Elbe, with twenty-six battalions and fourteen squadrons, forming an arc of upwards of a hundred miles, the mountains in his front, the curve towards the enemy.

They were cantoned as follows:

Reichenberg,	2 Battalions.	Memes & Gabel	2
Lagebruch	2	Leitnerity & Teschen	2
Bomish Ancher	4	Seefersdorf	2
Lebenau	2	Penkraty	2
Reichstadt & }	2	Remburg	1
Leipee		Georgethal	1

The cavalry distributed by Greisdorf, Einsiedal, Ober and Nieder Grand, were cantoned in the open country, and in the centre of his line; his infantry in the mountainous parts. Had he been attacked, his intention was to take a position between Reichenberg and the Jeschkow-berg. As he fell back, he would have at the same time concentrated his forces. The King of Prussia said his position was stronger than the citadel of Lisle. By the excellence of this cordon, the hereditary dominions are covered by 30,000 men effectually; but these points are all studied by the Austrian and Prussian officers, in time of peace, and when they go into the field, they are perfectly acquainted with the strong and weak part of every position.

M. Catinat was obliged, in 1692, to defend a greater frontier with about the same force, but failed for want of magazines and carriages. An army cannot be expected to act if deprived thus of locomotive powers. His line of defence extended from the Lake of Geneva to the Mediterranean.

Two examples of passage of a river are selected, because they furnish an idea of the system of frontier war. The Prince of Conti, obliged to pass the Rhine, retired to his two bridges, a league below Worms, where the Rhine forms an elbow. He encamped at Nordheim, the brook Hoffheim to his right, the river Wirchnitz to his left, a part of his army thrown back along this river to the village of Vattenheim; he threw up detached redoubts, which supported each other mutually along the whole front, between the two rivers, and some near the village of Bolstat, a quarter of a league in his front; five

N.B.—Soldiers should learn to use shoes like the Croats, of undressed leather; by which an infinite trouble in campaigns would be saved.—*Author's Note.*

redoubts were made round the heads of the bridges, and the enemy could not pass without first taking them. The baggage passed during the night. At day-break a corps of cavalry showed itself, formed at Bolstat, and the army crossed the Rhine. When the troops formed before Bolstat, who masked the retreat, began also to retire, they were harassed by some irregulars, but being supported, retired in order to the redoubts, covering the bridges; *these* checked the enemy, and they were pursued and driven back to Bolstat. Here the superiority of redoubts over lines proved itself. The enemy could not have been pursued from the latter without the army's defiling, by which a precious time would have been lost.

Montecuculi wished to penetrate into Alsace by Strasburgh, where also his magazines and bridges were. Turenne taking a position near that city, compelled it to a neutrality, and of course entrance was refused to Montecuculi, but it was the latter's object to remove Turenne from his position commanding Strasburgh; he therefore made a feint as if he meant to besiege Philipsburgh. It was also Turenne's object to cut off Montecuculi's communication with Strasburgh, and thereby from his magazines and bridge. When therefore the latter moved towards Philipsburgh, Turenne threw a reinforcement into that place, and then crossed the Rhine, and occupied the strong camp of Vilstett, by which he carried the following great points: he cut off Montecuculi's communication with his magazines, carried the war out of his own country, prevented any possibility of the enemy's penetrating there, and ultimately obliged his adversary to fall back and lose the whole campaign, as effectually as he could have done it by the most signal defeat.

This is a most instructive lesson, where the war is carried on upon great rivers which are not easily fordable;

when that happens the business assumes a new face; and it is necessary to watch everywhere, the grand army retaining a central position, a partiè, to succour the whole. The scene of Montecuculi's manœuvres was about sixty miles in extent.

CHAPTER VIII.

ANOTHER PLAN.

ANOTHER system of defence may be, by concentrating the great force of the kingdom at Athlone, and forming the military depôt for the whole there, leaving garrisons of not less than 5,000 men in the capital, and in the north and west parts of the kingdom. In this case it would be necessary to have a large force in the county of Cork, as it would otherwise take six days' march for an army, in case of an enemy landing there. Limerick also must be strongly occupied; but if Galway were threatened at the same time, the Athlone army would be held in check; while an army landing in the south-west could march direct by Clonmel and the Barrow, crossing that river and leaving it on its left for Dublin; the whole of which route the country is abundantly provided with all things necessary for its support. In that case, if the Cork army acts on the flank of the enemy, the Athlone army must fall back on Dublin. This gives an enemy, if in any force on the coast of Galway, an opportunity of landing and penetrating to the Shannon; then the enemy's two armies might effect a junction, as to a moral certainty; all the out corps must be called in, to form and defend the capital.

If the grand army is attacked with a great force on the Leinster side of the Shannon, and at the same time with another force from Galway, its retreat is cut off; it can occupy no position, and must if defeated be destroyed, and the island conquered; therefore, it cannot in that case

stay there, it must fall back to the third cordon; then all its magazines at Athlone are lost.

If a central army marches to the south point of the kingdom, it cannot protect the Shannon, and if the Shannon is ever gained by an enemy's army of 40,000 men, all the forces of the empire will not dislodge it; nor could the army from the south fall back in time to protect the capital. At any rate the magazines ought not to be formed at Athlone, but considerably in the rear. It is also certain, that take what position on the Shannon you will, if a hostile detachment lands either in the north or west, it is on your rear; you must either beat it or retire. Nor can a cordon be formed according to this plan; the communication with the capital must be maintained by an intermediate post. Let the great position be where it will, Dublin must be maintained, in order to preserve the communication with England. This intermediate force must be strong, or it is nothing; if you make it strong, you so far diminish the force you oppose to the enemy.

CHAPTER IX.

ON CAMPS—POSITIONS—AND INUNDATIONS.

THE King of Prussia says, get good provincial charts and study them, impressing on the mind the names and situations of cities, rivers, and chains of mountains. Having acquired a general idea of the country, proceed to particulars; examine the direction of the roads, where an attack would be likely to be attended with most ease and success, and what force would be required; how far rivers are navigable, and where fordable; discover if they are dry in summer, or impassable in winter; observe the state of the lands, and what the general produce is; by what route an army can march from one city or river to another, and mark the best positions on these routes. Of plain and open countries we easily acquire an idea, of mountainous and woody with more difficulty, yet they must be known; ride into them with your map in your hand; take peasants, hunters, &c., with you; ascend the highest grounds, compare their answers with your map. Observe how many columns could march, or if it is possible to turn the enemy's rear or flank. Mark where a defensive camp could be taken, but particularly observe the gorges, or debouchures. Revolve in your mind all the possible contingencies that can take place in those situations, so that if they become the seat of war, you may carry a clear impression of the whole in your mind. This must be done while you have leisure, and are unobstructed.

The following circumstances are required and absolutely necessary to a camp, viz., wood [fuel] and water. The front should be covered, and the rear open.

The coup d'œil consists in the following faculties; the first is, to judge how many troops will occupy a certain position, from examining it with the eye. The second, which is a much more arduous talent, consists in being able to seize at once (mentally) and decide upon every advantage the locality can give. [This talent practice can acquire and perfect.] An able general turns the smallest height, a hollow road, a ditch, to his advantage.

The square of six miles will afford two hundred positions, and no two alike. A general's eye at the first glance decides which of all of them is the best.

Nothing is so difficult (says the King) as to defend the passage of a river for a considerable length. I would never undertake it if it exceeded fifty miles, or was fordable. He remarks, that if you have a river in front, your field of battle must be within half musket shot of your position (36).

The King of Prussia says, in choosing a position for a camp, to cover a country, it is not merely the strength of that position which is to be considered, but its relative situation; that is to say that it must not only be strong, but it must be so situated that, notwithstanding its strength, the enemy *must* attack it, in order to proceed upon his plans (37). It cannot be expected that such a

(36) [*“within half musket shot,”* &c.—It need scarcely be observed that since the date of the pamphlet (and the time of the celebrated King of Prussia) the improvements in fire-arms are such that the “half musket shot” of those days would not be much more than one-sixth of the distance which to-day might be described in the same words.]

(37) [*“choosing a position for a camp.”*—The principles upon which the position for a camp is chosen are so inseparably connected with the science of tactics that it would be impossible to make them

position should cover every possible road that the enemy could advance on; but it must command those which are most material to his grand design. It must be such a one, that in case of attack, the army which defends it must have no cause of apprehension, and that the enemy must have great doubt of his success; and also such a one that the enemy cannot avoid, without subjecting himself to the greatest risk and inconveniency,—that he must make wide circuitous marches to avoid it, while I by small movements can anticipate him in all his attempts.

The position at Nieustadt covers all Lower Silesia, on the side of Moravia, a frontier of a hundred miles; the river and town in front of the post. If the enemy attempts to pass between Ollmachen and Glatz, a movement between Neufs and Ziegenhals cuts his communication off with Moravia; a camp between Schomberg and Lieban, guards Silesia on the side of Bohemia. An enemy cannot advance on the side of Cone, if I am posted between Troppau and Yagerndorff; if he does, his convoys are cut off (38).

intelligible otherwise than by explaining the elementary principles of that science. The inquiring reader may be referred to the *Cours de Tactique*, par G. H. DUFOUR, (the present General-in-chief of the Army of the Swiss Confederation, formerly an officer in the service of the Great Emperor Napoleon, and the first authority in Europe during the last thirty years upon these subjects,) a little volume published by Cherbuliez, Paris, and Geneva; also to the *Memorial pour les Travaux de Guerre*, by the same author; and to M. URBAIN'S *Memorial des Camps*, Arnheim, 1827; besides, upon the general subject of Strategy, the great works of General JOMINI. In the English language the best, if not the only valuable, book of reference is the *Aide-Memoire of Military Sciences* ("framed from contributions of officers of different services, and edited by a Committee of the Corps of Royal Engineers in Dublin, 1845"), published in six parts, or vols., by J. Weale, London, 1845-59; especially part I., vol. I. (1845), and part I., vol. II. (1848).—See also APPENDIX, *post.*]

(38) [The examples in this paragraph, taken from the military positions of Frederick the Great, can only be understood by reference

Positions are natural fortification. All that is requisite is the talent to see and to choose them. From the above example the following conclusion is to be drawn· that however necessary fortresses may be, and however expedient it is for a nation to have its most important posts fortified, yet that they do not constitute the best or only defence of a country; and that it is by manœuvring armies, and able generals, that they are to be either conquered or defended.

It is always prudent to intrench the camp in the neighbourhood of the enemy, taking care to leave many and large debouchures, that the movements of the army may not be cramped. No difficult ground should intersect a camp; if there is any such, numerous passes ought immediately to be made over it.

An army commands as much of a position as it is in reach of in an easy day's march, on both flanks. If the enemy is ten miles in your front, you must be acquainted with his movements. If he marches to your right flank, you extend yourself in your position to your right; the position should always describe an arc; the curve to the enemy. Two armies of ten thousand men each, will occupy a country for thirty miles (39). If it is meant for a defensive position, break up bridges and roads in the front, and throw chevaux-de-frize, &c., in the fords, to make the advance on it difficult. If it is meant to march towards the enemy, open as many roads as possible, that

to a good map of the country. With respect to these, as to all other examples taken from Frederick's career, the diligent student will do well to refer to JOMINI'S *Traité des Grandes Operations Militaires*, the Atlas to which contains every thing needful to the study of the Seven Years' War, and therein to the topography of the military exploits of the greatest master of the Art of War in modern times, after Napoleon himself.]

(39) [“Two armies,” &c.—See Note (32), *ante*.]

the army may be put upon as many columns as its strength requires. Always detach out-lying piquets and grand guards beyond rivers. If it is near you, throw up works to defend the bridges or fords you leave passable, and occupy the mountains with your armed peasantry, if you have them.

The mountains of Ireland are not like those of the continent, to which the King of Prussia alludes, as before quoted: they bear no campaign, therefore a foreign officer, reading of the mountains in this country would be quite deceived if he imagined them to be rough, rocky, covered with fine forests, producing grain, inhabited, and with narrow defiles. Ours are wild high wastes, boggy, and unfit for man or beast, but entirely open.

The bogs in Ireland are sometimes insulated, and more frequently in chains. They seem to have been originally formed by the casual obstruction of some small stream of water, not of sufficient force to work a channel for itself, and stagnating in this moist climate, where the sun has not power to make it evaporate quickly, and where the tendency to vegetation is very great. A spongy substance forms itself, increases of course the stagnation, retains the moisture, and grows from year to year. Probably if the country were not inhabited, and the exertion of human industry opposed to this process of nature, in a few centuries all Ireland would be one vast bog. These bogs are, some more and some less, to a certain degree passable in summer for men, but unable to bear a horse or carriage. They have generally a very gradual fall, as the principle of their formation evinces, which is necessary to be observed, as their use in a military light in a great measure depends on this circumstance. They are generally surrounded, immediately at their edges, by elevated ground which commands them.

The more water is obstructed, the more impassable the bog behind it becomes, and where an army can have ground of this kind on its front or flank, it should endeavour to render that part of its position impracticable, wherever a head of water could by means of dams be formed with most advantage. By doing it, these bogs spread to a very wide extent, and in parts contract very narrow. The narrowest point through which the stream runs should be taken for making the inundation, by throwing a dam from the projecting point of the high ground, on one side, to that on the opposite. This should be commanded, especially the lower side, by a work mounted with artillery, which should rake the whole of the embankment. It should be covered by *chevaux-de-frize*, an *abbatis* [of felled trees innerlaced], &c., or strong *pallisades*; the bogs often supply timber of oak fit for this. If the fall is one yard in two hundred, which is a medium calculation, an embankment of this kind twenty-one feet high, will inundate the position for near an English mile; but it would render all the bog behind it impassable, by its absorbing the water, and become too wet to bear a man, especially if assisted by rains.

Our rivers are generally small, but with strong banks, therefore of great consequence in military operations. No river is so deep or so wide, as to be relied on for security; it must still be guarded. They are the most certain features in the face of a country; they mark the ground for military operations, and are in nature what scales and degrees are on a map. If an army occupies a position, a river is most advantageous on its front; if an army is in march, on its flank.

A dry season may render a river passable where it never was; sometimes fords are not known except to very few. No river is so large, that it ought to be considered im-

passable; nor none so small, that advantage may not be drawn from it. Any mill-stream may be turned to the purpose of inundation.

The greatest position afforded in Ireland, is the west bank of the Shannon; another presents itself from Maguire's-bridge to Charlemont in the North. One might also be taken from Portadown to Newry; also from Bel-turbet to Carrick. From Kilkenny to Nenagh affords a chain of positions of a great extent.

Every position that it is possible could ever be required, should be previously examined; its advantages and disadvantages noted down; the points to be fortified marked; the quantity of artillery and troops it would require entered down, that at a minute's notice it might be occupied; if it is to be fortified, the peasantry on the arrival of the officer of engineers might be immediately set to work, in case of invasion.

Instead of bat horses, two-wheeled carriages should be ordered for the conveyance of the troops' baggage; they should be so constructed that they could be taken to pieces, and carried over difficult passes; as also, in case of a horse sinking, that they might be put on others.

It would be advisable to have flying corps, composed of ten companies of grenadiers or light infantry, with four field pieces, and a squadron of light dragoons; they would be advanced in front of the grand army; they ought to be disencumbered of all unnecessary baggage, and carry an additional number of rounds of ammunition. Every man should have a blanket large enough to cover his head and feet, and a watch coat made as light as possible*.

* The shoes of undressed leather, used by the Croats, might be adopted to great advantage by our military, if they only used them on marches. The consumption and expense of shoes is inconceivable. In that case every man could make his own. All that is requisite is

Gunboats on the lakes and at the entrance of the Shannon would be of use.

If two armies execute flank movements, each on their respective positions, in order to pre-occupy a post, pass, &c., and one has a greater length of march to perform than the other, that disadvantage must be got over, either by making the road more easy, or so that a greater front may march on it; or, secondly, by turning the attention of the enemy, by a diversion on some other point, and so concealing your movement, unless there is a sufficient force to be able to detach cavalry to harass his rear, or light infantry to intercept him at a defile.

Whichever army occupies the pass first, the other cannot force it in his presence, nor can the occupier, although so far master of it, attempt the passage in the face of his adversary, without the greatest precaution.

The advantages of high ground for positions, are, that the enemy's movements are all open to you, while yours are concealed from him. In case of an attack, he is exposed to the fire of your artillery and musketry, while his has little effect on you. If an army has an enemy in front, and advances, it must open roads; but in flank marches, three roads are all required. If there is but one made road, that should be reserved for the baggage, and other roads should be opened for the two columns. These flank roads should be marked out on the army's coming into its position; they should be wide enough to admit a company in front.

When an army marches into a country, where it has not had time to prepare the roads, for example, in five columns, each column will have its guides in front, who, by camp colours, will mark out the route of the column,

a piece of undressed hide, which he cuts to the shape of the foot; it laces from the toe to above the ankle.—*Author's Note.*

according to the directions of the quartermaster-general; the pioneers follow the guides and level the road for their column; the baggage should, if possible, march on the high road.

The army ought to have so many roads open in rear of its position, as in case of necessity to be able to retreat on six columns.

CHAPTER X.

DUTY OF OFFICERS.

WHEN an officer, of what rank soever, arrives at his post, he should come provided with the best general and local maps he can procure. If it is on the coast, he should also get a chart of it (40). These he should compare with the ground, examine what depth of water there is, how high the tide rises, where shipping would command the shore, and where they would be commanded by it. He should examine all the roads, passes, rivers, fords, mountains and positions, calculate their distances by his computation—for instance, by the time he takes in going from one to the other. He should examine the state of the country as to forage, take the number of mills, how much they usually work, and what they have in store; inquire where corn and other articles of provision are kept; what fairs there are, and whence the cattle are brought. He should cultivate acquaintance with the people of the country, and endeavour to find out their temper and disposition, in order to be able to answer inqui-

(40) [*“the best general and local maps,”* &c.—In Ireland there is no longer any difficulty about Maps and Charts. The Ordnance Survey Maps give every thing; those of the Geological Survey (an inch to the mile) give even the elevations pretty well. The military engineer needs but roughly sketch in the hills and hollows, and other features remarkable in a military point of view, on the large scale Townland Survey sheets. The *“Duty of Officers”* shortly described in this chapter refers to the case of the officers of a strange army in an enemy’s country only.]

ries, and point them out to his superiors. He should be on horseback constantly, when not on other duties; examine things with his own eyes, and not trust to reports. If there are no maps of the country, he must compute the distances of towns, roads, rivers, &c., from rough maps from his own calculations. Where there is a position, he should measure the distance of the neighbouring heights by paces, and see if it is commanded; this knowledge, previously acquired, will give him confidence in a time of danger. In time of harvest he should calculate how much corn of all sorts is in the country, and inquire whither it usually goes.

Fuel is an essential article; he should inquire what stock there is of that, and if there is a sufficiency for troops in case of being put in winter cantonments. All this inquiry is necessary to possess an officer with that general and miscellaneous knowledge, without which he never can be of use.

If he is in an advanced post he must be cautious not to give any unnecessary alarms, to impress the public with an idea of extraordinary alertness; and not transmit a report till he has examined into the foundation of it himself.

The following anecdote of the great Gustavus Adolphus, transmitted to us by Prince Henry of Prussia, strongly authorises the principles here laid down. His words are:—

“ Il dit, (Schildknecht officier d'ingénieurs) que le Monarque Suedois étant au camp de Beerwalde, avoit projeté de s'emparer d'un defile, pour surprendre les Impériaux dans leur camp. Mais que comme il ne se fioit jamais aux cartes gravées & qu'il étoit impossible d'aller reconnoître le terrain parceque l'ennemi l'occupoit, cet ingénieur en fit le plan d'après le rapport des habitans, & le présenta aux Roi qui dirigea sa marche en conséquence,

mais l'armée, avant d'arriver au défilé, se trouva tout d'un coup vis-à-vis d'un marais qui n'étoit pas marqué dans le plan de l'ingénieur. Ce marais pouvoit être défendu par l'ennemi, & coûter beaucoup de monde aux Suedois. Le Roi rebroussa chemin, & traita fort mal le pauvre Schildknecht, qui assura sa Majesté que le plan avoit été fait sur le rapport d'un vieux gentilhomme & d'un ecclésiastique du lieu. Eh bein, dit le Roi en plaisantant, suivez ces braves gens, & faites vous montrer ce marais pour n'en pas tromper d'autres." (41).

(41) ["He said (Schildknecht, an officer of the engineers), that the Swedish Monarch being at the camp of Beerwalde, had designed to possess himself of a certain defile, in order to surprise the Imperialists in their camp. But that as he never placed confidence in engraved maps (that is, those of the time), and as it was impossible to reconnoitre the ground since it was occupied by the enemy, this engineer made a map of it according to the report of the neighbouring inhabitants, which he presented to the King, who directed his march accordingly; but the army, before reaching the defile, found itself all on a sudden in front of a marsh, which was not marked at all on the engineer's map. This marsh might be defended by the enemy, and might have cost many men to the Swedes. The King retraced his steps, and spoke to poor Schildknecht very harshly; who assured his Majesty that the Map had been made on the report of an old gentleman and of an ecclesiastic of the neighbourhood. 'Very well,' said the King, laughing, 'follow these good people, and make them show you the marsh, so as not to lead any one else into such a mistake.'"]

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY.

IF you have no great magazines, and live only from day to day, and the people of the country are ill-affected to you, and cut off your daily and casual supplies, what becomes of the war? If a country is in a state of defence, there should be a year's provision in advance in the military magazines. If there is not a sufficiency wherever the army comes, they or the people of the country must starve. The consequence of starving is desperation and pillage. What kind of foraging parties must you then send out? There is no country where a good understanding between the army and country people is so necessary as in Ireland. At any rate your magazines ought to be formed this year for the ensuing one. Suppose you are obliged to take the field in March or April—such a thing is impossible—where is your corn, potatoes, or fuel? Where forage for your cavalry before August? These are serious considerations, and no one thinks of them. The generality of people imagine all that is necessary for an army to take the field, is to have canvas to cover them (42).

(42) [It is plain that General Keating in this paragraph speaks only of an English army in Ireland. If an English army were looked on as friendly to the people it would be different. So in case a French army should chance at any time to be welcomed as friendly to the people of Ireland it would be still more different *for them*.]

The business of maintaining an army, so as to keep its operations unclogged, is a science by itself. It must be considered, that in an emergency, the country will be charged cent. per cent. more than the value. Whatever is bought in the country might be paid in government debentures; small ones might be struck off for that purpose (43).

What is the loss of ten sail of the line and two hundred transports to the French, compared to getting possession of this country? It is to be hoped government will see the consequence of it in due time. In four days from the appearance of an enemy on the coast, it is possible for them to be in possession of all Connaught, and probably a considerable part of Ulster. Imagine the situation of this country with forty thousand French on the west of the Shannon, and ten thousand from Belturbet to Newry. If our forces advance toward Connaught, the French army of the north is in their rear; if against the north, the army of Connaught is on their left and rear (44).

Immediately on landing, the enemy would most probably publish a proclamation, offering indemnity and security to all who staid at home (45), and inviting the country people to bring provisions to his camp. This would open a communication between them, and facilitate his means of procuring intelligence. If he found the people of the

(43) [*"paid in Government debentures"*—During the late war in Italy it is a notable fact that *the French army paid for everything its full value IN GOLD.*]

(44) [*"on the west of the Shannon."*—As has been already observed times are so changed since Mr. Keating wrote, in 1795, that an army of 50,000 men could *now* land anywhere, and could be in the centre of Leinster, or before Dublin itself, as quickly and as easily as at that time it could be at Galway or at Newry either.]

(45) [*"indemnity and security."*—An invading army "of liberation" would offer even more, and would take measures to give practical proof of its sincerity at once.]

country ill-affected to the government (46), he would deliver out arms to them, and take them in pay, form pioneers, free corps, &c.

Probably no inducement could make an Englishman act in concert with a Frenchman ; such is their antipathy. There is, as yet, no affection between the two nations here, *but there certainly is no antipathy to the French* (47).

Any one who has seen the wealth and happiness of the Dutch and Flemish peasantry, and afterwards seen them run over to their invader, will be apt to inquire if there are any peculiar circumstances in the case of the Irish peasantry which will induce them to adopt a contrary conduct. If they are not more wealthy, more happy, and more independent ; if they are not more attached to their laws and government ; if they have not more reason to be so, is it probable that they will adopt a contrary conduct ? The Flemings certainly lived under a happy government, and had no reason to dislike the house of Austria. Every well-wisher to his country ought to consider these points in time ; in the moment of danger it is too late, and we must at last recur to the peasantry for protection.*

(46) [*"ill-affected to the Government."*—It appears Lieutenant Keating (who was, indeed, but a Munster "Papist" after all) was able to form a pretty good guess as to the dispositions of the people of Ireland towards an invading army. But it is to be remembered the invaders he contemplates are always *the French*.]

(47) [*"no antipathy to the French."*—It would be but strange ingratitude if there were—and we know that for the idea of "ingratitude" there is no expression known to the Irish language.]

* The planters in the West India Islands are obliged to adopt the desperate resource of arming their negro slaves, and our men of property are afraid to trust their own tenants ! If this is the case, can anything be more desperate than our situation ? The French, when their country was invaded, armed the whole people, and the people did not betray their trust. How wretched then must be the situation of those, who are afraid to recur to such an expedient, and with what face will they attempt it, when it can be no longer

One cannot but be surprised, that the importance of this country should have struck the world in general so little of late years. Previous to the independence of America, it was an obscure spot at the extremity of the old world, and would probably have remained so, had America continued to be peopled only with savages, ignorant of navigation, and consequently incapable of coming forward in the great theatre of the human race. America has as yet much to do at home; probably it will be many years before she will begin to show all her greatness in action, before she will have her due weight in the political balance of the world; but if their progress increases in the same proportion that it has done, and there is every reason to think it will do even more, they will probably cause a revolution in the affairs of the world, in which these countries will participate more deeply than any other (48).

Ireland, situated between the two continents, is, notwithstanding the misfortunes of six centuries, now increasing in wealth, in civilization, and population. Happy would it be if the two former kept pace with the latter; but, unfortunately, the drain of the upper classes of the people and their money to England, is such as prevents the country's deriving all or near the advantages nature and the times hold out to her. It is to be hoped, that the connection between the two countries will be ever maintained (49); yet this war (50) England seems to have

avoided.—*Author's Note.* [When France was invaded *France belonged to the French.*]

(48) [*"America her due weight in the political balance of the world."*—How just was the expectation of the writer (in 1795) events have pretty well proved many years before the present.]

(49) [*" ever maintained."*—Had not the author been a British officer we might suppose such a conclusion, from what immediately precedes it, could only have been ironical!]

(50) [*"this war."*—The war against the Great French Revolution, 1793.]

either despised the power of France too much, or it relied too much on the natural strength of Ireland; or, finally, it was not aware of its consequence; for it was left by her in what may in the most unqualified manner be called an absolutely defenceless state.

Ireland contains about five millions of people of all descriptions, of whom the poor are at least four million seven hundred thousand (51). By poor is meant, not farmers and tradesmen, but those who are obliged to work to earn their sustenance from day to day. One reason for this great proportion of poor is, that every man marries. In most other countries people do not, unless they have some prospect of a maintenance for their families. It were to be wished that in this country, property and independence (without a certain degree of which mankind will not be at rest), were more diffused. It is true men are never to be satisfied. A monarch who possesses dominions larger than the rest of Europe, finds that a spot of her neighbour's territory lies convenient, and seizes it. Here is no stimulus of want, but merely the love of acquisition that Providence has implanted in the human mind. Can it then be wondered at, if what is commonly called the mob, that part of society composed of all that is wretched, all that is outcast, and all that is hopeless, should turn upon the property of their wealthy neighbour, when an opportunity offers. If it is said they were born and are used to their situation, that is the language of unfeeling folly. *That country is wretched, indeed, where ninety-nine in every hundred see and feel that no change, no revolution, can possibly make them worse or more miser-*

(51) ["Ireland contains," &c.—The description in this paragraph was true enough in 1795. It will probably be generally recognised as equally true, at least in the main, to-day. Certainly the hint contained in the last two sentences (printed above in italics) is quite as much in point to-day as ever it could have been.]

able than they actually are. From such a state of thinking they must look with anxiety for a change.

Where the inhabitants of a country are disunited among themselves, that country cannot enjoy security. All patriotism is smothered in the effervescence of private animosities and the most destructive passions. Such, happily, is not the state of England; nor will it anywhere else add to the strength or security of her empire. England for many years engrossed the trade and wealth of the universe, without a rival, and founded her splendour on it; but it is not in the nature of things that it can be always so; trade will in time find its level, and all cannot be gainers.

Should England decline, in proportion to her decadence, the value of Ireland to her increases, the attachment of Ireland should also increase, united by situation, language, manners, and common interest (52). Such a band ought to be indissoluble.

The best way to perpetuate it is by endeavouring to convince both nations—that is to say, not the few but the great mass of both that *they* are benefited by the connection; and let not the multitude be despised by the rich and great. It is that the rich may enjoy ease that the poor man labours; and for their security that the poor fight and bleed. In the hour of danger and distress, the great, the powerful, and the wealthy, must throw themselves for protection on their poor neighbours, for their lives, their families, and their properties. It is therefore the particular interest, not of the poor but of the rich, to endeavour to make the cause of the nation a common one. If it is alleged that the lower orders will not believe the arguments adduced in such a question, still the prin-

(52) [*“attachment.” . . . ; band. . . . indissoluble.”*—Irony again!]

ciple is undeniable, and it is an additional reason against procrastinating the only security of the rich until the hour of danger—it is then too late.

And it will be well for those who have power to remember, that if the poorer classes are the people, it is for the happiness of the people that power has been delegated to them; that a national cause is not the cause of the few but of the many (53).

La Jacquerie was the name given to a most dreadful civil war, with which France was once scourged. It was an insurrection of the peasantry, owing to the oppression of the nobles.

The Hungarian peasantry in their last insurrection, to which they were goaded by every species of oppression, committed dreadful excesses, shutting up the nobility in their castles, and setting fire to them, &c. Horiah and Kloskar were delegated by the peasants to present their petition to the Emperor. Horiah was a man of great talents. It is reported the answer of the Emperor was in the following words: "It is all your own fault."

Poland has neither strong ground, nor rivers, nor fortresses; its people are dispirited by their state of vassalage; they are treated everywhere with indignity. A postilion exercises his whip on every unfortunate peasant with impunity, who is not able to get out of his way in time (54). They are abject, unprincipled, drunken and licentious.

(53). [These two paragraphs are very well put by Mr. Keating; nor are the examples which follow in the least degree out of place to-day any more than in 1795.]

(54) [*"exercises his whip on every unfortunate peasant with impunity,"* &c.—It is not fifteen years since (1860, now,) we knew of such a case in a populous locality in the rich county of Cork, and the outrage went unpunished by the poor serfs that suffered it. As if in retribution, the rich Earl has even since then been beggared, and lives a miserable pauper on lands which it is to be hoped may never again be possessed by one of his race.]

Having no security for property, they have no business to acquire more than sustains them from day to day ; and their nobility are under no tie to treat them well. Yet when the country was invaded, the defenders of it were headed by tradesmen (shoemakers) of Warsaw, and the nobility did not then disdain their station or their assistance.

There is something so extraordinary in the following, that the translation of it, from the original German, may not be unacceptable :

“ War must be carried on, either in our own, or in a neutral, or in an enemy’s country. If I had no view but to my own glory, I would always prefer making my own dominions the seat of war. As there, every man serves for a spy, and the enemy cannot stir a step without its being known, I can then send out large or small parties without apprehension, and make any movement I please without risk. If the enemy is beaten, every peasant becomes a soldier and harasses the enemy. Of that the Elector Frederick William had experience, after the battle of Fehrbellin, where the peasants killed more of the Swedish soldiers than there were slain in the action ; and the same circumstance happened to me after the battle of Hohenfriedberg, where the mountaineers of Silesia brought in a multitude of Austrian prisoners. Where the country, which is the seat of war is neutral, that party always has the advantage which is able to obtain the good will of the people. In such a situation the strictest discipline must be observed, and plunder and marauding severely punished.

“ The enemy must be charged with the worst designs against the country. If it is Protestant, profess yourselves on all occasions the defenders of the Protestant religion, and trumpet forth in the hearing of the lower

orders of the people, whose simplicity is easily imposed on, the strongest sentiments of religious fanaticism. If, on the other hand, the country is Catholic, your conversation must run on the propriety of universal toleration in matters of religion; profess the most moderate sentiments, and lament that priestcraft should have caused such difference between mankind, who are all agreed in the main principles of Christianity.

“In regard to detachments, &c., all that must be entirely regulated by the knowledge you acquire of the good or ill disposition of the country people toward you. From the untolerated religious sectaries assistance may be derived; the gentry, let them pretend what they will, will betray you, so will the clergy. But the great ground on which to put yourself is religious fanaticism. If I can once succeed in exasperating a people, on the score of liberty of conscience, and can persuade them that they are oppressed by their clergy and gentry, you may rely on them. I call this bringing heaven and hell on my side. Taxes afford a good ground for agitating the people’s minds; persuade them that in case of a change of government they would be taken off,” &c., &c.

It is necessary to observe that the foregoing instructions are not written by a Democrat; but that though they contain traits of the most sublime Jacobinism, they are a part of the ninth article of secret instructions of the great Frederick of Prussia to his officers; of Frederick the King, Hero, Legislator, and Philosopher; the goodness of whose heart, unchanged by greatness and prosperity, was equally conspicuous in his personal friendships and his regard for the happiness and prosperity of his dominions. And it also appears hereby that the French have not the merit of having discovered this new system of setting the world in a flame, and shaking established governments,

as has been attributed to them, and which they arrogated to themselves.

When such measures are adopted by a character, to whom they are so uncongenial, as that above-mentioned, it only proves, that men's actions and principles are determined by the situations into which fortune throws them.

Every suggestion which is here laid down, as proper to instil into the minds of the subjects of a hostile Sovereign, is equally applicable to those of that Monarch from whom they proceed; yet because the measure answers the emergency of the moment, it is adopted without any fear of a future retribution.

CHAPTER XII.

ON FRONTIERS IN GENERAL—ON DESCENTS, AND PASSAGE OF RIVERS.

THE passage of rivers is so much connected with the defence of frontiers, and there is such a simplicity in the conduct of a descent, and the rules to be followed in the former case, that the two subjects of consideration may be, perhaps, not improperly thrown together. Since countries, as Poland, have no frontier that admits of defence, as has before been observed, to defend the margraviate of Brandenburg the King of Prussia advances and takes possession of Wittemberg; why? because Brandenburg is a flat open country, and not defensible, except at Wittemberg.

Portugal has a weak frontier, because all the chains of mountains and all the rivers run at right angles with it, of course, parallel to the line of operations of the invader.

Whichever way rivers are observed to run by the map, it may be inferred the mountains and positions also run. In Alsace they are favourable to defend the country, and the French knew how to take advantage of them.

The sea is the frontier of England and Ireland, and the first defence, the British navy; but no statesman or soldier would risk the existence of the nation under his care upon one security. Notwithstanding the superiority of our navy in every respect, there exists a possibility of France

being, at a future day, equal or superior (55). If France made a descent on this country, she would not consider what became of her transports. It is much to be regretted Mr. Pitt's plan of fortifying the dock-yards in the Channel some years ago was not carried into effect. It is surprising that the good sense of the English would not see how much cheaper they might be defended by militia, in works of earth, than by sailors in ships of war; or the absurdity of first fitting and manning a ship for sea, and then being obliged to keep her rotting in harbour to defend the dock-yard. The superiority of the English navy is not from exclusive resources, but from its having very naturally, on account of its situation, turned its attention early to the sea, and, in consequence, having got the start of the rest of Europe. But America and France have as good ports, as much timber, and may one day have as much trade. Had Louis the Fourteenth, instead of maintaining four hundred thousand men in arms on earth, turned his thoughts to the sea, the navy of France might have been as powerful now.

For these reasons it is to be wished more attention were paid to the defence of our coast.

A chain of telegraphs from the north, from Galway and Bantry, to the capital, would be very useful (56).

If a river is the frontier, and must be passed in face of an enemy, the following rules must be adhered to as close as possible, viz., choose a reentrant angle, your banks higher than the opposite ones, and place batteries on each flank. The night is also often a favourable time. What

(55) [*"equal or superior."*—Mr. Keating's anticipation appears to be now just on the point of being realized, if indeed it is not actually realized already.]

(56) [*"A chain of telegraphs,"* &c.—At the present day, of course, the Electric Telegraph is everywhere.]

Marshal Saxe says of intrenchments, may be applied to what we have read of the passage of rivers, sometimes they succeed, "*Parceque la tete tourne aux hommes quand il leur arrive des choses aux quel ils ne s'attendant pas*"—the passage of rivers often succeeds, because it is not imagined that it will be attempted.

The best way to defend a river, says Maizeroy, is to have corps detached along it at certain distances, but near enough to join at the point of attack. The usual precautions to be taken in guarding a river are to break up fords, destroy boats, watch the most likely places—namely, where the river forms a bend towards the enemy, and where another river runs into it on the enemy's side, by which they might send down pontoons, floats, &c. Where there are islands raise redoubts on them, and mount cannon.

Of descents, Maizeroy says, retrenchments to guard against them are not only useless but dangerous. So many places admit of a debarkation, it would be unnecessary to intrench the whole coast. The enemy will not present himself at a guarded place, except as a feint to divert. Every time the English descended on the coast of France they did it with the greatest ease. All that can be done is, when the intention of the enemy is evident, assemble troops as soon as possible, they being, it is to be supposed, previously arranged for the purpose, and advance toward the enemy. If he is in the act of landing, he should be attacked without deliberation, and without heeding the prodigious fire of the covering fleet, which is not to be dreaded by troops on the shore and in movement; and once they come to close action, the enemy can make no more use of his fire. If you find him landed and in force, occupy some advantageous post, where he may be detained till the arrival of all the troops. If he

means to establish himself in the country, he will come in great force, unless he expects to find them disposed in his favour.*

Redoubts upon a coast, if they have not cannon in them, are useless. As the enemy may disembark at low water, they should be made *en barbette* (57), and placed so as to have a cross fire. It is right to have points of *appui* and rallying, fortified up the country. It appears that Maizeroy speaks only of the smaller sort of attacks. He adds the following important observation. The defence of a country does not consist in the number of fortresses, but in the zeal of the people, well-regulated finances, disciplined troops, and the facility of augmenting them whenever necessity requires.

The manœuvres our [English] troops are taught, only serve to give them false ideas. Maizeroy says, to train troops, enterprises of small importance must be undertaken—Mais il faut prendre garde de s'y faire battre. A good rule.

* The French failed in their attempt on Sardinia, because they landed a very inconsiderable force, because the peasantry rushed down armed upon them, and because they took panic. They were defeated at Salée, because they came up the river in their boats with the tide; when it ebbed they were left sticking in the mud, where they were assailed by the Moors and Arabs, and, unable to defend themselves, they were cut to pieces by them with their short swords. These are two strong instances of what a peasantry can do.—*Author's Note.*

(57) [*en barbette*.]—A battery "*en barbette*" is one in which the guns are mounted not in *embrasures*, under cover, but upon an open platform on the top, as in the Martello Towers on the Irish Coast.]

CHAPTER XIII.

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY—THE
FORCE, AND PROBABLE DISTRIBUTION OF IT—AND ON THE
EXPENSES AND NECESSITIES OF THE CAMPAIGN.

THE forces in Ireland may be estimated at upwards of thirty thousand men, of whom twenty thousand might be brought into the field, in different parts of the kingdom. Probably ten thousand might, in case of an attack, be assembled. There is no train of artillery fit to take the field, equal to the exigencies of the country, nor are there magazines formed. It is supposed the cavalry could not take the field for want of forage.

There is (58) a squadron of men-of-war at Cork.

It is supposed the troops will be encamped in small corps of five thousand each; one near Dublin, one in the South, and one in the North. For the transporting magazines, &c., the troops are entirely dependant on the people of the country, having no carriages attached to the army for that purpose, which is one inconvenience (59). There is no corps of pontoniers, on which account the army could pass rivers but on one column. It has been already observed, there are no fortresses in the coun-

(58) ["*There is.*"—*There was* [1795], and of course there might be.]

(59) ["*Transporting Magazines,*" &c.—These remarks, like all the other observations of the author respecting the communications and means of transport, were, of course, only true before the completion of the existing Railway system.]

try; there are also few engineers; nor have the military been in the practice of breaking ground. If it were possible that the whole army could assemble to oppose the enemy, and leave the country without troops to maintain internal peace, protect their magazines, communications, &c., such an army could not continue a month together for want of provisions.

An army of twenty thousand men, with their followers, the necessary horses, and adding only the small proportion of one thousand regular cavalry, would consume eighteen thousand barrels of corn, of all descriptions, every four weeks; besides this, it must have turf, straw, hay, and cattle. It would require fifteen thousand sheep, or two thousand head of black cattle also monthly; and would thus consume in that space of time, the produce of four thousand acres of land, and in the course of the campaign of upwards of twenty thousand acres, amounting in value to upwards of two hundred thousand pounds.

An army of a nominal forty thousand men, which to a certainty would not bring more than twenty thousand into the field, would cost while there, the first campaign, half a million sterling. If forty thousand effectives are necessary for the defence of the island, sixty thousand must be rated as the strength of the army, the additional expense may be calculated.

The camp equipage, and the year's stores beforehand, would require a sum of two millions to put this country in a tolerable state of defence. One million must be added for fortifying posts; and the casualties and contingencies, even the article of blankets, of which there must be a hundred thousand in store, comes to a large sum, and if the army are in the field, must be renewed every year. A less sum of money than four millions sterling, in the national treasury, would not be sufficient to carry an army

through the first campaign. Twenty thousand men would require near two thousand horses, of all descriptions, in order to move from place to place.

Government should have a hundred thousand barrels of corn in store in the country for the use of the army.

When the late General Edward Dalton, marched to the Low Countries, at the time the Emperor Joseph II. [of Austria] threatened Holland, his army was fed from the opposite side of the Rhine; a severe frost rendered it un-navigable, and when the supply of bread was exhausted, there was no remedy, but to disband the army, with orders for every man to shift for himself. These orders were actually to have been issued on the ensuing day, but a thaw fortunately occurring during the night, and again opening the communication, prevented the total separation of the army taking place.

CHAPTER XIV.

FINANCES—TAXES—REVENUES.

IF the French were to get possession of this country, they would probably act here, as they have done elsewhere—would respect private property, but rob the public treasure. The revenue they would seize here, are what originate from taxes, and those of the church (60).

Reckon the Hearth Tax at	£50,000 per annum.
The County Presentments amount through the kingdom, to not less than	100,000 (60).
Tithes and Church Revenues,	450,000
	<hr/>
	£600,000

A sum of money equal to the maintenance of 30,000 troops. Suppose all these taxes were, during the present war (61), given up, and instead thereof two shillings an acre on all arable and pasture land, laid on, to be expended in the defence of the country, deducting also for the public roads, necessary salaries, ecclesiastical and others. The goodness of our roads is a great misfortune; it would facilitate in the greatest degree the conquest of the country. Why should money be expended in making roads and

(60) [*“the church.”*—(*i.e.*, the Protestant Church Establishment). This Chapter is allowed to stand only because it is so short; it is in many respects inapplicable now. There is now no “Hearth-tax;” and the “County Presentments” amount to a million a-year, or ten times the sum named by General Keating.]

(61) [*“the present war.”*—In 1795, namely.]

building bridges, when we do not know how soon we must break them up? It would only be necessary to retain a few of the principal ones.

It would be better for the opulent classes at once to contribute liberally, by a free gift for the defence of the country; for what would the enemy probably do, if they gained a footing here; they would abolish, by a manifesto, all the above-mentioned taxes, which fall in this country solely on the poor, and instead of it lay a general tax on all property. They would be sure in such a measure to have the voice of the people with them.*

There are many other taxes from which revenue is drawn, but the above are what come particularly out of the pockets of the people; and an exoneration from which would be most particularly felt and applauded by them. It must be admitted, that such a change in the system of any country is a very strong measure; those certainly ought never to be recurred to but in times of the greatest danger. People who think that is now the case, will probably be also of opinion, that it is now necessary for our own security, to be at least prepared to adopt something similar, if affairs do not very soon take a new turn; *if they do not, there is no alternative in case of an attack, but submission; for if the spirit of the people is not roused in their own defence, if they are lukewarm and indifferent, it is impossible for the country to be defended by any army.* There is no great hope from the convulsions in France; it is now [1795,] a great military Republic, and will always be equally formidable externally, because its force is derived, not from the casual ability of a military King or

* Tithes are in great part lay property. In whatever way the money is levied, the clergy must be paid. Nothing here must be understood as trenching upon the maintenance of that body; but tithes, though a tax, are a transferable property.—*Author's Note.* [The author was certainly a prudent spoken "Papist."]

a great Statesman, but from the spirit which pervades the whole mass of the nation. Probably France may ultimately fall as Rome did, but it is likewise probable she may be in the meantime equally victorious. Rome fought with nations, which, though barbarous, breathed a spirit of patriotism, and were unanimous against the invader ; but the French may say with Shakspeare, " We have met with foes who strike beside us."

CHAPTER XV.

MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS.

AN enemy's army of 50,000 men would consume in the various articles of the produce of the soil, as much as would amount weekly to upwards of three thousand acres. These articles of subsistence must be obtained, either methodically, through the means of the constituted authorities of the country, which would be attended with least misery, or by means of pillage. Whatever a retiring army may do, it is impossible an advancing one could subsist a day upon the wild system of rapine.

An invader's object is to get possession of the country as soon as he can; but this is not done until the seat of government is in his power. Let him have what footing in the country he will, until he gains that, the vital principle remains unextinguished, and the body will perform its functions. Dublin as the capital and seat of government, would of course be the object of attack. But there is an additional reason; it would be necessary for them to gain the east coast of the kingdom, fortify Dublin, Drogheda, &c., and there form their frontier against England (62).

(62) [*"necessary,"* &c.—That is supposing the invaders were not provided with a Navy of sufficient force; or, wanting an overwhelm-

Previous to Lord Howe's action with the French, though both fleets endeavoured their utmost to come to it, they were three days in sight of each other, without being able to do so. This proves the uncertainty of our reliance or security from the sea. What might not have been effected by a fleet of transports during that time?

If this country became the theatre of war, whichever party had the advantage, Ireland would be trampled to pieces in the struggle (63). A very few individuals make by war; the country which is the seat of it is beggared (64).

Perhaps it would be well that the Irish mob knew a victorious army, as well French as any other, suffers no people to pillage but themselves; the existence of a conquering army depends on the security of property, which it will always protect, in order to plunder it at leisure.

On the appearance of the enemy on any part of the coast, the cavalry should immediately drive all the cattle and everything moveable, behind the grand cordon (65), and destroy everything which they could not remove. In short, all between the grand cordon and the enemy should be made a desert; but the people should be indemnified. It is evident, nothing but the last necessity should induce such strong measures; but in such a case it is always done, and is unavoidable.

ing force at sea, were not provided with an army sufficiently powerful effectually to resist every attempt that could be made by the English to effect a landing in force. If the population should turn out to be friendly to an invading "army of liberation" the case would, of course, be still stronger in its favour.]

(63) [*"trampled to pieces."*—Not exactly; now, at all events!]

(64) [*"beggared."*—No longer now, in these days of short and decisive campaigns.]

(65) [*"the grand cordon."*—See Chapter VII., (and see also Note 33,) *ante.*]

In a system of defence possibilities and not probabilities alone must be guarded against. Sometimes an enemy will not attack in the part we think probable but on the contrary, where we think impossible. But it is a weakness to suppose anything impossible to an active enemy.

To recapitulate in a few words that which is necessary to put this country in a state of defence : the first article is money : secondly, officers.

An army fully equipped, with its equipage, field artillery, corps of pontoniers, staff, and hospital properly appointed ; this army to consist of forty thousand *effectivf* men (infantry), and two thousand cavalry, a corps of engineers well acquainted with the country, and a full year's provisions beforehand of all kinds of stores, with a train of carriages and horses, to enable troops, artillery, &c., to move, without being at the mercy of the people of the country. Lastly, we should have unanimity among ourselves.

Our army consists of disjointed corps, unused to the system of acting in great bodies ; nor is there any probability of a regular organisation of it taking place. In addition to this, the regular troops only enter it on the east side, to embark from it on the west. Manœuvres in great bodies are unknown to our troops.

Parties of cavalry should never be sent out in this country, except sustained by infantry.

It is unfortunately too true, that those men who despise danger most, when at a distance, have the strongest sense of it when it is at hand. Courage may be the effect of constitution, but it is reflection gives firmness.

Let every person of property just resolve seriously in his mind upon what he would do, on hearing an enemy

was landed in the country, and in force; and remember what Marshal Saxe says : *Que la tête tourne aux hommes, quand il leur arrive des choses aux quels ils ne s'attendoient pas.*

APPENDIX

NOTE

ON CERTAIN MILITARY PRINCIPLES USEFUL FOR THE BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF GENERAL KEATING'S TREATISE.

[From the French Text Book : "*Mémorial des Officiers D'Infanterie et de Cavalerie, rédigé d'après les documents officiels et les cours professés dans les Ecoles Militaires.*" (pp. 51-71 ; 78-83.)]

I. STRATEGY.

§ 1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Strategy is the art of making war on the map ; *Tactics*, on the field. The former consists of the dispositions of a plan of campaign, and of the great operations of war ; the latter of the management of troops on the field of battle.

The general principle of War is to bring at once the greatest possible amount of the force at the disposal of the general to bear on the decisive point of the theatre of war, or of the field of battle ; and to operate in such a way as to bring ably into action that mass of force.

In *Strategy*, the Offensive presents advantages over the Defensive. He that attacks knows the object of his attack beforehand, and brings his masses to bear so as to strike at a point predetermined. He that awaits an attack does not know the intentions of his enemy ; the separate fractions of his army are exposed to be surprised and his combinations to be deranged accordingly. In *Tactics* the advantages of the Offensive are balanced by

the difficulty of getting at an enemy occupying a good position, and prepared to defend it.

The mass of an army makes its force, that is a mass trained and organised so as to act together as one; it is the result of Order and Discipline. (Mere numbers do not constitute an army; they cannot act as one mass without perfect discipline; however brave, therefore, individually, undisciplined numbers constitute not an army but an armed mob; and an armed mob is generally, for all practical purposes, even the worse for being very numerous.)

As soon as war is determined, a *Plan* or *System of Operations* is drawn up, which should correspond with the object of the war, the character of the enemy to be dealt with, the nature and resources of the country in which the war is to be carried on, the means of attack and defence, and the aid which may be expected on the one side or the other. A *Plan of Campaign* ought to provide for everything which the enemy can accomplish, and ought to embrace in itself the means of frustrating his efforts. The Art lies in compelling your enemy to lose sight of the principles of Strategy, without ever severing from them yourself.

The *Theatre of Operations* of one or more armies embraces the territory which it is proposed to invade, and that which has to be defended. It comprises the *Base of Operations*—the *object of Operations* of the campaign—the *Front of Operations*, the extent in breadth of the line occupied by the army in front of its Base—the *Lines of Operations*, the directions to be followed in order to reach the object proposed—the *Lines of Communications*, which connect the different Lines of Operations with one another—the *Obstacles*, natural or artificial, to be surmounted or to be opposed to the enemy—and the *Places of Refuge* for retreat in case of reverse.

§. 2. THE BASE OF OPERATIONS.

The frontier of a State, from which the Army is to draw its resources and its reinforcements and which it has to defend, may serve for a *Base of Operations*, or for a *Line of Defence*.

The wider the *Base* the less easy it is to cover it; but, also, the more difficult it is to cut off the army from it.

A *Base* ought to be supported, as much as possible, upon obstacles capable of stopping an enemy for some time, without taking away the means of making a forward march against him.

A wide and deep river, the banks of which are occupied by means of good fortified towns extending on both sides of the

stream, would perfectly answer the purpose; still better if these fortified towns should be large enough to accommodate the Depots and Magazines, and if they should present on the side of the enemy well entrenched *têtes de pont*. [A *Tête de Pont* (literally "Bridge-head") is a regular fortification, more or less extensive, erected in front of the head of a bridge on the opposite side of a river from that on which the town, country, or army to be protected lies. It is properly so constructed as to be able to hold an army in check, by obliging it to undertake a regular siege of the works; and it is traced so as to cover or embrace within it a sufficient space to enable an army crossing by the bridge to form within its shelter in force.]

A *Base of Operations* too near the Capital of a State is a very disadvantageous one.

The extent of the Base should be proportioned to the length of the *Line of Operations*. Its Solidity, and the Security of the Communications, make up the fundamental principle of a Plan, whether offensive or defensive. An Army, separating itself to a distance from its frontier, must adopt new Bases of Operations.

§ 3. THE OBJECT OF OPERATIONS.

The *Object* of a campaign may be the capture of the enemy's capital, the conquest of an important province, or the occupation of a *Front of Operations* provided with fortresses.

On the defensive, the first Object is to protect the capital; after that to cover a first Front, and either the *Base of Operations* or the *Line of Defence*. [These definitions obviously apply more particularly to continental wars, where the frontiers of nations are but imaginary lines, interrupted mountain chains, or mere rivers.]

§ 4. STRATEGIC POINTS.

These are those geographical points the military importance of which arises from the very configuration of the country: as the meetings of the principal roads and other communications, the fords and crossing places of rivers, the knots in mountain chains, fortresses, &c.

The possession of the *Strategic Points* is necessary in an offensive as well as a defensive campaign; open force, or else manœuvres directed against the communications of the enemy, are the sole means of gaining possession of them and of defending

them; lastly, promptness in resolution as well as in execution is one of the conditions necessary to success in every enterprise.

§ 5. DECISIVE POINTS.

These are those *Strategic Points* which are of particularly great importance, and those which offer points for manœuvring with relation to the position of the enemy. These Points are at that extremity at which it is most easy to separate the enemy from his *Base* and from his reinforcements, so as to throw him back upon an obstacle, without exposing one's self to the same danger. It is dangerous to place one's self between the enemy and an insurmountable obstacle, such as the sea, a lake, or a chain of mountains; it is advantageous, for the same reasons, to throw back an enemy upon such an obstacle.

The *Decisive Point* is in the centre, if the enemy's army is broken up into detachments on a line too widely extended.

§ 6. THE FRONT OF OPERATIONS.

It is advantageous to restrict the *Front of Operations*, in order that the army may be able easily to concentrate its forces either to receive the enemy or to throw itself upon him. It should be well supported on its flanks, and it should present easy communications with all the points of the *Line of Operations*.

An army in march to conquer a country should have both its wings supported on neutral countries, or on great natural obstacles, such as rivers or mountain chains; it may sometimes happen, however, that it has only one of its wings supported, or even that both of them are uncovered. In the first case, it has only to take care that its front shall not be broken through; in the second case, it must support itself on the covered wing; in the third, it must support itself on its centre. It should have fortresses, or entrenched camps, at every five or six days' march.

§ 7. LINES OF OPERATIONS.

The right selection of the *Line of Operations* is of great importance in a plan of campaign, because it affords the means of bringing into action at the Decisive Point the greatest possible mass of force.

The direction of this Line depends on the geographical situation and the position of the enemy. It is always either by the centre, or by one or the other of the two extremities. If how-

ever one's forces are very much superior, one may act simultaneously by the centre and the extremities. In every other case this would be a great error.

With equal forces it is better to act in one and the same direction, by a *single line*, and under one sole head, without forming large independent corps, rather than to direct the march by several lines, towards one or several objects, with two or three corps operating separately.

At all times, however, the configuration of the ground may require the employment of *double* or even of *triple lines*, for the rest indispensable, even, if the enemy has formed several, for a separate mass must be presented to each of his. In this case their directions must be so combined as to bring the different corps in connexion one with another, and to unite their movements closely, before the enemy can oppose to them a superior mass of forces.

Lines are either *Internal* or *External*, according as an army manœuvres within or outside the directions followed by the enemy. *Concentric Lines*, which set out from points distant from one another but follow a direction towards a point of union, ought also to be so combined as that the troops should nowhere be exposed to attack in front before being in the way of effecting the junction of the different corps. *Eccentric* or *Divergent Lines*, on the other hand, are scarcely ever suitable except after a battle gained, or when one has just succeeded in dividing the enemy's army.

The events of a war may oblige one to alter the original plan of campaign, and to take *Accidental Lines*, different from those at first determined on. A manœuvre of this kind is a delicate one, and may, according to circumstances, be productive of great results or of great reverses.

§ 8. LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS.

An army ought to be ready at any moment to oppose to the enemy all the resistance of which it is capable; which requires that the different divisions should be constantly in a position to sustain, to support, and to protect one another; and that in the camp, on the march, and at a halt, the troops should always find themselves in advantageous positions for action.

An army which takes in its train a siege equipage and a large supply of baggage cannot take roads too short to reach its depots as rapidly as possible.

§ 9. MARCHES.

The different columns of an army having in general different distances to traverse in order to reach the point intended, it is necessary to combine by pre-arrangement the moment of the departure of each, and their several orders, with the consideration of the distances to be accomplished, the equipment and baggage of each column, the nature of the country, the obstacles which the enemy may be able to oppose, and the importance of concealing the movement in hand.

§ 10. OF DIVERSIONS.

Diversions are those movements of bodies of men which have relation to Strategic combinations; those which take place on a field of battle, under the name of *Demonstrations* or *False Attacks*, are such as depend on Tactics only. [See §. 1.]

With equal forces and before an able enemy a *Diversion* is generally a dangerous error, unless indeed one can hope for a powerful support in the country itself, and so occupy the attention of a considerable body of the enemy.

However, a demonstrative detachment may be made in order to deceive the enemy as to the direction in which it is intended to inflict a great blow; but care must be taken to avoid engaging the detachment in serious fighting, and to recall it rapidly towards the corps designed to engage in battle.

In general *Detachments* bring destruction on an army, and they should be avoided as much as possible. An exception must however be made in the case of portions of an army detached in order to cover the *Line of Operations*. It is then advantageous to enlarge the Field of Operations, and to bring into action the forces left in position of observation merely so as to assist in striking decisive blows.

§ 11. OF THE PASSAGE OF RIVERS.

In the selection of a point for the *Passage of a River* one must endeavour to combine Strategic advantages with the Tactical conveniences afforded by the nature of the locality.

The point of passage should be as little as possible removed from the *Line of Operations*; it should be near good roads on both banks. A spot should be selected where the river forms a re-entering angle (that is, where the projection of the corner of the land

into the river is at the opposite side, and the line of the bank forms a concave at the near side), so as to allow of the establishment of batteries on one's own side of the stream with a converging fire playing on the banks at the opposite side; the bank at this side should command that of the enemy's side, if one marches in advance, and the contrary if in retreat. Scarped or precipitous banks and approaches to the river on the enemy's side should be avoided. The neighbourhood of a large island near the enemy's bank affords facilities for disembarkation; [this observation only applies to some of the larger Continental rivers such as the Danube, the Rhine, the Po, &c.] The neighbourhood of a tributary stream enables one to conceal the preparations for crossing.

It is very advantageous if the army after its passage can take its *Front of Operations* and its *Line of Battle* perpendicular to the river, at least for the first few marches, without being obliged to divide itself into several corps in different directions.

Diversions must be made to deceive the enemy. The army should be disposed "*en echelons*," the centre in advance, so that the enemy shall not be able to attack more than the most advanced column without exposing his flank. [*En Echelons* (literally, like the steps of a ladder); suppose an army arranged in divisions, battalions, or regiments, in line; instead of all occupying the same front, suppose that the second regiment (or battalion, &c.,) on the right or the left be placed a little in front of the first (shoulderwise to it, as it were, but the actual front line parallel though more in front), the third a little in front of that, the fourth a little in front of that, and so on, then the army is said to be disposed in *echelons* of regiments (or battalions, or divisions, as the case may be)]. The light troops, particularly of the cavalry, scatter themselves along the valley by the river. The first detachments of the Infantry are passed over in boats, followed by the remainder, to drive in and push back the enemy; the troops must not open fire until after their landing.

If means be not deficient, two or three [floating] bridges should be thrown across at the same time. Strong Batteries, with guns of heavy metal, should be so disposed as to cross their fire and to take the enemy in flank and rear; these must be covered as quickly as possible.

The Bridge completed, some light field pieces must be passed over, without their waggons, with the first corps of infantry; the Batteries are to follow with the divisions.

The *Defence of the Passage of a River* is difficult, because one

must watch a great number of points, and one is exposed to be deceived by False Demonstrations. The banks of the river must be cleared and reconnoitred carefully, and the troops concentrated at a central point with abundant means of transport. The Cavalry, above all, will be found particularly useful. Signals should be established. The Artillery should be held in reserve, ready to throw itself rapidly on the point attacked; the enemy should be engaged smartly while he is yet inferior in numbers; he must be sharply attacked with cross fire.

If you reach in time, place howitzers [guns throwing shells] in front of the bridge so as to *ricochet* along it [that is to throw the ball so as to hop along the ground, instead of aiming point blank at an object upon it]; batteries of guns of the largest calibre [throwing solid shot] should also be placed so as to batter the bridge with cross fire and to sink the boats on which it rests.

§ 12. OF ENTRENCHED CAMPS.

Entrenched Camps may prove of great importance in the support which they afford to an army; they should be established at a point at once Strategic and Tactical: but they must be abandoned at once as soon as they are turned or passed. A *tête de pont* [see § 2] is generally selected, on the opposite bank, near a great fortified city which affords resources to the army. *Entrenched Camps* are, above all, favourable to an army near such a city, or near its *Base of Operations*. They are then able to support themselves, even though invested, and to disquiet the enemy on his rear.

§ 13. OF FORTRESSES.

Fortresses harass the march of an enemy, compelling him to make detours and to divide into detachments; they secure the march of the army which is in possession of them—facilitating the débouche of its columns, if they are on rivers covering its flanks, and all movements; and supplying it with a refuge at need. Fortresses [as on the continent] are made the points of meeting of the greater number of roads, rivers, and canals; they are the central points from which all movements proceed. They afford important means of making diversions. NAPOLEON has said: "Fortresses are useful in offensive as well as in defensive war; doubtless they cannot by themselves take the place of an arm", but they are the only means to stay, to clog, to weaken, and to disquiet a con-

quering enemy. * * * * * *A general in chief ought always to act with all his forces concentrated, and to bring them rapidly to bear upon the Decisive Point of the theatre of war, taking care all the while to remain himself unexposed; and to this end he ought to dot over his Line of Operations with a series of Fortresses or Fortified Posts, distant the one from the other not more than seven or eight days' march at most, and to secure his march and his communications by the occupation of some fortresses of some importance which may be found on his flanks or in his rear."*

Fortresses established in good Strategic and Tactical positions [see § 1.] are very useful; those on the other hand which do not fulfil this condition of situation are great evils to the State, which expends in them soldiers and money at absolute loss of both.

Great and populous Fortresses, great fortified commercial cities, afford resources for the supply of an army; they are to be preferred to small ones, above all if one can count upon the mass of the inhabitants.

In mountainous countries small Forts, well placed, are as valuable as great Fortresses; for the question there is but of closing passes, not of supplying a place of refuge to an army.

The *Fortresses* of a country should be *echelon'd* [see § 11,] on three lines, from the frontier to the centre of the State; [this observation applies, of course, to continental nations only, see § 3, &c.]

The Fortification of the Capital of a State [of Paris, for example,] assures to the frontier fortresses all their value, in opposing itself to a rapid system of invasion. [If Paris had been fortified in 1814, or again in 1815, France would not have succumbed to the invasion of the European coalition.]

An invading army should always endeavour to beat and to disperse the masses which occupy the open country, and with this view it may pass by the fortresses; but if it succeeds only imperfectly, it becomes imprudent to pursue the course of invasion without limit.

An army cannot have a great river on its rear, without occupying one of the fortresses situated upon that river, so as to have its line of retreat secured. It may then advance in safety, always pursuing at the same time the siege of the neighbouring fortresses.

An army which passes by the fortresses of the country it

invades is always obliged to blockade them, or, at least, to "observe" them, in force.

If it decides on laying siege to a fortress, it leaves behind it a corps d'armee charged with this task, and continues its march, or takes up a position selected to cover the siege.

The operations of a siege are always rendered more difficult by the presence of an army of assistance. The best way to cover a siege is to pursue as far as possible those of the enemy's troops which endeavour to interrupt it, to throw back what remains of them from it beyond some natural obstacle, and to stay there in observation.

If one is not in great force, a central position must be taken up which covers the approaches to the fortress, and the besieging corps must be in part united with the corps of observation to strike a decisive blow. In case the two armies together, the besieging army and the army of observation, are only equal to the enemy's army of assistance, the entire besieging army must remain within or close to its lines.

To attempt at once to besiege a fortress, to keep up one's communications, and to restrain and keep in check an army of assistance bent on raising the siege, would be a false and a dangerous combination.

Entrenched Lines of several miles in extent are always forced or turned, the defence of such lines being necessarily too much cut up in details.

§ 14. OF MAGAZINES.

The supplies ought always to be in proportion to the resources of the country. They are intimately connected with *Strategical Operations*.

The proximity of the sea affords great advantages as regards supplies and reinforcements; nevertheless there are dangers attending the keeping too near the coast in warlike operations, for one may be pressed back upon it without retreat.

A continental army should never neglect to have its *Base of Operations* on the land side, and a reserve of supplies independent of naval means, which are but too subject to unexpected vicissitudes.

§ 15. OF CANTONMENTS.

The *Cantonments* (permanent encampment, &c.) of an army should be well closed up, on a space as deep as wide, so as to

avoid presenting too long a line, which it is always easy to pierce, and in which it is impossible to rally; they should be covered by a river, or by a front line of troops in barracks and protected by field works; places of re-assembly, or rendezvous, should be fixed; the army must be well watched and sentinelled; signals must be established. The essential point is to be able to bring together Fifty to Sixty Thousand men in Twenty-four hours.

§ 16. OF RETREATS.

There are many ways of combining a *Retreat*:—

To march in mass upon a single line of road. This disposition is proper for an army yet untouched, and which is ready to fight as soon as it receives a reinforcement or finds a good position.

To dispose the army *en echelons* [see § 11] on a single road, in two or three corps, at the distance of a day's march asunder; which does not allow of concentrating the troops for action.

To march by several parallel roads. It is necessary that the roads should be near each other, otherwise the divisions will not be able to give each other assistance in case of attack.

To direct the divisions of the army, from several points distant from each other, towards the same point; which supposes that the different corps are at a distance from one another.

To march by several diverging roads. This would be to deprive the different divisions of all mutual succour, and such a retreat could only answer in cases where each corps would be capable of serving as the nucleus of a national insurrection.

The passage of great rivers, in retreat, is one of the most delicate of operations. It would be advisable to construct beforehand entrenched *têtes de pont* [see § 2—but in this case, of course, the *têtes de pont* would be on the side of the river *from* which the retreating army desired to cross to the other side,] or at least some redoubts heavily armed.

A *tête de pont* protecting the passage of a great River should be so constructed as to leave an interval between it and the bank of the river [see § 2,] sufficiently wide to allow the troops to defile without crowding, and it should be so disposed as to cover them effectually.

§ 17. OF DESCENTS.

Experience has demonstrated the difficulties of a distant expedition. A *Descent* (on a coast) can only be effected against colonies or isolated possessions, or against powers of the second rank which

cannot be at once supported;—in order to operate a momentary diversion, or to capture a post the occupation of which, for a given time, would be of extreme importance—or by way of political and military diversion against a State engaged in a great war, and whose troops are engaged at a distance.

An anchorage should be selected close to some narrow peninsula, so as to give the troops greater assurance, and to facilitate the disembarkation.

§ 18. OF THE DEFENCE OF COASTS.

It is impossible to guard an entire coast line; even numerous armies would not be sufficient for the purpose, and would not be able to offer anywhere a serious resistance. It is better to have the coast watched by the naval force, which is its chief guard, and to confine one's-self to defend the principal landing-places and the important points by a system of fortresses, of forts, and of fixed *Batteries*, and to form moveable corps ready to be brought to bear to meet the enemy.

Fixed Batteries stay the ships for a time, and inflict some loss upon them; *Forts*, raised on the shores favourably circumstanced for a Descent, hinder a first lodgment, and, not being exposed to be attacked, except with cannon of great calibre, they afford time to a moveable corps to march upon the point threatened, and to give battle to the division disembarked there; lastly, *Fortresses* have for their object to place in safety from attack the great naval establishments of the country.

The fortification of these *Fortresses* consists of a system of external works capable of resisting regular siege attacks, as well as to prevent a bombardment, and of an *enceinte continue* [an uninterrupted circle of ramparts] sufficiently strong for protection against an assault or attack by main force. The protection of man-of-war roads or anchorages and of channels is secured by a system of forts and batteries attached to these fortresses. *Coast Batteries* are sufficient for the Defence of small commercial ports, of establishments of secondary importance, and of anchorages for merchant vessels, the population of the country itself being bound to complete their defence by light-field fortifications.

II. TACTICS.

§ 19. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ON TACTICS.

Tactics comprise the art of bringing into action the masses which *Strategy* has directed on the Decisive Point of the theatre of war. Every field of battle has also its own *Decisive Point*, which is determined by the configuration of the ground, the relation of the locality there with the Strategical *Object* of the campaign, and the disposition of the respective forces on both sides. The Strategical Point is selected by preference (to become the Tactical Decisive Point of the field of battle,) when the nature of the ground does not present obstacles too difficult to be surmounted. One should so employ one's forces as to bring the greatest mass into action at that one of these points, the two extremities and the centre, which affords the greatest chances of success; attack the centre if the enemy's lines are long, and thin in force; attack one of the extremities of his line if it is well closed and strong. It is only with a great superiority of forces on one side that the two extremities of the enemy's line can be attacked at the same time.

Battles are divided into: *Defensive Battles*, or those which an army gives in an advantageous position in which it awaits the enemy; *Offensive Battles*, on the occasions of attack of a position regularly examined beforehand; and *Accidental* or *Unforeseen Battles*, given by armies on the march.

§ 20. OF DEFENSIVE BATTLES.

The *Defensive Order of Battle* depends on the nature of the locality and the general *Object of Operations* [see § 3.] Take care to have the openings of the position such as to be easier for those within to fall upon the enemy than for the enemy to gain an entrance. See that the artillery is assured its full effect in the Defence of the position. Take care to select a position on ground advantageously circumstanced to conceal the movements of your masses upon the *Tactical Decisive Point* [see § 19]; to have your retreat easy and sure; to have your flanks well supported, so

as to oblige the enemy to attack the centre. Avoid supporting yourself on a river or on obstacles absolutely impracticable, for fear of being driven back upon them. If your position supplies no supports on the flanks, then place a double reserve column in deep order behind the wing which requires protection. If you are driven from your first position, take care to rally your columns sufficiently far back in the rear as that the enemy shall not be able to prevent them from re-forming. Resume the offensive, then, as soon as the moment for doing so has arrived; arrange then your order of battle as if you had been all along the attacking party; in this way prevent the enemy from coming up to disorder your flanks.

§ 21. OF OFFENSIVE BATTLES.

The *Simple Parallel Order of Battle* is that in which each side is arranged in a single line parallel with the other, every where of equal strength, the two hostile lines set opposite one another. This arrangement leaves everything to accident and to individual personal bravery; it is only convenient when an army has cut off the enemy's line of retreat while covering its own: the enemy has nothing for it then but to cut his way through by an attack, man to man.

The *Parallel Order on the Front, with a "crochet"* [*i.e.*, a portion of the line doubled back, in front or rear, at one end] *manœuvring on One Wing*, is that in which, instead of opposing to the enemy a single line of equal strength everywhere, the line is doubled or trebled for some distance at one of its extremities, whether by a second line in front or in rear, or by an additional line both in front and rear of that wing. This Order is more advantageous than the former, but it supposes that the attacking army is superior in strength.

The *Oblique Order of Battle* is that in which, instead of drawing up the line parallel to that of the enemy, it is ranged so that one extremity shall be nearer than the other to the enemy's line; in which case that extremity, or wing, which is nearest to the enemy, and which, of course, acts first in the attack, is generally strengthened by a second line either in front or rear. This disposition is particularly suitable for an army inferior in strength; the retired or drawn back wing is out of reach of his arms, but it keeps in check that part of his line which is not intended to be attacked, while it serves as a reserve support in case of need to the acting wing.

The *Perpendicular Order of Battle on One Wing* is that in which, instead of taking line parallel to that of the enemy, the line is at right angles with his, and so that its centre shall be the nearest point to one of his extremities, taking him directly in flank. This Order affords nearly the same advantages as the last mentioned; but it is difficult to establish one's self on one extremity of the enemy's line without his being aware of it, in which case the more distant portion of his forces can hasten up to the point threatened.

The *Perpendicular Order on Both Wings* is that in which the attacking army, divided into two parts, attacks at the same time both wings of the enemy's single line in the manner last described. This Order may sometimes be found useful, but the attacking side must be very greatly superior in numbers.

The *Concave Order of Battle on the Centre* is that in which, instead of taking a single line parallel to that of the enemy and everywhere equally distant from it, the two wings of the parallel line are advanced some distance in front though still parallel to those of the enemy, and these wings are connected with the centre by oblique lines so as to leave nowhere any interval. This disposition is very convenient when it is taken in the course of the chances of a battle; on principle the enemy would throw himself in force on the wings.

The *Convex Order projecting* ["*saillant*"] *at the Centre*, is where the line, always continuous, forms a projecting angle in the centre, the apex of which is placed opposite the enemy's centre, the wings or extremities of the whole line being kept back. This arrangement is scarcely ever adopted except on the occasion of engaging in battle at once, after the passage of a river [see § 11]; in which case the wings must be withdrawn, in order to support them on the river and to cover the bridges. If the enemy should direct his efforts against the salient or projecting centre, or against one alone of the two wings, the army would be compromised.

The *Order in "Echelons" on the Centre* [see § 11] is that in which, instead of keeping a continuous line, with the centre thrown forward in a projecting angle, the line is all arranged in *echelons* [see § 11]; the centre *echelon* the most advanced, and those on each side of it placed farther and farther back from (though each always parallel to) the line of the enemy, the *echelons* forming the extreme wings farthest back of all. This Order may be successfully employed against an enemy's line too much broken

up and too widely extended, in order to cut it in two. In every other case it would return of itself into the Convex Order just described.

The Order in "*Echelons*" on Both Wings, is the converse of the last; that where the Centre is farthest withdrawn, and the Two Wings equally extended, the whole line in *echelons* [see § 11], the last on the extreme wings the nearest to the enemy's line. This Order resolves itself into that either of the "*Perpendicular Order on Both Wings*," or of the "*Concave Order on the Centre*."

The Order of Attack in Column on the Centre and on One Extremity, is that in which, the line being drawn up in Simple Parallel Order opposite to that of the enemy, the Centre is supported by a Column immediately behind it (disposable, of course, at will during the battle,) and another Column is placed on one or the other Wing, in such a manner as to be able to march at once in front of that Wing to attack. This disposition prevents the enemy from throwing himself on your flank, and it brings a great force to bear against the extremity of the enemy's line; it is the Order of Battle to which NAPOLEON has so often given the preference.

A general should never have any intervals, between the different corps placed in line-of-battle, by which the enemy could pass through it; unless it be, indeed, in order to draw him into a snare.

Always seek to find out the relations which exist between the enemy's line and the Decisive Strategic Directions [see §§ 1 and 4]; direct all your efforts upon the Decisive Point [see back §§ 5 and 19]; employ one-third of your force to keep back, to amuse, or to observe the enemy, and throw the other two-thirds in mass upon that Point.

In these different combinations there may be made either one or two attacks. Double Attacks may be either contiguous or separated from one another, successive or simultaneous, according to the strength of one's disposable forces, and the object proposed to be attained.

Every Order of Battle may be formed in Squares of battalions, as well as in Lines, or in Columns.

Against a very numerous Cavalry a *corps d'armée* may be drawn up in one great Square, itself formed of Squares of regiments or battalions; the light artillery is to be placed in the intervals, the parks in the centre of the square.

With an army inferior in numbers, inferior in Cavalry and

Artillery, you must avoid a general battle, supply the want of numbers by the rapidity of your marches, the want of artillery by manœuvres, the inferiority of your cavalry by good choice of positions; you must entrench yourself every evening, and place yourself always in a good attitude of defence, positions supplied by mere natural advantages of ground being no longer sufficient to be depended on.

A field of battle previously examined and studied by the enemy must be avoided; much more one which he has fortified, and where he is entrenched. Never attack any position in front which you can carry by turning it. When an army must effect its retreat upon a particular point, and the army opposed to it is free to retire whither it pleases, the latter has all the advantages; the first must then strike heavy blows, and manœuvre on its flanks.

§ 22. OF UNEXPECTED BATTLES.

Halt and form your Advanced Guard; concentrate your forces at a suitable point, having in view the object proposed when you began to march. Circumstances must determine the dispositions to be adopted in these unforeseen battles improvised at the moment.

§ 23. OF MOUNTAIN WARFARE.

A great number of positions extremely strong in themselves are met with, in Mountain Warfare, which one must care not to attack. Encampments should be occupied on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, so as to leave him no alternative but to evacuate his position without fighting and to take up another position in his rear, or to march out from it to attack. Whichever side attacks (in Mountain Warfare) has the disadvantage, even in offensive war: the art consists in fighting none but defensive combats, and in obliging the enemy to make the attack.

Surprises are the principal enterprises in this kind of war; everything must be so arranged as to effect them, and to avoid those of the enemy. Beat up every defile, ravine, road, and path that can be of use to him. In order to defend a valley place yourself behind it, so as to take the enemy by an *enfilade* if he should engage himself in it; [an *enfilading* fire is that in which the direction of the missile is along the length of a line (or road), not across it; the proportionate amount of damage done by such a fire need hardly be commented on.] Avoid placing yourself at too short a

turn of the road. Take measures to beat up well the foot of the heights on which you establish yourself. Keep most careful watch; be on your guard against surprises; at need cover your position by entrenchments. Keep well open the communications between all the parts of the position you occupy.

§ 24. FORMATION OF TROOPS.

There are no absolute or invariable principles concerning the Formation of Troops, which varies according to circumstances and according to the genius of the commander-in-chief, and which besides undergoes incessant modifications during action.

Advanced Guard.—It endeavours to carry, to cut off, or at least to drive in, the enemy's posts; it occupies, in its advance, all those points which could facilitate the march or the retreat of the body of the troops; it provokes some attacks, from time to time, without engaging so as to compromise itself, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy and to deceive it as to the dispositions of the army; it applies itself to reconnoitre it by means of demonstrations, and by threatening to cut off its advanced guard; if it should prove absolutely necessary, it engages in action, always connecting itself closely with the main body. Its rôle lies in manœuvres. The *Advanced Guard* can be afterwards re-united with the main body, or placed in a convenient Position.

Lines.—If the numbers of the army allow of it several Lines are formed, composed of troops drawn up in Column or in Line of Battle. If there are but two Lines, post some battalions in Column behind the Wings of the Second Line. The Cavalry is distributed in *echelons* [see § 11,] on the Wings, and sometimes at the Centre, if the ground be favourable. The Artillery occupies its own positions [see § 25, (3)], so as to protect the principal attacks or the retreat.

Reserve.—The Reserve is placed in the rear, generally at 1500 to 1800 paces from the second line, either at the Centre or within proper reach of the Decisive Point [see §§ 5 and 19]. It is composed of the very best troops, infantry, cavalry and artillery; and it should be well commanded.

Dispose everything so as to attack the Decisive Point with a superior force, and cover your preparations by false attacks; on the points which you do not desire to carry, present Columns which may afterwards be able to throw themselves rapidly on the true point of attack; concentrate, for the same object, a body of troops

concealed from the enemy's view either by the ground or by the bodies of troops in front of them ; keep back the enemy with the smallest number of men you possibly can on those points at which you have no design to make a serious attack.

The Defence, like the Attack, has its Decisive Point ; all its means must be there concentrated. Support your Wings, or supply the want of natural supports for them by corps placed in *echelons* [see § 11] ; take the offensive from the very moment that you have succeeded in repelling the attack of the enemy, to the end that you may disconcert him and that you may restore confidence to your own troops. Throw a serried Column rapidly upon one of the wings or upon the flank of the enemy. Attack sharply by *echelons*, so as not to give time to the enemy to change his front or to bring up his reserves. (The different *echelons* would of course engage in quick succession one after another, the attack of each being rapidly supported by the next behind it.)

On the Defensive, in order not to lose the advantage of your position, and to give yourself a moral superiority in the combat, you may place yourself a little behind the ground upon which you design to give battle, and only bear down upon it at the moment of repelling the attack of the enemy.

In every disposition, whatever it may be, do not allow your plans to be unfolded until the latest moment, and execute them promptly. Take advantage of the night to bring your troops on the flank or on the rear of the enemy, so as not to have to mask their march by any great movement.

You may obtain great advantages over an enemy by combining your attacks upon one extremity of his line, without too much weakening your own line, so as to surprise and get behind his flank before he has time to make his dispositions. Fall upon his camp a little before daybreak. Reconnoitre well the locality in which you act ; give to the masses of your forces a proper Direction, both Tactical and Strategic. [§§ 1, 4, 5, and 19.]

When you give battle you should give yourself every possible chance of success ; not one should be omitted or neglected. Concentrate all your troops ; bring all your forces into action at the proper moment, and pursue your success in the most complete manner possible. Detach some columns of Light Troops on the flanks of the enemy, and endeavour to cut his army in two.

The Commander-in-Chief prescribes beforehand the dispositions to be followed in case of failure of success, leaving, however the

necessary latitude to the general officers under him. All the several divisions should give mutual assistance to one another.

In case of success, the Light Troops alone should pursue the enemy with celerity. The others march from position to position, and always so disposed as to be in a condition to repel any return to the offensive on the enemy's part, and to support the divisions engaged.

The Commanders of the different Divisions of the Army indicate, as far as possible, the points where they are to be found from time to time to receive Reports.

Officers and Sub-Officers (in the English Army "non-commissioned officers") keep the men in their ranks by all the means in their power; they do not allow the soldiers to search or to despoil the dead; nor to carry the wounded, unless by express permission after the action. Prisoners are never to be despoiled, and they are to be treated with all the respect due to their rank.

The *Intendance* (Medical and General Service Department) is responsible for the service of the sick and the care of the health of the army; it brings together the means of assistance and of transport for the wounded.

The officers of the Artillery send, after the battle, to collect the pieces, the small arms, and the belts, &c., which remain on the field.

Food stores, and all effects proper to the commissariat, taken from the enemy, are placed at the disposition of the *Intendance*.

All the Superior Officers agree, as far as concerns them, in the written Report of the day. The various deeds of arms referred to are certified by them.

§ 25. OF THE DISPOSITIONS PECULIAR TO THE DIFFERENT ARMS. (1.) INFANTRY.

The Defensive requires Solidity and abundant Fire; the Offensive Mobility, Solidity and Impulse.

Infantry is habitually formed in three ranks (three deep). The formation in two ranks is not allowed save by way of exception in case of a reduction in the effective force. (So in the French service; the English use the formation in two ranks.)

File-firing (individual firing) is the most active and the most killing, the true Fire in action; platoon and division Firing can only be suitable to troops posted in position; that of the battalion may be employed in an offensive movement, or in retreat. No fire should ever be delivered while marching.

The *Open Order on two lines, with a reserve* is generally used; that is where in each line a small space is left between the several divisions (battalions, or brigades, &c.) of which it is composed, those of the second line being so placed as to front the spaces left in the first line. The distance between the two lines, though variable, is about 400 paces on even and open ground and in presence of artillery; 150 paces in broken ground.

The Lines thus displayed in "Open Order," (each of which may be considered as made up of a number of smaller Lines placed in a line with one another), may be disposed (that is the smaller Lines of which each is made up) in even line, chequer-wise ("*en échiquier*"—alternately in advance and retired like the white or the black squares on a chess-board), or in *echelons* [see § 11]; but the disposition "chequer-wise" requires the formations to be in columns, in order to avoid being taken in flank by cavalry.

The First Line is often *deployed* (i.e., drawn out into a line, instead of being massed together), and the Second Line formed in double columns behind it; in which case each Division (whatever it may be) of the Second line, instead of being placed in line behind, opposite to the intervals left between the divisions of the first line, as in the "Open Order" just described, is posted exactly behind the corresponding division of the First Line, and is not deployed, but massed in two equal Columns one behind each of the extremities of the division in front. But this disposition varies according to circumstances, and the object proposed. Sometimes the Second Line is made to extend at each side beyond the First in order to protect its flanks where necessary. The intervals between Battalions deployed are of about twenty-four paces. The intervals between Brigades or Divisions are more considerable, to allow of the passage of Cavalry and Artillery.

Changes of Front, in advancing, allow of taking in flank a portion of the enemy's line.

The Order of Battle in *Echelons* [see § 11] is employed in making a powerful attack upon a single point of the enemy's line, or in order to retire slowly and gradually after a check. The Battalions are either deployed, or in column, just as if they were in a continued line. All the portions divided in *echelons* should mutually flank each other at 300 paces of distance.

The formation in *echelons* is of little use against Artillery, unless the nature of the ground be such as to protect the troops.

Oblique *Echelons* (i.e., the Oblique Order of Battle, but in

echelons instead of in continuous line [see § 21]), may sometimes be employed with success.

The First Echelon (that which is farthest back in the line) should have its outer flank supported upon some obstacle. It may be supported at need by a Reserve, in Column, or by some Cavalry or Artillery.

Against Cavalry the Infantry forms Squares, whether by regiments, by several battalions, or by battalions. [These Squares may be drawn up in a continuous line (each square taking the space it would have occupied in line if deployed, and leaving of course wide intervals between itself and its neighbours), or they may be placed chequer-wise [*en échiquier*, see § 25 (1) in the *supra*]; every second square withdrawn somewhat behind; the Squares themselves, also, may be formed either *Straight* or *Oblique*, in the latter case presenting a salient Angle to the enemy instead of a side of the Square.] The largest Squares supply the greatest Fire. They are sometimes formed by Brigades, even, but this is exceptional. Lastly, Squares are disposed either literally as perfect squares, or as Long Squares (right-angled parallelograms) where it is desirable to extend the Front and to increase the Fire.

In order to secure facility of movement Battalions are often formed, when there is room for it, in Double Columns, or in Columns by Divisions, more or less deep. This formation is a convenient one for the attack of a Position; the flanks must be protected by Light Infantry Skirmishers or Sharpshooters (*tirailleurs*) or by Cavalry. A serried or close Column, disposed by Battalions, would be deficient in Fire, in Mobility, and in Impulsion, and would be too much exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery.

For the offensive, Columns of Attack are also employed, placed *en échiquier* ["chequer-wise," see *supra*, § 25 (1)], and formed of two Lines of Battalions ranged in Column by divisions on the Centre, with Skirmishers in the intervals. This formation is ordinarily with three ranks, in order to offer greater resistance to Cavalry. It may be made with two ranks only, to give more Fire [see § 24,] but in this case it must be supported by Cavalry.

Take advantage of undulations of the ground to cover your troops against artillery; defend all villages, woods, and other obstacles situated on your front; carry them from the enemy,

but without showing too much obstinacy in fighting, which might be productive of disproportionate losses.

The Sharpshooters (*tirailleurs*) are scattered in twos; at least one-third of the party remains in Reserve. A platoon of Sharpshooters threatened by Cavalry retires on this reserve and forms circle. These Reserves occupy the more important points. In the open plain the Sharpshooters should be supported by Infantry or Cavalry in order of Battle. Turn with your Sharpshooters such obstacles as are difficult to carry, while the others attack in front.

When the enemy's artillery is not sufficiently supported by other troops, it is advantageous to attack it as with Sharpshooters, in force, in order to avoid as much as possible its killing effects. Turn the pieces against the enemy at once; carry off or destroy their ammunition stores; bring away, if possible, the pieces themselves; if you cannot, then spike them, blow up the ammunition boxes, and take the horses.

(2.) CAVALRY.

The principal object of Cavalry is to finish and complete the victory, to bear assistance rapidly to a menaced party, to break through Infantry when shaken or in disorder, to make prisoners, to carry off standards, to pursue the enemy, and to cover a retreat.

A general attack of Cavalry against a line in good order ought to be supported by the Infantry.

Cavalry has good chances of success against Infantry already engaged, by taking it in the rear; it has an equally good chance against Infantry disordered or cut up by Artillery; it may be directed against Cavalry in order to isolate it from Infantry, or in the confusion of a movement; lastly, it may be used against Artillery not sufficiently well guarded.

Cavalry should be kept in the Rear or on the Wings; do not mix it with Infantry, as that would paralyse its movements. Leave intervals sufficient for its free passage; keep the two Arms (Cavalry and Infantry), generally separated, near enough to protect each other. Post your Cavalry at 400 paces from the point where it must come into action.

Cavalry admits of the same formations as Infantry; it should however avoid long continuous lines, and should prefer those ranged *en échiquier* ["chequer-wise," see *supra*, § 25 (1)], which allow of rallying troops in disorder. The distance between

cavalry lines ought always to be from 400 to 500 paces, so as to be able to remedy an unsuccessful charge, except in case of forming *en échiquier*, when the distance may be less. The Second Line is never to be a continuous one, that it may allow of retreat to the troops of the first line.

In every Brigade of Cavalry dispose each Regiment in two Lines, the second acting as Reserve to the first, and thus finding itself under the command of the same officer, and more within reach than if it was in the same Line. Or else, form Columns by divisions behind the first line (that immediately behind each of the intervals left between the divisions whatever they are, which are deployed in the first Line, place another full division in close Column), so as to cover its flanks and to be able to *debouche* (i.e., to pour out) by the intervals.

The Order in *Echelons* [see § 11] is very suitable for cavalry. Without leaving the Open Order Deployed [see supra, § 25 (1)] it economises its strength, and alternately refuses (keeps back) one or the other of its wings. A First Line, beaten back, thus retires readily through the flanks.

Cavalry charges in Line against a Deployed Line, in Column against Infantry formed in Column or in Squares. The Squadrons are formed in close Column, keeping them out of reach of the enemy's Artillery, either by distance, or by taking advantage of the formation of the ground. Do not give to a Column of Cavalry useless depth; form at need several attacks. Guard against being attacked in flank, by means of a few squadrons placed in *echelons* by platoons, which can thus at need show face to the enemy.

The Charge is made against the angles of squares, if they are not provided with artillery. The squadrons, formed in close Column, take distance one after the other of double the extent of their front. The first squadron is promptly followed by the second, which, if the first has made a passage, throws itself into the square by the two sides. If the first squadron is repelled, it escapes by the right and left to reform in the rear of the column, and leaves the way clear for the front of the second. The latter renews the charge; and so on. The squadrons which follow are sent in pursuit.

Against Artillery, Cavalry charges loosely (*en fourrageurs*, as if engaged in foraging), unless it can turn it. A Reserve, concentrated, meantime attacks the neighbouring troops. In case of success, see above, (directions for Infantry in similar case).

In combats between Cavalry and Cavalry, the advantage is generally with that side which keeps the last squadrons in reserve, and knows how to throw them at the proper moment on the flanks of the enemy.

You should not endeavour to rally too near the enemy.

Artillery is more necessary to Cavalry than to Infantry, because Cavalry does not return fire. Cavalry engaged in the support of Artillery ought to leave it full room to act, should never mask it, but should charge on the flanks of the party attacking it.

In retreat, it is proper to cover the movements of Cavalry by about one-fourth Cavalry Skirmishers.

(3.) ARTILLERY.

Officers in command of Batteries of Artillery, or of their subdivisions, should keep themselves in communication with the general or superior officers commanding the troops and under whose orders they are placed, in order to be informed of the various movements in proper time, to be acquainted in advance with the dispositions for attack and defence, the positions to be occupied, and the object proposed to be attained; they are to report their own observations on these matters, after having reconnoitred the ground.

Keep the Reserve separate, and assign it a provisional post. Halt the Batteries out of cannon shot. Assure yourself that everything is in order—Form the Batteries in column by sections; if the ground allows, make them march deployed, [see *supra*, § 25 (1)].

Positions proper to Artillery.—When the appointed position for the Batteries of Artillery is not rigorously prescribed by the Order of Battle, it should be chosen according to the following principles:—

The ground in front of the Battery should be as far as possible flat, and should leave the enemy entirely uncovered as far as the fire of the piece can reach (say 1500 yards.) You should have a command over the ground of one yard in the 100 (*i.e.*, fire from a spot having only that command of elevation); this elevation is most favourable for *ricochet* (*i.e.*, firing [see § 11], so as to make the ball hop along the ground). The maximum elevation above the points to be hit should not exceed seven yards in the 100. When, in default of any other, or to take the enemy in reverse,

one is obliged to occupy positions of greater elevation, the neighbouring ground should be defended by pieces placed to hit point blank the foot of the height. Reconnoitre the ground in every direction, and if necessary, establish *debouches* (passages by which to come out of the position easily). Take advantage of all obstacles which can stop or check the advance of the enemy, or neutralise his *ricochet* (see above,) such as marshes, ditches, dykes, undulations of ground having an elevation of half a yard to the yard, hedges, brushwood, &c. Avoid rocky positions. Keep the ammunition boxes and carriages out of reach of the enemy's arms, without, however, inconveniencing the service of your pieces. As far as possible do not establish Batteries in front of your troops, or on any slight elevation behind them; if not in the very same line with the troops, they should be in front of the intervals in the line.

At need, and when there is time for it, cover your Artillery by means of the inequalities of the ground, especially on its flanks. By night, above all, in the Advanced and the Rear Guards, put your Artillery in safety against surprise by means of entrenchments.

Employment of Artillery.—The object of Artillery is not to kill men or to dismount pieces in isolated positions, but to make spaces in and passages through the front of the enemy, to stay his attacks, and to second those directed against him.

In front of a line, never place your Batteries directly opposite the points upon which they are to play; dispose them always so as to take them aslant, or in flank, and so that they may be able to cross their fire so as mutually to protect each other.—Play on the enemies Columns, however, in front; attack vigorously their extensions as they deploy.—Direct the fire of several Batteries together upon those points where it is desired to produce decisive effects, avoiding at the same time the concentration of a great number of pieces and the placing of several Batteries in the same line, in order that the enemy may not be able to enfilade them [see § 23,] and take them all at once (by a *ricochet* fire—[see § 11,]).—Do not expose yourself to be taken by the enemy's fire aslant, in flank, or in reverse, unless the desired effect cannot be rapidly produced.—Do not engage Artillery in combat with Artillery, unless your troops should suffer too much from the enemy's guns and that his are under cover. Separate your pieces then as much as possible, or divide your Batteries; endeavour to take the enemy's pieces by the wheels, or to concentrate your

fire on those of the centre.—When Artillery marches with an attacking Column, or when the enemy is pursued, advance by *Echelons* [see § 11.] so as to beat him without intermission. Observe the same order in retreating.—Do not discover your Batteries to the enemy too soon; conceal them from the view of the enemy until the moment of going into action, then form them with rapidity.

The different Batteries should be always ready to change their position, but should not do so without need; regulate their movements so that they shall not inconvenience those of the other troops, and so that they shall be always sufficiently well supported.

Prolonge should not be employed except under circumstances; for example, in a retreat, when it is of importance that the firing should continue until the very arrival of the enemy at the pieces.

If you form Oblique Squares [see supra, § 25 (1)], place your Artillery between the Squares, by Batteries or Half-Batteries.

Disposition on the Offensive.—Several Batteries of Division are so placed as to play with converging fires upon that portion of the enemy's line against which the principal attack is directed; the remainder are employed to check the troops opposed to them. Some Batteries of Reserve, of heavy calibre, should be established on the most distant positions, on heights, from which they may be able to prevent the enemy from making any effectual attempts against the flanks of the attack, or from which they may take in reverse the position attacked.

Disposition on the Defensive.—The pieces of heavy calibre are placed at those points from which the enemy can be discovered the farthest off, at the weakest points, or where he would find it most his interest to force his way, on the wings of the position. The Batteries of Division are made to cross their fire in those directions by which the enemy may advance. If the ground allows of it, all the line of Artillery is so disposed as to form a re-entering or concave curve, always taking care not to weaken it by extending it too far.

Batteries of Reserve.—One portion of the Batteries of Reserve may be engaged from the commencement of an action; the remainder should remain disposable, to be employed at need. As far as possible you should not let any but the Batteries of Foot Artillery enter into the plan of your original Order of Battle, and you should keep your Horse Batteries for those occasions in which

no substitute for them can be had. As long as the Batteries of Reserve are not engaged, they should be kept beyond the reach of the enemy's arms, and even absolutely out of his sight, and they should be placed in security against a sudden dash, or *coup de main*, by an escort or by some defensive dispositions; they are to follow the *corps d'armée*, always keeping the same distance from it.

Movements in Advance.—If the enemy gives up the field of battle, the Horse Batteries march in pursuit of him, with the Cavalry, to throw him into disorder. The Batteries of heavy calibre follow with the Infantry, to prevent his resisting by taking advantage of any position.

Retreats.—Movements in Retreat ought, should be partial and successive, and should be made in the most perfect order and at quick marching pace. The Artillery which is in line retires in *Echelons* by Batteries or Half-Batteries. Some Batteries are rapidly established on positions examined beforehand, to protect the troops, to enable them to rally, and to pass through defiles on the way. In such a position the Batteries, unless they receive orders to retire, should continue their fire to the last extremity, at the risk of losing their pieces themselves. Disgrace is attached to a disaster of this kind when it is caused by weakness or cowardice; it becomes honourable when one is exposed to it only by a generous obstinacy in defence.

To Defend a Village, post Batteries on its flanks to fire on the Attacking Columns. Keep a Reserve in the rear, to check the enemy in case he endeavours to turn the village. Do not expose your artillery in the village itself, unless it occupies an advantageous position, unless it be fortified, or unless it must be defended even to the last extremity.

To Attack a Village, throw shells into it, to set it on fire, if you merely want to drive the enemy out of it; if you want to occupy it, or to pass through it, throw round shot.

In *Mountain Service*, use shells to reach the enemy in the deep valleys and cuts, and in covered places; grape shot and canister against attacking bodies within easy distance.

Delivery of Fire.—The Commanders of Batteries are to determine the moment to fire, according to the distance. They are to determine the direction of the aim, and the kind of projectile to be used; they are to economise carefully their ammunition and not to use it without discernment, never forgetting that all the ammunition of one piece (about 400 shots) may be consumed in a

few hours. They are to insist on all these details, if need be, with the generals, because all the responsibility weighs upon themselves.

Never throw projectiles at an object more than 1,200 to 1,500 yards off,* nor grape or canister shot beyond 400 to 500 yards. Throw round shot and shell against the front of a Column, against a Line taken aslant, in flank, or in reverse, and against Artillery. Throw shell against Houses occupied by the enemy, behind Curtains, and in the open field. Throw balls (grape and canister) against the Front of a Line, and against any troops, at a convenient distance. Throw rather at the side of, than beyond, the object of your aim; at first slowly, at great distances; faster and faster according to the effect produced, or according as the enemy draws near; as fast as possible at the approach of a Charge. To pass over some 200 yards Infantry require two minutes at charging pace; Cavalry, half a minute at a gallop. Fire always every shot singly, and never in salvo (or volley), so as not to leave any breathing time to the enemy. Against an attack, artillery should hold its ground to the very last extremity. Never answer the fire of Sharpshooters, it is the part of the Infantry to keep them off. If your Artillery has to oppose itself to Artillery of greater calibre, let it approach it as near as possible, only stopping short beyond the effective distance of grapeshot, Never fire at night, unless: against a fixed object, and one previously well reconnoitred by day; or with grapeshot at a very short distance; or to set buildings on fire with shells.

Disposition of Reserves and Parks of Artillery, and Stores of Ammunition.—The Reserve of each Battery—where the Infantry Ammunition is kept for use—should be always harnessed for march, and provided with an escort if necessary; it takes up proper positions, and follows the movements of the troops, keeping itself at a safe distance from the arms and from the various attempts of the enemy.

The Park of Reserve of each Corps d'Armée, with a strong escort, is to keep near the troops, at a distance of from three to five miles, in a central position.

In Retreats all the Parks are directed, in full time beforehand, to appointed positions in the rear of the Army, and, as far as possible, to proceed thither by different roads.

[* Of course this direction is to be taken as applicable only to the pieces commonly in use; not to the rifled cannon of the present day, or other similarly improved weapons of modern warfare.]

III. MARCHES.—MANŒUVRES.

§. 26. OF FRONT MARCHES.

The Order most favourable to the March is that which unites celerity of movements with promptitude in deploying, [see §. 25 (1)]. The Order of March should be the same as the Order of Battle to be taken on arriving on the field. Form as many Columns of March as there are Corps d'Armée; make them advance by different roads, always keeping them so much together as to be able to give each other mutual assistance. There is always an advantage in marching in several columns at distances sufficiently wide to allow of deploying, when the ground admits of it; this disposition should always precede a deployment either in advance or in rear. As long as you are not advised that the enemy is near and in front, each Corps d'Armée need but form a single column, having a front proportionate to the smallest breadth of the road or path to be passed through.

Avoid leaving any insurmountable obstacles between the Columns. Take advantage of all the localities suitable for securing your flanks on the march. Occupy the *débouchés* (passages, passes, and their openings); take possession of the boats; destroy at need the bridges and ferries. If the country be very rough and unsuitable for *deploying*, turn the positions which the enemy may take possession of, while you watch him in front. Keep up constant communication between your columns; employ signals, if necessary, in order to combine their movements. Let your columns be preceded by a body of Artillery, in order to facilitate their deploying. When the country is open, keep together as many columns as the ground allows at distances just sufficient to permit them to deploy freely, so as to be able to form an Order of Battle either in line of divisions or in continuous line. Examine the various localities susceptible of exposing the enemy to reverses, or allowing you to turn the positions which he may take up. Never engage more than two columns in front in the same pass or defile,

that of the right marching left in front so as to be able to deploy at the same time with the other. Redouble your precautions in hollow ways (*i.e.*, where the road, or passage, dips down between high ditches or rising ground on each side); avoid changes of direction in your march.

Infantry and Cavalry should not be mixed in the same column; the Infantry is generally placed at the head; the Cavalry usually marches on one wing, or behind the Infantry. In uneven countries each column, being able to engage by itself, should have its cavalry in the rear.

Independent of the general Advanced Guard which precedes an Army, each Corps d'Armée has its particular Advanced Guard, which should show face to any attack, and which is composed of the three arms (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery,) with some workmen (pioneers) to open and free the way, and a light bridge equipage. The effective force of the Infantry should always be double that of the Cavalry; the Advanced Guard, varying in strength, should be within the limits of 1-10th to 1-20th of the Army.

The flanks are protected by scouts of light Infantry and Cavalry, which are to be relieved frequently: the first, in greater number, are placed at from sixty to seventy-five paces from each other, so as to form a continuous chain; the horsemen keep themselves in communication with the flankers of the nearest column.

The rear is secured by a Rear-Guard, the force and composition of which vary according to circumstances.

The Advanced Guard should always be kept within reach of being supported. Draw it near, when you make an attack, so as not to discover your intentions; in marching in several columns, place it in advance of that one the movement of which it is of the greatest importance to cover, but so as always to be able to protect the deployment [see § 25 (1)] of the others. Cover the Advanced Guard by scouts; search completely every village, every defile, &c.; dispose your troops in such Order [see § 21] as may be most suitable to the nature of the country; always place some horsemen at the head of your march.

§ 27. OF MARCHES IN RETREAT.

In Marches in Retreat, let all the baggage be moved to the front, as well as even a portion of the Artillery; take possession of all the defiles in your way, by establishing yourself on their

flanks ; close up the enemy's *débouchés* (the passages by which he can pour out upon you). Send forward detachments beforehand, by the cross-roads, to occupy the positions which the enemy is to take, so as to cover its deploying [see § 25, (1.)]. Seize possession of all posts, *têtes de pont* [see § 2], &c., which the enemy might occupy in your rear.

Retreats may be facilitated, either by making an offensive movement to deceive the enemy, or by profiting by the night to conceal the first moments of the march, or by passing over a river and blowing up the bridges after it is passed ; or, again, by throwing one's-self into defiles the entrance into which may be defended with obstinacy.

The Rear-Guard, and the Flanks, stand in need of powerful protection during Retreats, and should be composed according to the nature of the country and the importance of the circumstances at the moment.

The Rear-Guard should halt and stand firm at all points offering support, so as to give the various detachments time to join the Army. Obstruct the enemy's march. Blow up the bridges. Assume the offensive occasionally, but so as not to compromise yourself too deeply.

§ 28. OF FLANK MARCHES.

Flank Marches should be avoided as being always dangerous in presence of an enemy, and as being only suitable to very small bodies of men. You may be surprised and cut through, not being in force ; an attack on the head of the columns affords little remedy against this. Such Marches can only be executed slowly ; they almost always leave the line of operations uncovered.

When you are compelled to have recourse to a Flank March, each Line of Infantry [see § 24], according to the strength of the Army, should form one or two columns of itself ; the Cavalry, exclusive of detachments, should march on the inner flank, in as many columns as may be necessary to hasten the movement ; it keeps itself abreast with the Infantry ; the several Batteries follow their divisions ; the Parks of Artillery form a last column on the inner flank. Keep yourself continually ready to fight both in Front and in Flank ; have an Advanced Guard, and a Rear-Guard ; cover yourself by means of every natural obstacle, and keep sufficiently far from the enemy ; send out detachments upon every point proper to cover the march ; establish batteries ; profit by such positions as may be able to support satisfactorily

the inner flank; [inner flank, *i.e.*, that farthest from the enemy, across whose front you are marching.]

§ 29. OF RETREATS.

A good Rear-Guard should be formed, composed of the different arms, (Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery), supported by reserves of Cavalry; it should be kept half a day or a day's march distance from the main body of the army, according to its strength and to circumstances.

An Army in Retreat accomplishes its movement by several roads, which should not separate far from one another, and which should all conduct to the rallying point fixed. It is not necessary that these roads, or directions, should converge among themselves, if the retreat can be made behind a river or a chain of mountains. Cover your flanks well either by means of natural obstacles or by light troops.

An Army yet intact, and in but moderate force, may retreat in a body by the same route.

Whatever be your manner of Retreat, conduct it slowly, concentrate your forces, and multiply as much as possible those obstacles by which the enemy may be stayed. Take advantage of a wooded country, and of one cut up by gorges, passes, ravines, and defiles. Make cuts across the roads, unless at the sides of them the way is practicable; obstruct them by *Abattis*; [an *abattis* is an obstruction composed of a number of large trees, cut down with all their branches on, and heaped one upon another, the entangled branches turned towards the enemy; various artificial means are often adopted to assist and strengthen their entanglement, and to give solidity to their mass;] break them up by hollowing out pits in them, by conducting into which the water of a neighbouring brook the road may soon be made impassible. Close up or obstruct the passage through the Villages, by *Palanques*, (palisade-work arranged in a particular way, formed of large thick palisades or squared trunks of trees, of at least seven or eight inches in diameter each), by barricades, by loaded waggons, taking away a wheel, &c.; fill the last houses with combustible materials and set fire to them, so as to accomplish the burning of the village when the enemy is engaged in its passage; the artillery should throw shells upon the houses to prevent the fire from being extinguished. Destroy or break down the Bridges, or merely block up the passage over them if you are likely to require them afterwards yourself. Take care to carry over all the Boats

to the side you occupy. Make Fords impracticable by making a dyke (embankment) from the side of the river you occupy; by cutting a wide trench in the middle of the river, following the direction of its current; by stakes, caltrops, planks with long nails stuck in them and well loaded, and harrows, spread through all the breadth of the stream; by trees fastened together and sunk to the bottom by means of bags filled with stones and fastened to their branches, &c.; and scarp down (*i.e.*, cut down straight and precipitous) the banks on both sides. Employ, according to circumstances, in fine, all the various means furnished by the art of Field Fortification; [*Fortification Passagere, i.e.*, Light or Temporary Works of Fortification, as distinguished from those of solid construction, upon an elaborate plan, applied to Cities and regular Fortresses; this branch of Fortification is the subject of distinct military education; and of distinct treatises which must be studied for themselves by those who would become acquainted with it].

Prevent the decrease of the moral strength and spirit of your army in retreat by well combined movements of an offensive character from time to time. To hold your ground and halt at the wrong time would be to complete your ruin; not to do so at all would be to convert a Retreat into a Rout.

§ 30. OF DEFILES.

To Defend a Defile, the Advanced Guard takes an advantageous position beforehand, sufficiently near the entrance of the pass to be supported upon the obstacles furnished by the Defile. The Reserve, and the greater portion of the Cavalry, should be posted at the exit from the Defile, so as to guard it, and to protect the retreat. Leave the Defile itself free, and let your Parks of Artillery remain behind it. Take some positions within the Defile, if possible; throw up some earth-works to cover your Batteries. Occupy all the knots (centres and crossings) of communication, and cover your flanks by detachments under precise and rigid orders.

Cavalry is but ill fitted for this kind of service, unless it has Cavalry to oppose.

In a high road, in a narrow passage of any length, effect, if you have time, deep cuts, from which the earth should be cleared so that the enemy should not perceive them. Establish cannon at 100 to 200 yards in the rear so as to cross their fire, if possible, upon these cuts. Throw round shot, if your guns can play along

the Defile for a certain distance; only use grape-shot when the head of the enemy's column is stopped by the cuts. Cross the fire of your Batteries at the exit from the Defile.

If you desire to prevent the enemy from coming out of the Defile, place yourself in the rear of it, and at the point most favourable for attacking him both in front and flank as he comes out.

To force the passage, endeavour to turn the Defile; send out Sharpshooters; make counter play, from a distance, with heavy guns, upon the pieces established in the Defile; bring light field pieces rapidly to bear against the Batteries placed in the rear of the Defile; establish them in succession, within grape-shot distance, in the greatest possible number. Form Columns of Attack.

§ 31. OF WOOD FIGHTING.

Defence.—Construct *Abattis* [see § 29,] at the principal issues of the Wood, and at all practicable corners or projections of it; open communications with your centre of action; defend the skirts of the Wood, which may enable you to discover the enemy at a distance; establish Artillery at the approaches and at the corners and projections. Bring up your Reserves near; employ Sharpshooters skilfully; form several Lines; take good care of your Flanks.

Attack.—Follow the ordinary rules for Attack on Positions; cover yourself with Sharpshooters; form small Columns; surprise the enemy's Flanks; employ heavy artillery, and cover it by proper use of the inequalities of the ground, by earthworks, by *Fascines* [long bundles of twigs and branches bound together, and used either to make a sort of wall of themselves, or to strengthen or line a wall of earth], and by trunks of trees; keep up a strong Rear Guard in order to protect your rear and your flanks.

[As to the PASSAGE OF A RIVER, see § 11.]

ADDITIONAL NOTE.

FROM THE WORKS OF THE LATE GENERAL SIR C. J. NAPIER.

[The following practical Observations, by one of the greatest authorities on War in the present century, will be found, perhaps, still more useful than the formal instructions in the "*Memorial*" for the proper understanding of General Keating's pamphlet. They are those of the late Sir CHARLES JAMES NAPIER (the first cousin of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, and a general who, in India and elsewhere, proved himself not only the equal, but, perhaps, the superior of the late Duke of Wellington); from whose Note-Book several valuable extracts have been published since his death by his scarcely less distinguished brother, Sir WM. NAPIER, in the first volume of his admirable *Life of the hero*. (See *Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier, G. C. B.*, by Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. Napier, K. C. B. Four vols. London: John Murray; 1857. Vol. 1; pp. 232 *et seq.*, 243; 250.) It will be observed, by the dates that these Notes were made during the Peninsular War.]

"1809. POPULAR WARS.—It is generally found that Wars arising from popular enthusiasm have been excited by oppression, bad government, or bad faith; in short, that the populace has good cause for anger. Those who wish to direct popular troops, and those also who are inclined to lend assistance, must be very cautious, or else resign caution entirely, risking all on chance. The heated imaginations of enthusiasts, who are generally weak men, see no reverses; each has victory in his own plan, and all will make mountains of mole-hills and mole-hills of mountains. The last is indeed a minor evil, *for a man may dare any danger successfully, but must never forget to estimate accurately his own powers*. FALSE ESTIMATES ARE THE CAUSE OF FAILURE IN ALL SUCH ENTERPRISES. Those who engage in them always exaggerate their numbers and resources, and TO DECEIVE YOURSELF IS TO FIGHT

FOR THE ENEMY. *Another cause of failure is, that when coming to action every man is confident in his own particular plan and will not give it up, or, at most, but coldly acts on his neighbour's plan: hence dissensions, the cry of 'traitors!' and all the evils of jarring interests.* MILITARY PLANS REQUIRE DESPOTISM. Great men may, when shackled by control, do much, but they would do more if unshackled.

"In popular wars you must not attempt to form armies, or combine movements, unless a powerful body of Regular Troops is already embodied; in which case a despotic government must direct all the operations. Spain [in the Peninsular War] furnishes the proof of this. Instead of attempting to meet the disciplined warriors of France in battle, she should have made a partizan war. Small corps of foot should have acted in the mountains, fought in the defiles, and watched the fords; small parties of cavalry should have eternally harassed the enemy's marches, and beat up his quarters when halted. At first these parties could not be too small; but in the towns every house should have barricades, be pierced with loopholes, and turned into a redoubt which its master should defend or die. Ten towns like Zaragoza or Gerona would save [have saved] Spain—one, if that were Madrid. In the plains forage might be destroyed or collected in towns. Cavalry could not get it in mountains occupied by active partizans, who, as they acquired experience, would gradually become formidable corps equal to combined movements. The armies of France could then only gain ground with loss of blood, and their system of concentration be unavailing. Armies in mass could not pursue a hundred men, the bodily endurance of the Spaniards would tell, and their losses be supplied by a present population, while those of France could only be repaired from a distance and scantily in comparison.*

"1810. COMMANDERS.—A Commander should concentrate his own forces, divide his enemies, and never think himself strong enough when he can be stronger. Yet he should remember that additional numbers do not always give strength.

"He should never voluntarily attempt anything where failure would be ruin, whatever be the temptation: he may however be

* [Spain did do so, and admirably well; had she not, neither Wellington nor Napier himself could have checked the Armies of France in this War. But she should have confined herself to this, and she suffered nothing but disaster for not having done so.]

forced to do so. *Attempt anything, the more daring the better, if you can bear defeat.* But:

“*Always when you do attack do it with all possible fury: be sudden and rapid, and if possible unexpected.*

“*Always attack if you cannot avoid an action.*

“*And when you do attack throw your whole power also upon one point, and let that point be a decisive one; the day is your own if it is carried; and your other points are safe, as the enemy cannot maintain his ground, much less advance, if the key of his position be in your power, even though he should be successful everywhere else. If the key point can be turned it is still better, and there are many ways of attacking a position abstractedly.*

“*Let your guiding principles be first to form plans of campaign on the largest scale possible; then to have your army compact, and your movements well combined, concentric, and rapid.*

“*If your enemy is strongest, fall on his weakest points and avoid his strong ones. If you are more powerful, fasten on his vitals and destroy him. If he is strong, provoke him to separate; if he is weak drive him to a corner.*

“*Never separate your own force unless your detachments are equal to the enemy's; and even then it is bad, though sometimes it must be done. The fable of the bundle of sticks ought always to be in a general's mind.*

“*The place to strike at your enemy is not so much where you are sure of success in battle, as where your blow will be decisive in the consequences. Suppose an army has only one road by which he receives supplies; if he preserves that, the beating his left or right or centre may be glorious, yet will be unavailing—he remains in the field: but once gain that road, and all is over. These things appear simple, but how few generals do we find able to act on them?*

“*Is your army of Cavalry or Infantry chiefly? If the former, take the open plains if you can. If the latter, an intersected country should generally be preferred; but that depends more on your enemy's force than your own, indeed on so many things that to say absolutely what should be done is folly—circumstances must direct. However the first of all objects is the Commissariat. Your troops may wrest arms out of the enemy's hands and if they fail they can run, but if they want food the game is up, they must surrender. The means of securing food must therefore be fixed, not left to chance or promises. The general should be sure, if it is in his power; if it is not, he must give up all at once;*

unless the nature of affairs demands the risking the destruction of his army. Lord Wellington did so in Portugal, whether properly or not is for those who know how things stood to judge—I do not.

“Discipline should be enforced with rigour; death is the only effectual punishment on service; the life of a criminal must not be thought of when it gains a point of far more importance than a post, in attacking which a hundred honourable men may fall. Discipline is necessary for health, for safety, for combinations, for keeping up numbers, seeing that the loss of men killed or taken singly from plundering and drink is inconceivable; policy and humanity to the wretched inhabitants of the seat of war command that marauders should die without mercy. But the supply of food must be sufficient or discipline goes, no man will starve for fear of being shot : the Commissary is the very life of an Army; if his department goes wrong the General can do nothing, disorganisation and disease follow his neglect.*

“A General should also watch the Drill of his Army, but that is the easiest part of his duty. Regiments must, however, take all means of perfecting and adapting it to the country acted in.

“With these precautions a general may take the field with confidence in himself, if he is also cautious, daring, active, deceitful, searching his enemy with spies in all directions, but giving little credit to their stories, save when corroborated by circumstances, or on proved fidelity. He should acquire accurate personal knowledge of the country, and make his staff departments do the same. When in movement, let him be careful to prevent his troops being kept standing long under arms; waiting either for quarters at the end, or for orders at the beginning of a march; nothing is more harassing to men and officers, nothing so likely to produce sickness in hot, cold, or wet climates. Seize all intoxicating liquors when they can be found, and let them be immediately distributed as far as may be without injury; if that can't be, destroy them, for to guard them with *English* troops is impossible. [!]

“Guard well against surprise; *to be surprised is inexcusable in a general*, if it happens from his neglect of proper posts: if his troops are surprised in good posts they must be in a dreadful state, which can hardly be the fault of any one but the general.

“Never call a council of war; a general is to command his officers,

* [Except Irishmen, at home, in “Famine” time, in the midst of a rich and plentiful harvest.]

not to obey them. This need not prevent his receiving the opinion of any officer, or of every officer, in regard to their peculiar duties. Leave every officer power and responsibility in his own post, according to his worthiness. A general publicly avows his embarrassments when he tells inferior officers he does not know what to do, and that they do: his army loses confidence, magnifies every difficulty, and either becomes panic-stricken or despises the chief, or both. In council also each will believe he knows better than his neighbour, and be dissatisfied if his advice is not followed. The man who says, do that because I order you, is obeyed with confidence and decision.

“As to fighting battles, Marshal Saxe said they were won by legs more than arms, and *certainly battles are decided by rapid well-directed marches more than anything else*; but I do not see much wisdom in the apothegm, for *it is the head, arms, and legs, united that win battles, and not any one of them.* The head has clearly the best share, for *the best legs and arms with a bad head will rarely conquer, whereas bad legs and arms with a good head may.*

“COMMANDER OF A REGIMENT.—He should *be steady in system*; that which demands change must be bad: *change is in itself an evil of magnitude.* He should *issue as few orders as possible*; there is scarcely a greater evil than long and frequent orders. He should enforce the orders he does issue; *a habit of obedience is the great spring of military arrangements*; but when subject to constant orders men’s minds, especially young minds, become fatigued and heedless; disobedience, or, at best, inattention, follows, for no commanding officer can be a constant spy on his officers—nor would it become him if he could. How, then, can this natural weakness of men’s minds be met? By not overloading them; by short, simple, and few orders; by seeing to their execution, and making severe examples of the disobedient in matters of consequence. *Sharp reprimands for slight neglects are necessary*, not because the matter signifies much in itself, but that a habit of disobedience grows, and steady checking makes men dread disobedience more than the trouble of duty: they reason thus—the orders are few, but necessary; I am bound in honour to obey them; and neglect subjects me to unpleasant treatment. When this feeling arises, a lieutenant-colonel has little to do beyond admonishing the careless; and on service he will find that, while others are overwhelmed with exertion and yet disobeyed, he, and those under him, scarcely feel the difference.

"This is real subordination, real responsibility. It is not saying to a lieutenant-colonel, 'I hold you responsible,' that succeeds; the same speech goes through each gradation to the drummer; and when the thing is not done, the lieutenant-colonel being responsible to the general, cannot say 'the major disobeyed me,' for that would bring the general and the drum-boy face to face to settle the matter, which would be the reverse of responsibility. *The colonel should be able to say to the general; I cannot see this order executed with my own eyes, but having taught my officers the necessity of obedience I will be responsible for its execution.* Here is the true 'chain of responsibility,' which is not to be found by throwing your own duty on the shoulders of your juniors.

"Let the commander do his own duty; that is the great secret: neither rewards nor punishments have so much effect as example. In battle a leader who cries 'Forward,' may see his men fly disgracefully; but he who, sword in hand, rushes on the enemy will generally be followed.

"The fewer reprimands the fewer punishments, and more effect; nothing more disagreeable to one's-self, nothing more useless than *scolding*—it is weak and contemptible. The voice of a commander should seldom be heard in anger, and then it will be feared and heeded; if frequent it will excite ridicule, often indignation: its course is first teasing, then impertinent, ungentleman-like, finally unjust and insulting; then an apology is due to the misused person, and you are no longer respected.

"ORDER OF BATTLE.—Jomini's method* of forming three lines by dividing regiments into three grand divisions, one behind another, would sacrifice fire and be unhandy. For English troops the single line, two deep, has been found strong enough. If men have solid nerve, that formation is sufficient; if they have not, three lines will equally fail, and the rear line will be shooting the front lines. *If you distrust your troops the column is best to break an adverse line,* because disorder and flight from line is destruction; whereas the most frightened troops can keep in a body, and be able to make terms if not able to resist with effect, and in the attack they force each other forward. *But no general rule can be given in these matters.* General Jomini seems, however, to be

* [General JOMINI has long been regarded as the first authority on military science; General Napier's criticism must, however, have been founded on experience, at least that of an *English* army.]

right as to keeping men more collected than they are, at least, in our [*i.e.*, the English] army. *Should I ever command an army* it shall be kept, so far as the ground will admit, in a wedge-like form, which may, according to circumstances, be compressed to an oblong, or displayed as a line.* When required to act, it may be done by companies, regiments, or brigades, according to the need. Six regiments are in line; twelve may follow in straight column behind each flank, or divergent in *echelon*; thus offering the oblong or the wedge form as the ground dictates. Behind the entire should march the reserve. This would give a pliability scarcely to be attained by any other formation, seeing that battle may be offered to the front, or obliquely, to the right or left, without inconvenience. The artillery and cavalry must be placed according to circumstances.

“CAVALRY.—Infantry grow accustomed to cavalry, but the tendency of cavalry is to become fearful: this a good general should take great pains to obviate. The infantry soon learn that close formation and steadiness gives them safety; they take advantage of ground, and thus gain confidence; but the cavalry must lose it, because they find the foot soldiers grow firmer in resistance, and delivering a closer fire. Thus attacks become more dangerous for man and horse, and both become faint-hearted until the dispute is decided by the complete superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sabre.† One simple fact will account for this. The foot soldier can kill his adversary at some hundred yards; the horseman cannot hurt his enemy until the latter is within reach of his sword, and then six foot soldiers are opposed to each file of horsemen! Is it fair to expect they should cope with such odds for any length of time?

“I do not mean that cavalry are not to charge infantry; *they must charge anything they are ordered to charge*, and they will frequently break and annihilate infantry: moreover, it may be requisite to charge with the certainty of defeat. These are not points becoming for cavalry to consider, they wholly belong to the

* [These admirable Notes were written when the illustrious general was still but a regimental officer, in 1813.]

† [Since these Notes of General Napier were written great improvements have taken place in the musket and bayonet. The present “Enfield Rifle,” so long, and so light to carry, is quite easily managed in fencing; and even without firing it is in dexterous hands all but a match for the sword in those of a practised swordsman.]

general ; my aim is to shew that infantry will have greater force in battle than cavalry. It may be said that artillery will break the infantry ; but the latter have artillery also, and *my decided opinion is that infantry, even in line, may oppose cavalry* ; particularly when accidents of ground cover their flanks, in want of which a company wheeled back will answer the purpose. I will go farther, and will, after a great deal of personal service in the infantry, say that *a line charged over by cavalry will, if the men do not endeavour to escape by flight, lose very few, and will finally beat the cavalry*. Artillery therefore makes little difference, and solid formations are not essential, though preferable. Cavalry may nevertheless act with prodigious effect accidentally—great conduct, and great misconduct, will not submit to principles.

“The great advantages of cavalry are these :—

“1st.—When an enemy is beaten, its use in pursuit is admitted.

“2nd.—If the enemy is victorious, cavalry covers the retreat. On this much may be said more than these Notes will admit of : their obvious services would be in flank attacks on the most forward of the pursuers ; ambuscades, &c. ; and also to save the rear from flank attacks ; but it would require more knowledge than I possess to say all that cavalry can do in a retreat.

“3d.—What cavalry can defend in a retreat they can attack in a pursuit : superiority in cavalry will therefore be very decisive in a battle or a campaign. For if the beaten army has it, by that superiority the general may palliate his losses, rendering them of small consequence. If the victorious general has the superior cavalry, he will probably gain more by the pursuit than the victory itself.

“4th.—The greatest effect on a campaign by the skilful use of Cavalry will be to employ it on the flank of an enemy, and even in his rear. Two points are thus gained. Your cavalry, having great tracts of ground to act in, is more easily supplied than when concentrated, and requiring supplies to come up to it instead of going to those supplies, meanwhile acting offensively. Again : your opponent is in constant fear for his supplies, and must send forces to protect them. If successful, the danger of attack renders the march slow, and weakens his army more than your cavalry detachment weakens you ; for his can only rejoin slowly with the convoys, while yours can rapidly rejoin the main body, and in combined movements a junction often requires but a very short march.

"Expeditions of this kind would form, and bring out, men of enterprise in every class; offering glory for officers, and non-commissioned officers, sufficient to create great emulation and intellectual exertion; exciting also in the privates a daring spirit for personal achievements of strength and courage."

[Long after writing these Notes, Sir CHARLES NAPIER was in command of the "Northern District" of England, as Major-General, on the occasion of the expected Chartist Insurrection, in 1839. It is impossible better to conclude this Appendix than by putting on record, here also, this great general's estimate of that kind of "physical force" which is the ordinary boast of the popular "agitator." The following pregnant extract from his *Journal* is taken from the second volume of Sir W. Napier's work—p. 69.

"August 6th.—The plot thickens. Meetings increase and are so violent, and arms so abound, I know not what to think. The Duke of Portland tells me there is no doubt of an intended general rising. Poor people! They will suffer.* They have set all England against them and their "physical force." Fools! We have the physical force, not they. They talk of their hundred thousands of men. Who is to move them when I am dancing round them with cavalry and pelting them with cannon-shot? What would their 100,000 men do with my 100 rockets wriggling their fiery tails among them, roaring, scorching, tearing, smashing all they come near? And when in desperation and despair they broke to fly, how would they bear five regiments of cavalry careering through them? Poor men! Poor men! How little they know of physical force!"

So might Napier have said had he been in Dublin during the "Club" mania of 1848. "*Who is to move them, when,*" &c! Numbers are *not* strength; they must be *organised* as well as armed; they must be *well led* as well as armed and organised. They must be not only brave, but disciplined; and *disciplined to obey*; and they must have a leader to *command* them. Let every word in all this APPENDIX be read by the light of these First Principles.]

* [Sir Charles Napier, remember, not only sympathised with the outraged democracy of England, but deliberately agreed with them upon the political principles expressed in the "Five Points" of the Charter."]

